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 Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory argues very low fertility results 
from the simultaneous processes of modernization and secularization. However, this 
theory has primarily only been examined in the Christian countries of Northern and 
Western Europe. The assumption that modernization and secularization are co-occurring 
processes may not apply in other non-European, non-Christian contexts. Notably absent 
are studies of Muslim-majority nations, where modernization has occurred separate from 
secularization because the primary interpretation of Islam views the pursuit of secular 
knowledge is as important as the pursuit of religious knowledge. Therefore, there is a 
critical need to examine the applicability of the SDT theory to fertility in a Muslim-
majority country. Using data from the 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Surveys 
of Turkey, and a series of regression models, I examine the independent and joint effects 
of modernization and secularization on married women’s parity, contraceptive use, and 
induced abortion receipt. Overall, I find mixed evidence concerning the effects of 
modernization and secularization on married women’s fertility behaviors. Modernization 
and secularization are independently associated with married women’s parity and 
abortion receipt. However, there modernization and secularization are jointly associated 
with married women’s contraceptive use and methods. I conclude that the specification of 
the SDT theory, that modernization co-occurs with secularization to allow more 
contraceptive use and more abortion, does not follow—and therefore does not—explain 
low fertility in the Muslim-majority country of Turkey.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
For almost a century, scholars have been examining fertility in countries around 
the world. Understanding fertility has been the focus of some of the largest social science 
data collection efforts (e.g., the World Fertility Surveys, Demographic and Health 
Surveys [DHS]). The motivation for these surveys was initially to identify the correlates 
of excess fertility in developing countries. In the last few decades, however, following 
declines in fertility in the countries outside of sub-Saharan Africa, such studies have been 
increasingly focused on understanding low fertility and its consequences (Morgan and 
Hagewen 2005).  
The most staggering examples of fertility decline are found in (Western) Europe. 
The simultaneous increase in modernization and secularization have been identified as 
having had a substantial role in the shift in Western European fertility behavior (Bruce 
2011; Chaves 1994; Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986; Martin 1978). 
Indeed, the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) theory was proposed to explain why 
fertility continues to decline in these nations and one chief component of this theory is 
that secularization (reinforced by modernization) leads to sustained very low fertility by 
disconnecting marriage and procreation (Lesthaeghe 2010).  
1.1 The Applicability of SDT Outside of Western Europe 
Although the experiences of Western Europe initially led to SDT being thought of 
as a global theory of fertility decline, there are several reasons to question its applicability 
outside of Western Europe. First, scholars have questioned whether secularization is 
inevitable and unfolds exactly as it did in Western Europe by pointing out different 
patterns in other regions (Berger 1999; Davie 2002; Rodney Stark and Iannaccone 1994). 
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Second, although very low fertility has generally been accepted as the future of all 
populations, there is evidence that modernization does not necessarily lead to fertility 
decline or very low fertility (e.g. Sub-Sharan and Muslim countries) (Heaton 2011). 
Overall, studies examining the relationship between secularization argument of Second 
Demographic Transitions (SDT) theory and fertility have been conducted mostly in 
Christian-majority nations, where modernization and secularization have occurred 
relatively simultaneously. Such studies have largely neglected developing Muslim-
majority nations, where modernization does not necessarily require secularization. 
Consequently, this study examined the applicability of the secularization component of 
SDT to fertility in a Muslim-majority nation, Turkey. 
Continued trends show fertility has declined to very low levels within European, 
North American, and developed Asian nations. These trends have concerned national 
governments because of the wide-ranging consequences of fertility. At the population 
level, low fertility (below replacement level [2.1 children]) leads to unbalanced age 
structure for populations in the near future and will result in smaller cohorts of younger 
people supporting larger cohorts of older people. The root causes of low fertility, as 
Durkheim specified, can be seen in the changes of cultural, social, and moral elements 
within societies (such as individualization and secularization) characterized by the 
modernization process (Durkheim, Sutcliffe, and Simons 1992; Lamanna 2002). It has 
been argued for decades—and is the central tenant of SDT—that human development 
(modernization) has loosened the power of religion (secularization) and both 
modernization and secularization negatively affected fertility rates (Kane 2013; Kirk 
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1996; Lesthaeghe 2010; Ron Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004; 
Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). 
A large body of work has shown that both modernization and secularization have 
negatively affected fertility rates (Kane 2013; Kirk 1996; Lesthaeghe 2010; R Lesthaeghe 
and Neels 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). These studies 
of fertility decline have primarily drawn on the Classic (or First) and Second 
Demographic Transition theories (DT and SDT, respectively) for almost a century 
(Lesthaeghe 1983; Thompson 1929). The demographic transition refers to fertility and 
mortality declines occurring in Western countries (Lesthaeghe 2010). During the first 
DT, fertility decline was caused by greater survival rates of children in the event of 
increased agricultural production, decreased value of children’s labor, due to 
technologically supported economic development, and increased parental investment in 
children, including education (Aries 1980). The motivation of the decline in fertility 
during the SDT included several ideational changes: self-actualization, individualization, 
and secularization (Lesthaeghe 2010). Because of those rapid changes in Western 
Europe, the trend of low fertility and the secularization of Europe was viewed as the 
future of human development globally (Durkheim 1902; Inglehart 1997; Weber 1973; 
Whimster and Lash 2014).  
On the other hand, many scholars have argued that European secularization and 
the accompanying low fertility have not been an inevitable result of modernization 
everywhere (Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008; Davie 2002; Finke and Stark 1998). 
Modernization has demonstrated evidence of the anticipated secularizing primarily in 
Europe and other English-speaking countries (Bickel 2017; Davie 2002). Many scholars 
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argue that the secularization of Europe, specifically secularization because of 
modernization, has occurred in Western-Christian Nations, and cannot be generalized to 
all social contexts because of different historical backgrounds and cultural values (Berger 
1999; Casanova 2011; Davie 2002). Similar to the secularization of Europe, in the 1990s 
scholars criticized the SDT theory as “an archetypical Western European feature,” not 
even expected to spread to the United States or other parts of Europe, let alone Asia 
(Lesthaeghe 2010). Furthermore, studies support the counterargument that the United 
States and many other developed and developing nations, show different characteristics 
in regard to secularization and fertility (Finke and Stark 1998; Frejka and Westoff 2008; 
Sasaki and Suzuki 1987). 
Both the SDT and secularization theories have been tested primarily in Christian-
majority nations. Because of the evidence observed both historically and currently in 
parts of Europe, secularization has largely been viewed as an unescapable result of 
modernization (Inglehart 1997; Kaa 2002; Lesthaeghe 2010). This generally accepted 
phenomenon might not be applicable to Muslim-majority nations for two reasons. First, 
many scholars argue that Islam values scientific knowledge as much as religious 
knowledge; thus, Islam does not sacrifice religiosity for modernization (Ibn-Khaldūn 
1969; Okumuş 2005; Sonn 2005). Second, because of the influences of historical 
colonization, many Muslim nations condemn secularity and view it, as well as modernity, 
as a device that destroys important Islamic values (Hoebink 1999). Therefore, examining 
Muslim nations might provide evidence that fertility change does not require the co-
occurrence of secularization and modernization.  
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Specifically, Turkey is an interesting Muslim-majority case for two reasons. First, 
it has not been colonized for more than 700 years, including the Ottoman era, meaning 
that the potential rejection of modernization due to its correspondence with colonialism 
does not apply. Second, Turkey has a secular state, where Westernized reforms were 
adopted, and the components of those reforms aiming to change traditional values were 
expelled. This historical preservation has allowed the Turkish people to retain most of 
their cultural and religious values. Thus, for Turkey modernization has not required 
secularization. Thus, in terms of testing the applicability of secularization component of 
the SDT theory to fertility in a Muslim-majority nation, Turkey is an ideal case study that 
advance the literatures. 
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation Project 
My overall goal in this project was to examine if the effects of different cultural 
and geographical social contexts create different levels of modernization, secularization, 
and thus fertility behaviors. Specifically, I sought to examine how Turkish context is 
influenced by both European and Eastern social contexts and how these other contexts 
affect demographic changes in the country. To do this, this dissertation investigated three 
indicators of fertility decline—specifically the number of children and the two proximate 
determinants of fertility, contraception and abortion (Bongaarts 1978)—by separating the 
primary components of modernization (education, egalitarianism, urbanization) and 
secularization. As I briefly reviewed above, and will elaborate on in the next chapter, 
modernization and secularization are jointly and negatively associated with fertility 
behaviors in modern Christian countries (Kane 2013; Lesthaeghe 2010), but I argue that 
this is not necessarily happening in Muslim nations in general, and specifically it is not 
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happening in Turkey. My central hypothesis is that the interaction between 
modernization and religiosity will not be significantly associated with indicators of 
fertility behaviors. For instance, the effect of woman’s religiosity on parity would not 
depend on her level of modernization including woman’s education, egalitarianism, and 
urban residency. In order to test this hypothesis, I used data from the 2008 and 2013 
Demographic and Health Surveys of Turkey (TDHS). 
1.3 Outline of the Proceeding Chapters 
This dissertation examines whether modernization and secularization are jointly 
or separately associated with the fertility behavior of married women in Turkey. In 
Chapter 2, I discuss the theoretical and empirical issues related with the secularization 
component of SDT theory on fertility, its implementation being largely limited to 
developed Christian nations, and why it is important to test its applicability in a different 
social context. Chapter 3 outlines the TDHS data and the methods used to whether 
secularization and modernization are jointly associated with fertility in Turkey. 
Modernization is specified as women’s education, egalitarianism, and urban residency.  
Secularization is specified (inversely) by adherence to religious practices. Chapters 4, 5, 
and 6 present the results of analyses between modernization, secularization, and their 
interaction for three fertility behaviors—parity, contraception use, and abortion use, 
respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of the findings from the three 
analytic chapters with an emphasis on the improvements to the literature, providing 
suggestions for government policies about low fertility in Turkey, and future research 
directions. 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
Low and declining fertility is a significant issue for nearly all developed and even 
many developing nations (United Nations 2011). Understanding demographic 
characteristics and trends remain critical for economic and population growth, yet they 
are the most difficult to forecast (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000). Governments must make 
plans for schools, roads, and revenue, for future health care needs and pensions. 
Businesses also need to forecast potential demands for goods and services (Hirschman 
and Tolnay 2005). Thus, low fertility—especially below replacement level— is a concern 
for most national governments because fertility rates are of vital importance for their 
socioeconomic development. 
Low fertility is a source of social and economic problems of modern countries 
(Morgan and Hagewen 2005). The negative effects of low fertility are largely due to the 
resulting changes in age structure of the population. Low fertility causes slow population 
growth rates for developed countries and is the main cause of population aging (an 
increasing average age of the population). Several studies indicate that the recent 
financial crises in Japan, the Asian “Tigers” (i.e., Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Hong Kong), and the United States were due to the shrinking young adult people (ages 15 
to 24) in these populations (Macunovich 2007). Young adults use significant educational 
investments; thus, failure to predict the shrinkage of this group may result in inefficient 
resources use and ultimately costs for governments.  
Population aging has implications for age-graded institutions, such as the labor 
force, social security programs, and even marriage. A decline in the proportion of 
working age adults relative to older adults increases the old-age dependency ratio, which 
means that the growing costs of public pensions and health care must be supported by a 
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smaller tax base (Doepke 2004). The gradually shrinking working-age population also 
negatively influences the economic performance of countries in the global market. Low 
fertility may even have a critical effect on marriage in some countries because traditional 
son preferences lead to imbalanced sex ratios, which in turn limits the availability of 
potential marital partners (Choe, Kim, and Lee 1993). Therefore, many developed 
countries are investigating the reasons for low fertility and trying to increase their fertility 
through social policies (Chesnais 1996).  
In the long term, if fertility continues to decline, as projected in some countries, 
population growth becomes negative and population decline starts. When the total 
fertility rates declines below the replacement rate of 2.1, the population will begin to 
experience natural decrease. Even a small drop below replacement rate can be 
consequential. For example, a total fertility rate of 1.9 means that with each generation 
the size of the population will shrink by 5%. These effects compound over time meaning 
that a negative growth rate can drastically reduce population size (assuming there is no 
immigration) in a relatively short time. For example, if today’s fertility rates in Europe 
remain stable, the European population will decrease by 199 million—nearly 25%—by 
2100 (United Nations 2013). Historically the concern with underpopulation has centered 
on its effects on international economic and political power. Today, many developed 
countries are afraid that their declining populations are undermining their power and that 
they will be economically, politically, and culturally eclipsed by developing or recently 
developed countries–given that the later are currently experiencing substantial population 
growth (Gerland et al. 2014; Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). However, recent statistics 
show that low fertility and underpopulation are not the problem of only developed 
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countries, they have the potential to become a global issue (Bongaarts and Bulatao 2000; 
Morgan 2003; United Nations 2003).  
2.1 Causes of Global Fertility Decline   
For more than a century, in almost all developed countries, fertility decline 
followed moderation and was thought to be part of a universal demographic transition. 
The fertility effects of socioeconomic factors associated with modernization have been 
well documented (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000). For instance, women’s 
education is negatively associated with fertility. In early work seeking to understand the 
causes of fertility change,  Bongaarts (1978)  argued that in order to understand how 
socioeconomic development affected fertility behaviors, it was necessary to focus on the 
intervening behavioral and biological factors responsible for fertility  Bongaarts (1978) 
designated these factors the Proximate Determinants of Fertility (PDF).  
The PDF encompass 8 factors: 1) Proportion married, 2) Contraceptive Use, 3) 
Induced Abortion, 4) Frequency of intercourse, 5) Lactational infecundity. 6) Sterility 
and infecundity, 7) Spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and 8) Duration of the fertile 
period. The first four variables (proportion of married, contraceptive use, induced 
abortion, and frequency of intercourse) are the behavioral factors, while the remaining 
four variables are biological factors. Subsequent research has shown that the behavioral 
factors have the greatest potential to be affected by socioeconomic, cultural, and 
environmental processes (Bongaarts 1993), while the biological factors remain relatively 
constant across populations. Moreover, given the limited fertile period each month, 
subsequent studies have shown the frequency of sexual intercourse is only weakly 
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associated with fertility, especially relative to the proportion married in developing 
countries or the proportion sexually active in develop countries (Stover 1998).  
The three prime behavior factors that are associated with fertility are described as 
follows. The proportion married, limited to those of reproductive age, captures those 
who are risk of pregnancy due to regularly engaging in sexual intercourse (Bongaarts 
1978). Although nonmarital sexual activity is of importance in many developed countries 
(and more so than marriage; Stover 1998), the focus of this study is Turkey where nearly 
all sexual activity and births happen within marriage (TDHS 2013). Contraceptive use 
includes “any deliberate parity-dependent practice—including abstention and 
sterilization—undertaken to reduce the risk of conception” (Bongaarts 1978:107). 
Induced abortion includes any action that purposely ends the normal progress of 
pregnancy before its due date (Bongaarts 1978).  
Although the original specifications of the PDF were for population-level 
indicators (e.g., proportion of pregnancies ending in induced abortion), they have 
parallels at the individual-level (e.g., use of abortion). In the current study, therefore, I 
investigate the association between individual-level indicators of modernization and 
secularization and behaviorally indicators of fertility: parity, contraceptive use, and 
induced abortion use. Given that most sexual behavior and nearly all fertility in Turkey is 
marital (TDHS 2013), this study examines these factors only among married women. 
2.2 Modernization, Secularization, and Fertility 
The classic theory of secularization claims that the modernization process —
including developments in technology, economy, and education—decreases the 
importance of religion until it no longer has any influence on private and social life 
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(Bruce 2011; Wilson 2003). Many scholars have  consequently assumed that the decline 
in religious practice changes family behaviors by increasing the influence of the desire 
for self-fulfillment, which guides union formation and reproductive choices (Van de Kaa 
1987; Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988).  
Reproductive behaviors are often investigated under the guidance of classic 
Demographic Transition (DT) theory. DT theory was derived from the observed 
historical fertility and mortality changes shaped by modernization as they occurred in 
Western and Northern Europe (Notestein 1953). The DT refers to the process of fertility 
and mortality decline (Lesthaeghe 2010). During the early stages of DT, fertility and 
mortality are high until agricultural production causes mortality decline. As soon as 
humans could produce surplus food, we had the caloric reserves to fight off routine 
infection, which drastically reduced the infant mortality rate; thus, fertility declined 
because not as many children were needed on the whole to ensure that some would 
survive to adulthood.  
During the later and post-transition stages of the DT, fertility decline was caused 
by industrialization, urbanization, and technologically supported economic development. 
Fertility rates declined to at or below the replacement level (2.1 children) because of the 
decreased the value of children’s labor and increased parental investment in children’s 
education (Aries 1980). These changes not only caused very low fertility (VLF), but also 
resulted in ideational changes, the focus of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) 
(Lesthaeghe 1983, 2014). SDT theory argues that the cause behind VLF is individual 
self-fulfillment, individualization, and secularization (Lesthaeghe 2010). Thus, critical 
changes in Western Europe precipitated the trend of VLF and modernization, with 
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secularization in Western Europe accepted as a by-product of future global human 
development (Durkheim 1902; Inglehart 1997; Weber 1973). 
2.2.1 Modernization and Secularization 
Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1973) define modernization as a group of social 
processes occurring in the recent history to adapt all elements of society to technological 
and economic growth. There are various processes accepted as components of 
modernization, but education, egalitarianism, and urbanization are generally viewed as 
key components of modernization (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; White 
et al. 2008). Those social processes—including changes in economic, political, and social 
institutions—highlight the interrelatedness of institutions; during modernization the 
changes in one institution reciprocally influence other key institutions (Black 1976). For 
example, the modernization of economic and political institutions of Europe during 
industrialization triggered the decline of the social importance of religion (Berger 1999; 
Martin 1991). Therefore, many scholars emphasize European modernization and 
secularization––the latter as a result of modernization––as reciprocal and co-occurring 
worldwide (e.g., Inglehart 1997). 
Secularization refers to a social process in which the social significance of 
religion declines (Chaves 1994; Wilson 1985). Although definitions vary across studies 
and scholars, there is a fair degree of consensus on multidimensionality of secularization 
(Dobbelaere 1981, 1985, 1987). In this study, secularization will be defined in two 
overlapping ways. First, I will use secularism as defined as an institutional-level process 
by which religion loses its authority over other institutions (Wilson 1985). This process is 
also accepted as the differentiation of institutions, which is at the macro level 
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(Tschannent 1991). Second, I use secularization to mean the individual- or micro-level 
process by which church, mosque, or temple attendance and religious beliefs of 
individuals decline and lose their value in daily life (Tschannent 1991). This distinction is 
important to this proposed study, which tests the effects of secularization, as a result of 
modernization. 
Scholars have viewed modernization and secularization as inextricably linked 
social phenomena in the Western Christian world (Bruce 2002; Casanova 2011; Lamanna 
2002). They have commonly argued modernization and secularization as having a 
reciprocal relationship, but secularization is seen as the result of modernization in 
secularization theory—where “modernization necessarily leads to a decline of religion, 
both in society and in the minds of individuals” (Berger 1999:2, 2012). McLeod and 
Ustorf (2003) define secularization theory as “the decline in the social significance of 
religion [at social and individual-levels] as a long-term and inevitable historical process, 
with short-term accelerants (such as enlightenment… industrialization and urbanization) 
….” (p. 37).  More specifically, the secularization process among all other things has 
been accepted as an inescapable consequence of modernity in Christian, Western nations: 
“to be secular means to be modern, and therefore by implication, to be religious means 
not yet fully modern” (Casanova 2011:59). This understanding of modernity with 
secularization in Western Christian nations, as an applicable paradigm to all nations, 
takes for granted a universal transition of human development (Wilson 1966, 2016). 
2.2.2 Fertility 
Many scholars have argued that modernization has loosened the power of religion 
(secularity) for individual behavior, thus both modernization and secularization are key 
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factors for declining fertility (Kane 2013; Kirk 1996; Norris and Inglehart 2004). 
Durkheim specified that the root cause of low fertility is demonstrated in the changes of 
cultural, social, and moral elements (such as individualization and decline of religious 
authority) of societies affected by the modernization process (Durkheim 1902; Lamanna 
2002). Various aspects of modernization––including industrialization, urbanization, 
greater education attainment, female employment, egalitarian ideology, and 
secularization––are used to explain low fertility, all of which co-occur with 
technologically enhanced economic growth (Berger et al. 1973; Notestein 1945). 
2.3 Modernization and the Movement toward Low Fertility 
2.3.1 Demographic Transition Theory 
Even though Notestein (1945, 1953) is generally known as the founder of the 
concept of the demographic transition, Thompson (1929) offered the three-stage 
explanation of demographic transition before Notestein. The beginning of the DT starts 
with high birth and mortality rates where both are unstable. As shown in Figure 2.1, this 
period of time is called pre-transition stage 1 (Thompson 1929). The second stage started 
with the decline of the mortality rates (see Figure 2.1) and rapid population growth—first 
with increased agricultural production and then later with improvements in health and 
sanitation (Notestein 1945; Thompson 1929). Because of this development in agriculture 
and medicine, the proportion of the population who survived to reproductive age 
increased, along with their life expectancy. In the third stage, fertility begin to decline 
from very high levels to replacement level given the increased probability of survival and 
the increasing socioeconomic costs for rearing children that accompany economic 
development (Notestein 1945, 1953; Thompson 1929). In the fourth stage, both the 
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fertility and mortality rates have declines to low levels and the size of the population is 
stable.  
The fourth stage of DT theory illustrates the effects of modernization on fertility 
rates and the potential for fertility to decline below replacement level. Today’s typical 
small families were shaped by industrialization and urbanization of European societies. 
As Notestein (1953) argued, urbanization pushed the family into new roles in 
industrializing society. Employment in factories allowed individuals to stand on their 
own accomplishments (Coale and Hoover 1958). The anonymity of urban life also 
increased the individualization through reducing family and community pressures to 
practice traditional behaviors.  
In addition, rapid changes in technology required new skills and provided new 
opportunities for individuals to advance their education and to discover rational thought 
around human existence (Notestein 1953). As a consequence of changes brought about 
by urbanization and secularization, the cost of rearing children increased; developments 
in hygiene and medicine kept mortality decline very low, and decreased the incentives of 
having many children (Notestein 1953). Because of these changes in modernization 
process including the development of modern contraceptive methods and induced 
abortion, women had new opportunities, such as participating in work life and education, 
both less compatible with childbearing (Notestein 1953). 
2.3.2 Second Demographic Transition Theory 
Classic DT Theory specified that fertility would stabilize at replacement-level. By 
the 1960s, however, there was growing evidence that fertility was continuing to decline 
in many developed counties.  Lesthaeghe (Lesthaeghe 2014) positied that a Second 
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Demographic Transion (SDT)—denoted by below replacement level fertility and a wider 
range of union formation behaviors—has been triggered by series of “revolutions”: (1), 
the development of modern contraceptive methods, including hormonal regulation and 
more efficient IUDs; (2) the questioning of traditional gender roles; and (3) the rejection 
of authority, specifically religion. The overall outcome of these revolutions––the 
postponement of marriage and having the first child, increased cohabitation and divorce 
rates, and the rarity of higher parity births (four or more) ––was the emergence of fertility 
far below replacement level or Very Low Fertility.  Although a combination of many 
factors lead to low and VLF, SDT theory typically focuses on women’s education, gender 
ideology, urbanization (as components of modernization), and secularization to explain 
VLF rates. 
2.3.2.1 Women’s Education 
A number of studies have shown that women’s education is negatively associated 
with their number of children (Basu 2002; Colclough 1982; Kazembe 2009; Lutz and Kc 
2011; Strauss and Thomas 1995). Better educated women have greater decision-making 
power over reproduction (in part because they tend to marry highly educated men who 
have similar fertility preferences) and possess more knowledge about how to access and 
effectively use contraception (Basu 2002; Cleland and Rodriguez 1988). Better educated 
women also face higher opportunity costs from the resulting disruption to employment 
that comes with childbearing (Becker 1981). In developing countries, more educated 
women have greater confidence that their children will survive and this is negatively 
associated with parity (Basu 2002; Cohen 2008; Lutz and Kc 2011). The negative 
association between a woman’s level of education and the overall birth rate accounts in 
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part for the decline in the total fertility rate of societies with greater levels of female 
higher education (Cohen 2008; Martin 1995).  
Lutz and KC (2011) show that women’s education (specifically secondary 
education) is negatively associated with child mortality and birth rates, but the effect of 
women’s education on fertility rates might vary by countries. Education and religion are 
inversely related (Berger 2011; Sherkat 1998), although this varies across countries. 
Directly relevant to the current study is the fact that the effect of education on fertility is 
lower in Muslim-majority countries than it is in Christian-majority countries (Heaton 
2011).   
2.3.2.2 Egalitarian Ideology 
Changing economic structure, increasing education, and greater employment 
opportunities for women with modernization are associated with changes in both gender 
role ideology (Lesthaeghe 2010; Notestein 1953). Specifically, increasing egalitarian 
ideology is associated with declines in fertility (McDonald 1992, 1994)   It is well 
documented  that a traditional, less egalitarian,  ideology supports having children at 
earlier ages, which leads to higher rates of fertility (Bongaarts 1978; Stewart 2003), while 
an egalitarian gender ideology is associated with postponing marriage and consequently  
postponing first birth (Cunningham et al. 2005). Moreover, Kaufman (2000) found that 
women with egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles are less likely to actualize their 
intention to have children than are women with a more traditional ideology. 
Generally, consistent with the premises of SDT theory, studies reveal a negative 
association between egalitarian gender ideology and religiosity (Abouchedid and Nasser 
2007; Hertel and Hughes 1987; Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991). However, again the 
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strength of this association varies across countries. Limited prior research has 
demonstrated, for example, the effect of ideational changes on fertility in some Muslim-
majority countries even though there are high levels of religiosity. Specifically, 
increasing egalitarian ideology in Iran provided greater decision-making power for 
women within the family and decreased their fertility from 6.5 children to below 
replacement level in a short period of time (Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, and Hosseini-
Chavoshi 2009).   
2.3.2.3 Urbanization 
Urbanization has been one of the commonly used indicators of modernization 
because of its wide availability and easy comparability (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2002). The pattern of lower fertility in urban areas than in rural areas has been 
observed for all developing and developed countries (Heaton, Lichter, and Amoateng 
1989; Kulu 2005, 2006; Tromans, Natamba, and Jefferie 2009). The urbanization effect is 
particularly pronounced for higher parity births (Kulu 2013). White and colleagues 
(White et al. 2008) argue that the high opportunity costs and price of housing in urban 
areas are main factors discouraging high fertility, as well as the easier access to 
contraceptive methods in urban areas that encourage the postponement of parenthood.   
Cities (urban areas) are a monument of modern (secular) values (Ron Lesthaeghe 
and Neels 2002). As Tönnies emphasized, societies, in this case urban life style, promote 
secularization, individualization and self-actualization that all favor childlessness or 
fewer children. (Wilson 1998) also argued that secularization is an inevitable thrust as a 
consequence of other changes in a social structure in modern societies. A number of 
19 
 
studies show that urbanization is negatively associated with both religiosity and fertility 
(Gries and Grundmann 2015; Hay 2014; Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; Steinhoff 2011). 
2.3.2.4 Secularization 
In addition to modernization, which is negatively associated with religiosity, SDT 
theory also considers secularization as an important factor accounting for VLF rates 
(Lesthaeghe 2014; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Secularization was observed during 
modernization of Europe and accelerated fertility decline to VLF (Lesthaeghe 2010). 
There is a general agreement on the role of religion in affecting behaviors of marriage 
and fertility through traditional family values, importance of parenthood, and gender 
roles (Goldscheider and Kaufman 2006; Hayford and Morgan 2008). The modernization 
process of Western Europe, for instance, reduced the pressure of community toward 
traditional values and gave a way to individualistic and self-fulfilling behaviors that 
proceeded in parallel with the fertility decline (Kirk 1996). Secularization is clearly 
connected with modernization and also associated with declining fertility (Coale and 
Watkins 1986). 
More than most other social institutions, religion creates moral codes to guide 
individual behaviors, including sexual behaviors, roles of men and women, and the 
importance of the family in society (McQuillan 2004; Wallwork 1985). There are 
religious rules and norms that directly regulate fertility behaviors through the PDF. 
Additionally, broader values indirectly influence fertility behaviors through conservative 
family ideology, such as the importance of marriage and parenthood (Hayford and 
Morgan 2008). Religious values, however, have been losing their power on individual 
behaviors, specifically fertility behaviors, because of self-actualization and 
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individualization, both observed in modernizing and modern societies since 
industrialization (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Wallwork 1985).  
There is widespread agreement among scholars that rising secularization head led 
to declines in fertility and population growth (Frejka and Westoff 2008; Lesthaeghe 
2010; Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The association 
between secularization and individual fertility behaviors at the individual-level is quite 
clear with, for example, Kane (2013) finding that increase in secularization was 
associated with decreased final parity. Indeed, a number of studies have shown—
consistent with SDT theory—that secularization and the decline of religious authority are 
a substantial cause of very low fertility in developed societies (Kane 2013), especially in 
Europe (Lesthaeghe 2010; Ron Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002; Mcdonald 2006; Moors 
2008; Ogden and Hall 2004). 
2.4 SDT and the European Case 
2.4.1 Fertility 
The transition from high to low fertility is not only “the result of cost-benefit 
structure of each additional child… but a strong correlate of other indicators of a shift in 
the ideational system” in Western Europe (Lesthaeghe 1983:412). Many scholars argue 
that the relationship between fertility and religion has been changing because of 
increasing secularization from one generation to the next (Van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 
1983; Nitzan 2016). Nitzan (2016) examined religious structures in France, the 
Netherlands, and Britain between 1930 and 1965, and the effect of these (including 
religion and practice variable) on completed (or near completed) family size across 
cohorts of women. This study found that, the proportion of regular (church) attendees 
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declined from older to younger cohorts in both Britain and France. Among later-born 
cohorts in France, non-practicing women have lower fertility than practicing Catholic 
women. Fertility levels for both nominal Catholic and non-affiliated women also 
continued to decline to below-replacement levels, 1.9 and 1.7, respectively. Fertility 
levels among nominal Catholic women in the Netherlands showed a decline from 2.6 to 
1.8 children on average. In Britain, the role of religion on explaining fertility differences 
among new generations is diminishing, although Nitzan argues this is a temporary 
situation. 
Modernization and secularization, the two primary components of SDT, have had 
a strong influence on the VLF rates observed in Europe. Indeed, this strong 
correspondence is exhibited by my own analyses using the European Value Surveys 
(EVS) 2008 (see Appendix A).  The mean number of children born in all European 
countries was 1.69 in the 2008 EVS, well below the replacement level. Among female 
respondents who are age between 16 and 49 in the EVS (N = 15,049), religiosity—
including religious service attendance, belief in God, prayer outside of religious services, 
and the importance of religion in respondent’s life—were all positively associated with 
number of children (Model 1 in Table A.1 in Appendix A), whereas education was 
negatively associated with parity both all women and married women’s parity (see Model 
2 in Table A.1 in Appendix A). In these analyses, I included control variables for women’ 
employment, income level, and age. Furthermore, the interaction between a summated 
scale of these religiosity variables and education showed a statistically significant and 
negative association with the number of children, in both the full sample of women 
(Model 3, p < 0.050) and in a sample limited to ever married women (Model 4, p < 
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0.050) (see Figure A.1 in Appendix). These findings support the secularization 
component of SDT theory and the argument of Lesthaeghe (2010, 2014) that 
modernization and secularization have an interdependent relationship and joint effects on 
fertility. 
2.4.2 The Link between Modernization and Secularization 
The secularization model is supported by much empirical evidence because 
secularization and modernization have progressed simultaneously in Western and Central 
European countries (Casanova 2011; Davie 2002, 2000), as well as some English-
speaking countries. As the economic and political modernization of Europe accelerated, 
religion lost its significance in the public sphere, and religious behaviors were pushed to 
private life (Berger 1992; Martin 1991).  
For years, scholars have argued that many nations in Europe are experiencing 
secularization at both institutional and individual levels, including decline in church 
attendance, in belief, and in significance of religion in public life (Berger 1967; Wallace 
1966). Wilson (1982) argues that Europe has lost the social significance of religious 
consciousness, actions, and institutions. The spread of modernity and rationalization 
eclipsed religion (Wallace 1966). More specifically, the demise of religion and its loss of 
influence was predicted (Wilson 2016, 1985). Even though key secularization theorists 
remain cautious about claiming the disappearance of individual practices and beliefs, they 
view secularization as an inevitable change of modernization (Bruce 2011; Wilson 2016).  
For example, a study of 30 European countries revealed that secularization theory 
remains applicable to many European countries (Halman and Draulans 2006). The 
authors used religious belief and religious practices as dependent variables to measure the 
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effects of both individual and aggregate level variables. Findings show that 
modernization (level of education, women in paid employment, globalization, and GDP) 
has changed the role of the church and of religion generally in Europe (Halman and 
Draulans 2006). In particular, Halman and Draulans (2006) found that women in paid 
employment were less religious than their unemployed counterparts. Moreover, both 
globalization and the wealth of societies were negatively associated with their religiosity. 
Even though a secularization process can be observed throughout Europe, the speed of 
the process varies from one society to another. For instance, Halman and Draulans (2006) 
also found that “believing without belonging” to a denomination was common in the 
Netherlands, Estonia, and Latvia, but that the Czech Republic and Estonia were the most 
secular societies, according to the percentages of non-religious and non-churchgoers.  
Data from the 1999 to 2004 and 2008 European Value Surveys show that people 
in Western Europe and some central European countries are less likely to find religion 
important in their lives, believe in God, and attend religious services. Specifically, Figure 
2.2 shows that the percentage of people who believe in God higher in the Eastern and 
Southern European countries, while it is lower in the Western and Northern European 
countries (except Ireland). Figure 2.3 shows a decrease in percentage of people who find 
religion important in their lives in almost all European countries, but especially so in the 
Western and Northern countries. Lastly, Figure 2.4 shows that religious service 
attendance is quite low, mostly varies between 5% and 20% (exceptions being Italy, 
Poland, and Turkey). Overall, the EVS indicate that religiosity in Western and Northern 
Europe (which are the most developed countries) is considerably lower than in the rest of 
European. 
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These maps from the 2008 European Values Survey support the idea that 
secularization and modernization are intertwined in Europe, although there is some 
variation across countries. The fact that modernization and secularization  co-occurred 
lead to an assumption that Europe’s modernization would be replicated in other regions 
(Martin 1991). This European view of the modernization process specifies secularization 
as a necessary and automatic result of modernization (Bruce 2002; Dobbelaere 1981). 
2.5 Secularization Outside of Europe 
Although scholars have traditionally argued that modernization and secularization 
are inevitably connected, this idea is now losing support from many sociologists and 
historians (Berger 1999; Cox and Swyngedouw 2000; Iannaccone, Stark, and Finke 1998; 
McLeod and Ustorf 2003). Therefore, we might study other social contexts to understand 
whether the European modernization and secularization dynamics are applicable 
elsewhere. North America, Latin America, and Islamic Middle East are distinct areas 
worth examining (Martin 1991:470). Empirical research has shown that secularization in 
North America and Asia differ considerably from Europe (Davie 2002; Finke, Guest, and 
Stark 1996; Sasaki and Suzuki 1987). The Islamic Middle East, however, has been left 
largely unexplored by sociologists of religion (partially because of limited data on 
religion and religious practices; Colonna and Macey 1995). 
2.5.1 Secularization in the United States 
Secularization in the United States is quite different than in Europe (Berger et al. 
2008; Stark and Finke 2000). There—at least nominally—the separation of church and 
state in the United States. The separation in this sense differs from most European 
nations; for instance, U.S. presidents and legislators swear an oath on the Bible or other 
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religious text. Moreover, at an individual level, even though the secularization argument 
remains an unsettled issue, Finke and Stark (1998) argue that pluralism is key to the 
higher church attendance in the United States than in Europe. One could argue that 
pluralism leads to secularization (Bruce 2002; Quinn et al. 1982), though Stark, 
Iannaccone, and Finke (1996) make the opposite argument, claiming that secularization 
in this sense is replaced by the pluralism of American religion, which includes many 
religious organizations available in a free market. 
On the other hand, Bruce (Bruce 2002) argues that decline of religion is 
happening in most Western countries including the United States. Bruce (2002) connects 
the secularization with modernization. Specifically, Bruce (2002) claims that the 
weakening of religious power in public relationships also affects individuals’ thoughts 
and behaviors, specifically less belief in God, lower church attendance, and less use of 
prayer, which is exhibited in many Western nations (e.g., the United States, Quinn et al. 
1982). Contrary to Finke and Stark (1989), Quinn and his colleagues (1982) found a 
negative association between religious pluralism and church attendance. The debate on 
secularization is still an ongoing process, but Bruce argues that increasing secularization 
does not mean that religion will eventually disappear but points out that when religion 
loses its influence on individuals, it will be a lot harder to regain its power back. 
Furthermore, Bruce (2002) agrees with Finke and Stark (1989) that religion in the United 
States is stronger than in most other Western countries because it is deregulated. 
These arguments above show that secularization in the United States varies 
somewhat form the European case. For example, negatively correlation of pluralism with 
religiosity is mostly accepted in European countries, whereas the effect pluralism in 
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North America on religious practices has still being debated because of high religiosity in 
most North America countries (Finke et al. 1996; Finke and Stark 1989; Halman and 
Draulans 2006; Johnson and Ross 2009; Olson 1998). Secularism in the United States 
allows the co-existence of different religious institutions (pluralism), and the coexistence 
of both religious and secular discourses; thus, the North American case shows religion 
and modernity as compatible, contrary to Western and Northern Europe.  
2.5.2 Secularization in Latin America 
Latin America provides a quite different case, with a large and growing Christian 
population (Johnson and Ross 2009). At first glance, it appears as if religion and 
modernity are absolutely disconnected, as they are in much of Southern Europe (Berger 
1999, 2014; Martin 1991). However, although a few Latin American societies have “an 
explicit secularization of everyday consciousness,” the Christianity has maintained its 
hold in the majority of Latin American societies (Martin 1990, 1991:8). 
The Latin American case entails a combination of European and North American 
patterns, with some variations across counties  On the one hand, Uruguay clearly 
resembles European cases where a huge part of society has distanced itself from the 
Church (Martin 1991). On the other hand, many Latin American societies have enjoyed 
the religious competition because of the explosion of some religious movements, such as 
Protestantism (Berger 2014). The majority of Latin American countries, especially Brazil 
and Chile, make good examples of the free religion market. Modernizing Latin America 
demonstrates “modernity lead[ing] to pluralism,” rather than to secularization (Berger 
2014:20). As in the United States case, the Latin America case shows that the relationship 
between modernization and secularization in Europe is not a universal phenomenon.  
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2.5.3 Secularization in Asia 
Asia also fits uneasily into the Western European conceptualization of 
secularization, in part due to the a large regional gap between South and East Asia 
concerning the percentage of non-affiliated people (Reed 2007). Most South Asian 
respondents profess to have a religious identity, while East Asian respondents with no 
religious identity ranged from 18.6% to over 70% (Reed 2007). These findings could be 
interpreted to mean that East Asia (which includes most developed nations of Asia) is 
following the same track as Europeans with modernization and secularization. Reed 
(2007), however, found that affirmative answers to a belief in a spiritual world ranged 
from 49.3% in China to 72.3% Taiwan, and high levels of support for the involvement in 
weddings and funerals of religious professionals (such as imam, priest, and monk) and 
institutions (such as the mosque, church, temple, and shrine).  
Again, these findings suggest that high levels of modernization are compatible 
with high levels of religiosity; they also support the argument in Asia that Western 
modernity should not simply be accepted as a whole, but instead it is possible for 
countries to adopt the parts of modernity that work for them and to reject the others 
(Berger 2014).  For example, Japan, one of the most developed countries still has retained 
key elements of traditional Japanese culture (Berger 2014). Shintoism not only persists, 
but it has been revitalized in Japan, helping people to cope with the transitions that 
modernity has brought (Cox and Swyngedouw 2000). Even though Japan is generally 
considered as a very secular nation, the evidence above shows that religiosity and 
modernization can coexist together. 
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South Korea provides a similar case. Contrary to most other industrialized 
societies, the social power of religion there has reflected the growth of the religious 
organizations in South Korea (Kim 2002). Modernization has not weakened the power of 
religious organizations. Even though almost half (46%) of the Korean people have no 
official religious affiliation, church attendance among Catholics and Protestants in South 
Korea is higher than among their counterparts in the United States (Gallup-Korea 1998). 
South Korea, similar to other East Asian nations, is a secular society with a high demand 
for religious services (Reed 2007). These findings also show that the association between 
modernization and secularization can vary from country to country, indicating that 
secularization is not inevitable in all nations. 
To summarize, studies conducted in North and South America, Asia, and many 
other modern societies suggest that the model of European secularization need not 
describe the future for all modernizing and modern countries (Finke et al. 1996; Kim 
2002; Sasaki and Suzuki 1987). Different cultural and political backgrounds provide 
different meanings to the concepts of secular, secularism, and secularity; thus, multiple 
secularities occur depending on structural conditions and cultural frameworks (Wohlrab-
Sahr and Burchardt 2012). As Stark (1999) argues, it would be wishful thinking to view 
the European secularization model as a global certainty. As the evidence above shows, it 
is important to test the applicability of secularization arguments in different and 
unexplored contexts because the association between modernization and secularization 
varies from country to country. 
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2.5.4 Secularization in Muslim-majority Nations 
Given the variation across regions, it is worth considering whether secularization 
and VLF are unique to Europe. Secularism and secularization were clearly an important 
result of European modernization, which negatively affects fertility. Despite the general 
claim that the secularization of Europe is the inevitable fate of all religions, many 
scholars argue that religiosity is increasing worldwide, except in Western and Northern 
Europe (Berger 1999; Davie 2002, 2000). Further, the secularization of Western and 
Northern Europe has been considered as a primary reason for low fertility (Lesthaeghe 
1983, 2010). Based on the arguments above, secularization and VLF might be viewed as 
characteristic of Christian Europe but not elsewhere. 
The Western model of modernization was generally accepted as a global process 
that leads to the secularization of societies (Lerner 1958; Wilson 1985, 2016). Muslim-
majority counties provide a different context—on that has been largely unexplored—
where we might also expect modernization only to be weakly associated with 
secularization. Even though the primary interpretation of Islam has nothing against 
modernization or development, many colonized Muslim countries rejected European 
modernization (Martin 1991), not because of modernizing per se, but because of its 
European roots; Europeans had invaded their countries and attacked their traditional 
values (Saeed 1994). On the other hand, many elites from Muslim-majority countries 
have viewed European modernization as a salvation for their countries and implemented 
reforms, including secularization, to achieve European modernization without any desire 
or commitment from major elements of society (Göle 1997; Hoebink 1999). It is 
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important to elucidate these as two approaches to modernization, to understand better the 
modernization progress of Muslim-majority nations. 
The first approach, mostly a reaction to colonization experiences, rejects the 
modernization of the Muslim-majority society. European modernization has had 
important effects on developed and developing Middle Eastern countries; nonetheless, 
European modernization is unwelcome to many Middle Eastern countries given the 
history of colonization (Saeed 1994). The colonization period left many negative 
impressions about European modernization on colonized peoples. For example, colonial 
powers oppressed Muslim populations in colonized Muslim countries by imposing 
Western values as a central to conditions of modernization, while also labeling Islamic 
and traditional values as a burden to modernization. During the colonization period, 
European powers also portrayed Islam as a major obstacle to achieving modernization 
(Hoebink 1999). Even though the primary interpretation of Islam has never excluded 
modernity and rationality (Abduh 1966; Okumus 2008), European modernization has 
been understood as a threat to traditional Islamic values and was thus excluded as foreign 
in many Muslim countries (Martin 1991), including Sudan and some other North African 
Muslim majority countries. These experiences slowed down the modernization process 
for such Muslim countries because they explicitly rejected the inevitability of 
secularization that is embedded in European modernization model. 
By contrast, the second approach embraces the European modernization model 
that includes secularization. In some Muslim countries—such as Turkey, Tunisia, and 
Egypt, European modernization had been accepted as necessary for development (Martin 
1991). As it had in Europe, this view included secularization as a precondition for 
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Muslim modernization (Hoebink 1999). The main strategy of these developing countries 
was to simply imitate Western countries without attention to the processes that those 
countries underwent as they achieved modernization (Saeed 1994). Contrary to Medieval 
European conditions, where secularization involved a desire for change among the 
general population (Patrick 2007), most people in Muslim countries––where European 
modernization with secularization was implemented––had no disputes with their religion 
or religious authorities (Saeed 1994). They simply implemented the European 
modernization with secularization to quickly modernize their societies by disregarding 
Islamic thought, practice, and values (Mardin 1983, 2006; Saeed 1994). 
Turkey is a prime example of successful voluntarily implementation of European 
modernity, including both secularism and secularization, through social, political, and 
cultural reforms. Since reforms rarely work when initiated by social and economic elites, 
the government was confronted by a strong resistance among the general population 
(Mardin 2006). As with Japan, Turkey adopted many successful parts of European 
modernization (including secularism, the removal of religious authority from the state) 
and mostly rejected the parts––secularization––attempting to change key elements of 
traditional Turkish culture (Saeed 1994). Since the understanding of secularization as an 
inevitable condition for modernization is irrelevant to Islam, it can be argued that Turkish 
society created a third approach, modernization without secularization. Therefore, Turkey 
as a Muslim-majority country forms an interesting case for examining the effects of 
modernization––as separated from secularization––on fertility.  
32 
 
2.6 Compatibility of Islam and Modernity 
2.6.1 Schools of Islam 
No religion is monolithic. As with Christianity, Islamic practices vary from region 
to region due to different traditions, cultures, and political histories. These differences are 
quite important in Islam because there are legal schools that interpret laws and the 
variation in their interpretations generally reflect such regional differences (Melchert 
1997). There are many schools of law from the four different branches of Islam 
(Ahmadiyya, Sunni, Shi’ah and Khawarij), but a majority of Muslims follow one of five 
main schools of law: 1) Ja`fari (from the Shi’ah branch) includes 23% of Muslims; 2) the 
Hanafi (from the Sunni branch) includes 31% of Muslims; 3) the Maliki (from the Sunni 
branch)  includes of 25% of Muslims; 4) the Shafi’i (from the Sunni branch) includes 
16% of Muslims; and 5) the Hanbali (from the Sunni branch) includes 4 % of Muslims. 
The remained of Muslims follow other schools of laws (Al-islam.org 2018). As is clear 
from these percentages, the Sunni schools are the primary schools of law followed by 
majority of Muslims worldwide. It is important to that that although these school are all 
in the same branch of Islam, their interpretations vary by their conservativeness. 
2.6.2 Education 
Islamic thinkers, like the most popular medieval theologian Al-Ghazali, the 
fourteenth century legal scholar Ibn Khaldun, and many others, view knowledge as 
sacred and suggest that people value it as they value religious teachings. Even though the 
idea of secularization is contrary to Islam (Saeed 1994), reason and secular thoughts are, 
however, dominant values in Islam because a balanced human life can be achieved with 
both faith and reason (Ibn Khaldun 1974). According to the Quran and Hadiths, secular 
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knowledge is as important as religious knowledge; secular knowledge is for dwelling on 
earth and religious knowledge is for having a smooth life in both this life and in the 
afterlife (Quran 58:11). Similar to Christianity (Gould 1999), Ibn Khaldun (1974) argued 
that the separation of reason and faith could not be acceptable because there are some 
things that reason cannot explain. Thus, people should not focus on finding broad 
explanations for all parts of existence (Ibn Khaldun 1974). Rather, for example, people 
should focus on things, such as empirical science, where they can examine the empirical 
parts of existence by observing and reasoning. Concentrating on this kind of work would 
promote practical materials that aid human well-being (Ibn Khaldun 1974). 
Thus, modernization and Islam are compatible. Muslims have a common 
understanding that all knowledge comes from God (Al-attas 1980), and knowledge is for 
both men and women and should aid human well-being (Ibn Khaldun 1974). According 
to (Al-Ghazali 1939), “Knowledge exists potentially in the human soul, like a seed in the 
soil, through learning, that potential turns into reality” (Al-Ghazali 1939). Secular 
education and knowledge, consequently, are accepted as a religious duty for all Muslims.  
The Prophet Mohammed said, “Acquisition of knowledge is binding on all 
Muslims [both men and women without any discrimination]” (Ibn Maja in al-Sunan 1:81 
p.224, as cited in sunnah.com). Thus, in Islam obtaining knowledge is as obligatory for 
women as it is for men. Women’s increasing education and employment across most of 
the Islamic world (Abbasi-Shavazi, Mohammad Jalal and Torabi 2012; Kuhn 2012; 
Turkstat 2016) requires critical examination as to whether Islam creates barriers for 
modernization, including egalitarianism.  
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2.6.3 Egalitarian Ideology 
Equality (musawat) is one of the most important teachings of Islam. The Prophet 
Muhammad suggested all Muslim men provide equality in their household for each 
family member, and he became the first example by helping his wife on household tasks 
(Al-Bukhari 1976). Although men are expected to be the provider and the protector of 
their family (Quran 4:34), the prophet suggested that believers provide the same 
opportunities, such as love, education, and financial support, to both their sons and their 
daughters.  
The Quran does not discriminate against men or women. Many people might have 
falsely assumed that the Quran chooses men as the head of their household to behave 
obstinately towards their wife, subject women to men’s will, compel women, destroy 
women’s individuality, and thus deny women’s identity. Quran (4:19) states that “Live 
with your wife on a footing of kindness and equity.” The responsibility of being the head 
of the household is given to men because biologically women bear and nurture children. 
In addition to the Prophet Mohammed’s suggestion, many Islamic scholars argue that 
marriage does not allow men to confine their wives’ activities to housework and make 
them serve their husbands (e.g., Abu Hanifa 2007; Al-Shafi’i 2008). The suggestions and 
arguments above show that Islamic teachings value egalitarian understanding as well as 
education— which are key components of modernization (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and 
Baker 2000). Based on the arguments above, it can be argued that primary teachings of 
Islam show that Islam and modernization can work together in the process of human 
development (Al-Ghazali 1939; Ibn-Khaldun 1974). 
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2.6.4 Islam and Fertility 
Studies of Muslim countries are notably lacking. Prior studies of the association 
between fertility and religion have been conducted mostly in Christian societies. The 
findings of numerous studies show that religious traditions may affect individuals’ 
fertility in many ways (Mosher, Williams, and Johnson 1992; Sarah R. Hayford and 
Morgan 2008; Zhang 2008). For example, religions with pro-natalist values emphasizing 
the importance of family and parenthood are positively associated with parity (McQuillan 
2004), as is religious service attendance. Similarly, religiosity and fertility are positively 
associated in Muslim countries (Kaufmann 2009; Yavuz 2008). Despite high levels of 
religiosity, however, the fertility rates in most Muslim countries have been gradually 
decreasing (World Bank 2015; TSI 2016). The reason for this decline has not been 
systematically examined.  
2.6.4.1 Islam and Parity 
Islam, like other Abrahamic religions, has pro-natalist norms and values that 
influence fertility behaviors through the PDF (McQuillan 2004), most specifically 
marriage, contraceptive use, and abortion. Islam encourages adherents to marry and have 
children and teaches its believers not to worry about the financial burden of having 
children because Allah (God) will always provide for children and their parents (Quran 
6:151, 17:31). Islamic legislation does not limit the number of children that one can have 
and suggests that believers should not limit themselves to a specific number.  
Islam also encourages having as many children as one can because this is filling 
the Earth with obedience to Allah and His worship, and increasing the progeny. It is also 
accepted that increasing progeny is a provision for the person in both this life and in the 
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hereafter, especially when they raise their children according to Islamic. A hadith also 
states that “When a man dies, his deeds come to an end, except for three: a continuous 
charity, knowledge that benefits people, and a pious child who supplicates for him.” 
Islamic teachings place important value on having children, thus it would not be 
surprising to see a positive relationship between religiosity and number of children. 
2.6.4.2 Contraceptive Use 
Although the Quran does not talk about contraceptive use, some hadiths allow 
using traditional contraceptive methods (e.g., Al-Bukhari 1999 v7:b62:h135, h136) and 
the interpretation of those hadiths also include reversible contraceptive methods (Al-
Ghazali 1939; Karaman 2018). For example, the only contraceptive method (e.g., coitus 
interruptus) used during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, and he did not express 
disapproval of its use (al-Bukhari 1999) to postpone pregnancy for a certain period.  
The opinions of Islamic scholars vary on contraceptive use (Obermeyer 1992). 
Some scholars claim that is not allowed because it is like killing your child and based 
their arguments on Quran verses (81:8-9; 1731) (Musallam 1983). The verses specifically 
refer to the pre-Islamic period when some people killed their female children out of the 
fear of feeding and the unfortunate conditions of women during war and plunder 
times(see Yusuf 2014).   
However, many others allow contraceptive use for the mother’s health and when 
it is the decision of both husband and wife (Iyer 2002; Karaman 2018). Al-Ghazali (Al-
Ghazali 1939) argues (in his Ihya’ ‘Ulum-ud-Din) that male sperm alone cannot be 
accepted as human beings unless they are united with female egg in the uterus. Al-
Ghazali (1939) also adds that no one can guarantee that contraceptive will block a female 
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egg from fertilization with sperm. In his work, Al-Ghazali (1939) also talks about five 
reasons for contraceptive use: 1) to prevent transmission of disease from partners; 2) to 
space pregnancies, which can also be supported by a Quran verse (Al-Bakara 2/233) 
“Mothers may breastfeed their children two complete years for whoever wishes to 
complete the nursing [period];” 3) for the health of wife; 4) when husbands have no or 
little money (unless they want to have children); 5) for women’s beauty.  
Some hadiths tolerate and legitimize both traditional and modern contraceptive 
methods when it is the mutual decision of husband and wife; permanent contraceptive 
methods are prohibited, however (Atighetchi 1994).  Several hadiths state that some 
believers went to the Prophet Mohammed and asked him “… Shall we get castrated?” 
and the Prophet forbade them to castrate themselves (Sahih al-Bukhari 1999: v7:b62: h9, 
h11, h12). Turkish Islamic scholar Hayrettin Karaman (2018) also argues that 
“continuous and irreversible contraceptive methods” are not allowed. Irreversible 
contraceptive methods (e.g. vasectomy, tubal ligation, and hysterectomy) are forbidden, 
unless for medical reasons. Thus, in general, Islam allows for reversible forms of 
contraception when their use is the joint decision of the husband and wife. 
2.6.4.3 Abortion Use 
Abortion without just cause is prohibited in Islamic teachings. Some Islamic 
scholars suggest that abortion is permissible if the pregnancy is ended before the 
ensoulment of the fetus —defined as occurring between 40, 90, and 120 days after 
conception, depending on the school of thought—however, most schools of thought 
suggest that abortion requires a justifiable reason such as the mother’s health or in the 
case of rape (Asman 2004; Hessini 2007). Therefore, in most of today’s Muslim 
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countries, Islamic scholars do not allow abortion as a contraceptive method even though 
the legislation of abortion in some Muslim majority countries (e.g. Turkey and Tunisia) 
would seem to indicate otherwise (Aramesh 2006). 
2.7 Fertility in Muslim-majority Nations 
Even as fertility has declined worldwide, the demographic transition has 
proceeded at a considerably slower pace in many Muslim nations. Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which includes many Muslim-majority nations, is one of the areas where fertility decline 
has been quite slow despite concerted efforts by international aid organizations 
(Bongaarts 2011). Although most Muslim-majority nations have large young populations, 
some Muslim nations (such as Iran and Turkey) do have fertility rates around the 
replacement level or even lower (United Nations 2016). It is well documented that 
components of modernization are negatively associated with low fertility; however, 
Caldwell (1980) argues that education specifically has important effects on fertility 
decline. The effect of education, however, may vary across religious groups. Indeed, a 
study examining 30 developing countries found that education had a greater impact on 
fertility in non-Muslim nations than in Muslim nations (Heaton 2011).  
The weaker association between education and fertility decline in Muslim-
majority nations may reflect the co-existence of religious and secular knowledge in these 
nations. For example, a  study conducted in Egypt found that education strengthened 
traditional pro-natalist familial norms, those associated with higher fertility (Faust, Bach, 
and Alla 1991). This likely reflects the fact that public school systems in Egypt have an 
Islamic curriculum, teaching religion in all grades from elementary to high school (Al-
monitor 2016). Indeed, Faust and colleagues (1991:340) note that the Egyptian education 
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curriculum includes non-Western components that promote “traditional Islamic family 
morality rather than Western middle-class secularization.” These findings from Egypt 
show that education, and therefore modernization more broadly, need not promote 
Western secular values that have been identified as critical to low fertility in Europe and 
other regions. This points to the need to examine declining fertility in Muslim-majority 
nations in ways that do not simply replicate the assumed joint effects of secularization 
and modernization presumed by the SDT theory.  
The need to consider modernization as separate from secularization is necessary 
because, despite the fact that Muslim-majority nations remain highly religious and 
Islamic teachings have a pro-natalist ideology, some Muslim countries have in fact been 
experiencing (sometimes rapid) fertility decline (Abbasi-Shavazi, Mohammad Jalal and 
Torabi 2012; Kaufmann 2009; Yavuz 2008).  For instance, Iran’s fertility rate declined 
by more than 50% in a single decade after the government implemented a family 
planning policy (Ministry of Health and medical education 1998). Iran’s fertility rate 
(1.69) today is well-below the replacement level (World Bank 2015). Abbasi-Shavazi and 
Torabi argue that in addition to the government’s policy change about family planning, 
religious leaders’ support for family planning had an important influence on the fertility 
decline in Iran (2012). Similarly, Turkey has been experiencing fertility decline since the 
1960s, with the TFR declining from 6.30 to 2.05 (World Bank 2015). As in other 
countries, traditional beliefs are associated with higher fertility in Turkey (Yavuz 2003) 
because Islam encourages believers to marry and have children, and yet the fertility rate 
in Turkey (and many other Muslim countries) is declining (World Bank 2015). Therefore, 
it is necessary to examine the how modernization and religiosity separately affect fertility 
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in Muslim societies to better understand the reason for this fertility decline.  Turkey is an 
ideal country in which to undertake such an examination. 
2.8 The Case of Turkey 
Turkey became a unitary secular state as a key condition for modernization (Kuru 
2009). Though Westernization reforms in Turkey encountered some resistance, reforms 
that were not threat to Turkey’s traditional religious values accelerated the modernization 
process (Çinar 2005).  Westernization differs from modernization because it includes 
Western cultural values. In recent history Muslims have looked for ways to modernize 
without being forced to Westernize (e.g. secularize) (Hoebink 1999). Turkey differs in 
important ways from other Muslim-majority countries, such as a close and non-colonial 
relationship with Europe and a longstanding secular state ideology that facilitated such a 
non-Westernized modernization process. These characteristics make it a unique case in 
the Muslim world. 
Turkey’s case becomes most interesting and relevant when compared to other 
modern Muslim nations, particularly because it has had the longest period of 
independence (Saeed 1994)—with the current republic now independent for almost 100 
years. If we include the period of the Ottoman Empire (founded in 1299), the Turkish 
people have protected most of their cultural and religious values for 700 years.  
In contrast to Turkey, colonized Muslim-majority nations experience a repression 
of traditional and Islamic cultural values.  Islam was totally disregarded and made a 
private matter, restricted to the observance of rituals, because Western elites saw Islam as 
a major hindrance to social and political change (Esposito 1999; Saeed 1994). For 
example, Lord Cromer, the British counsel in Cairo from 1883–1907, argued “. . . as a 
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social system, Islam has been a complete failure. Islam keeps women in a position of 
inferiority . . . it permits slavery . . . its general tendency is intolerance towards other 
faiths. . . .” Because “the West was trying to subject Muslim society by weakening its 
cultural foundations,” modernity and secularization were interpreted as a device to 
undermine traditional Muslim values and therefore create Muslim dependency on the 
West (Cromer 1908; Hoebink 1999). The colonization process was condemned by 
colonized countries; thus, it is not surprising to hear denunciations of modernity from 
twentieth-century Islamists and to see Muslim societies avoiding European dynamics, 
including in modernity and secularity (Martin 1991; Sonn 2005). 
2.8.1 The Republic of Turkey 
To better contextualize the aims of this dissertation, it is necessary to briefly 
review the geographical and political characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Because 
of its location straddling two continents, Turkey is referred to as a bridge between Europe 
and Asia. It shares borders with eight European and West Asian countries: Bulgaria to the 
northwest; Greece and the Aegean Sea to the west; Georgia to the northeast, with the 
Black Sea to the north; Armenia and Azerbaijan to the east; Iran to the southeast; and 
Iraq, Syria, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south (National Geographic 2012). The 
“Turkification” of Anatolia started with the Seljuk Turks winning the battle of Manzikert 
in 1071 (Yardumian and Schurr 2011). After the foundation of the Ottoman Empire in 
1299, Anatolia (Turkey) became the center of the Ottoman Empire for more than six 
centuries. The end of the Ottoman Empire led to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s founding of 
the Republic of Turkey, becoming the first president of the state in 1923. 
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2.8.2 Turkey’s Modernization Process 
The Republic of Turkey was founded as a secular state. The secular ideology of 
the new state and government of Turkey meant that many reforms incorporated secular 
Western ideologies. These reforms met resistance among the Turkish people to the extent 
that they were viewed as incompatible with Islamic values (Saeed 1994). Islam is not 
inherently opposed to modernization processes, but the Turkish people opposed the initial 
reforms imposed by the new Turkish government—particularly assertive secularization, 
the idea of limiting religion in both governmental and public places (Kuru 2009; Mardin 
2006). These limitations included banning headscarves in all educational institutions, 
closing courses on the Quran, and terminating secondary schools with predominantly 
religious classes (Kuru 2009). This Westernization process, that included both European 
values and modernization, changed individuals’ perspective about modernization because 
it was viewed as an attack on both individual and religious values (Saeed 1994). This 
resistance to Western-style modernization has also been observed in other Muslim 
countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Pakistan. This resistance slowed the modernization 
process in Turkey. 
Nevertheless, Turkey did modernize. Modernization efforts in both the Ottoman 
Empire and the Republic of Turkey played a key role in the socio-economic and political 
conditions of Turkey today (Çinar 2005). The objections to the secularism of 
Westernization policies, however, preserved the unique culture of Turkey. If 
Westernization was taken to its extreme and accepted without resistance by the public, 
Turkey would have lost its cultural distinctiveness. On the other hand, if the 
modernization efforts had not started during the Empire, Turkey would likely have 
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achieved much less in its modernization progress (Çinar 2005). 
2.8.3 Demographic Statistics on Fertility Decline in Turkey 
Turkey has experienced a significant decline in its total fertility rate beginning 
around 1960, from 6.50 to 2.10 (World Bank 2015; TSI 2017) and is approaching VLF 
(see Figure 2.6). Compulsory education reforms (requiring 8 years in 1997 and then 12 
years in 2012) have had an important influence on fertility decline observed in Turkey. 
Women’s age at first birth rose as a result of compulsory education reforms, which in 
2002 led to an increase in the legal age of marriage from 15 to 17 years (Dayioglu and 
Kirdar 2010; Ince 2010). Education reforms and legal changes to marriage age negatively 
affected the number of children ever born to married women age 15–49, because almost 
all births occur within a marital bond in Turkey (TDHS 2013). Beginning in the 1970s, 
the use of modern contraceptive methods began to increase in Turkey (Senlet et al. 2001). 
Increased use of modern contraceptive methods constitutes another factor that negatively 
affected the number of children ever born to ever-married women (TDHS 2013). The 
greater use of modern contraceptive methods also contributed to a decline in the rate of 
induced abortions (which were legalized in 1983) because modern reversible methods 
have a much lower failure rate than traditional (e.g., coitus interruptus) methods (Senlet 
et al. 2001). 
2.9 The Current Study 
The application of the secularization model for understanding Turkish fertility 
decline is unclear, given that prior research has examined SDT theory in largely Christian 
countries where modernization processes (including increasing education and egalitarian 
ideology) have occurred simultaneously with declining frequency of religious behaviors 
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(e.g., Kane 2013)—a condition not observed in Turkey. Contrary to common Western 
belief, Islamic teachings do not view the pursuit of rational and secular thoughts––key 
components of modernization––as incompatible with religious teachings (Munir 2003; 
Okumuş 2008; Sonn 2005). Thus, there remains a critical need to examine whether the 
European secularization model applies to Turkey, or whether a refinement of this 
perspective to focus on modernization as separate from declining frequency of religious 
behaviors is needed to understand Turkish fertility change. Failure to understand the 
Islamic context of Turkey may result in ineffective government policies aimed at 
improving Turkey‘s fertility rate so as to preserve its position in the global market. 
My overall goal is to understand how the unique cultural and geographical context 
of Turkey, one influenced by both Western and Eastern cultural traditions, shapes the 
nature and the speed of demographic changes in the country (Bongaarts and Bulatao 
1999). The immediate goal of the current study is to investigate the indicators of 
fertility—specifically the number of children and the two proximate determinants of 
fertility, contraceptive use and induced abortion receipt (Bongaarts 1978)—by separately 
examining modernization (education, egalitarianism, urbanization) and secularization 
(measured in this study by its opposite, individual level religiosity). It is well established 
that modernization and secularization are negatively associated with fertility behaviors in 
modern Christian nations (Kane 2013; Lesthaeghe 2010), but I expect to find that it is not 
in Muslim nations, specifically in Turkey. Thus, my central hypothesis is that the 
interaction between modernization and religiosity will not be significantly associated 
with indicators of fertility behaviors.  That is, for example, the effect of women’s 
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religiosity on her number of children will not depend on her level of modernization 
(education, egalitarianism, and urban residence).  
The general literature argues that modernization and secularization co-occur and 
do not have independent effects on fertility (Lesthaeghe 2010). Indeed, as I showed 
above in section 2.4.1 on European fertility, there is a statically significant and negative 
interaction between modernization (women’s education) and religiosity on women’s 
parity in Europe. Thus, there is empirical support for the theoretical proposition of the 
secularization argument of SDT theory, as depicted in panel A of Figure 2.5.  In contrast, 
I argue that modernization and religiosity in Turkey are separate process and 
independently affect fertility behaviors, as depicted in panel B of Figure 2.5.  
2.9.1 Hypotheses 
I test three hypotheses as to whether modernization and secularization are 
separately and independently associated with fertility in Turkey. These hypotheses are 
described below and also in Table 2.1, which shows how my expectations contract with 
those derived from the secularization argument of SDT theory:  
H1: I hypothesize that modernization will be negatively associated with the 
number of children born to a woman, and a positive association between religious 
behaviors and the total number of children born to a woman, but that the interaction 
effects of modernization (education, egalitarianism, and urban residence) and religiosity 
variables will not yield a significant association with the number of children. 
H2: I hypothesize that modernization will be positively associated with 
contraceptive use, but that there will be no association between religious behaviors and 
contraceptive use, as contraceptive use in Islam is generally permissible. The interaction 
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terms between modernization (education, egalitarianism, and urban residence) and 
religiosity will also demonstrate no significant association with contraceptive use. 
H3: I hypothesize that modernization will be positively associated and that 
religious behaviors will be negatively associated with abortion, given Islamic prohibition 
against the practice, but that the interaction terms between modernization (education, 
egalitarianism, and urban residence) and religiosity will demonstrate no significant 
association with abortion use because primary interpretation of Islam generally prohibits 
abortion use but it also allows it in some conditions.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys (TDHS) 
This study uses data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for Turkey. 
DHS programs provide technical assistance to more than 300 surveys in approximately 
100 countries to advance global knowledge on the trends of health and population in 
developing countries. The DHS program is funded by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and participating countries. The surveys include basic household 
characteristics and a detailed interview with women age 15-49, who are in the 
childbearing ages. In some countries, data collected from only women who have been in 
a union but in others, include all women who are in the childbearing age.     
The Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys (TDHS) are face-to-face, nationally 
representative household surveys conducted in rural and urban areas in five regions of 
Turkey in 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013.  TDHS use a weighted, multistage, stratified 
cluster sampling approach in selection of all samples to provide estimates for a variety of 
characteristics for various domains (Turkey as a whole, Urban and rural areas, five major 
regions of the country, the 12 Nomenclature of territorial units, seven largest 
metropolitan cities (each with populations above one million). The purpose of the TDHS 
is to provide updated information about a number of factors, including demographic and 
health indicators, fertility, contraceptive knowledge and use, abortion practices, maternal 
and child health, nutritional status of mothers and children, and socioeconomic 
characteristics of households for policymakers and researchers (TDHS-2008, 2013). I use 
only TDHS-2008 and 2013 because they are only surveys that have religiosity measures 
including performing namaz (praying five times in a day), fast (fasting during Ramadan 
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month) and wearing a headscarf. Thus, these surveys are used to test the hypotheses of 
this present study. 
The TDHS-2008 was implemented by Hacettepe University Institute of 
Population Studies (HUIPS) in collaboration with the General Directorate of Mother and 
Child Health and Family Planning, Ministry of Health and the Undersecretary of State 
Planning Organization. The TDHS-2013 was carried out by HUIPS in collaboration with 
The Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Health, Public Health Institution. Both 
surveys were entirely funded by the Government of Turkey through the Scientific and 
Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) within the scope of the Support 
Programme for Research and Development Projects of Public Institutions (KAMAG) 
(TDHS-2008, 2013). Fieldwork for the surveys was completed in 3 months (from 
October to December) for TDHS-2008 and in 5 months (from September to January) for 
TDHS-2013. 
Two different questionnaires (household and individual) were used to collect the 
data of TDHS-2008 and TDHS-2013. These questionnaires were formed by using the 
international DHS program survey project model questionnaires and the questionnaires 
that have been used in previous Turkish population and health surveys to ensure that the 
results of TDHS-2008 and 2013 would be comparable with previous TDHS. First, the 
Household Questionnaire was used to gather information for each household member 
regarding their sex, age, education, marital status, employment status, and relationship to 
the household head. The household questionnaire also collected data on households’ 
socio-economic levels and wellbeing of the elderly, if any resided in the households. For 
example, the wealth was measured by households’ socioeconomic characteristics.  
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Second, the Individual Questionnaire for TDHS 2008 includes only ever-married 
women who are reproductive age while TDHS-2013 includes all women who are in the 
reproductive age. For both questionnaires, reproductive age ranges from 15 to 49, and 
questionnaires include all women who usually live and/or were present in the selected 
household on the night before the interview. The individual questionnaire includes 
information on women’s background characteristics, migration history, marriage history 
and information on marriage, pregnancy, birth history, fertility preferences, assisted 
reproductive techniques, knowledge and use of contraceptive methods, antenatal and 
postnatal care, breastfeeding, nutrition, diarrhea and immunization of children under age 
five, work history and status, husband’s background characteristics, anthropometric 
measurements of women and their children under five (TDHS-2008:13, 2013:14). 
More than 90% of women who were identified as eligible on the night before the 
interview completed the interviews. TDHS-2008 identified 8003 women as eligible for 
individual interviews and 7405 (92.5%) of these interviews were finished. TDHS-2013 
sampled 10840 women as eligible and successfully completed 9746 (90.0%) individual 
interviews. Questionnaires were completed in Turkish by 95.6% and 96.8% of 
respondents in TDHS 2008 and TDHS 2013, respectively. Less than 5 percent of the 
respondents preferred another language (e.g., Kurdish, Arabic). The primary reason for 
non-response among eligible women was that they were not present in the household 
during the extended time-period of the surveys.  
3.1.1 Analytic Sample 
For the present study, I limited my sample to the TDHS-2008 and 2013 
respondents who were currently married (by excluding women who were “never in a 
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union [available only in TDHS-2013],” “divorced,” “widowed,” and “no longer living 
together”) because almost all births are marital in Turkey—based on 2013 statistics all 
births happen in a marriage— (TDHS 2008, 2013). In 2008, 363 women—146 of them 
are widowed, 156 divorced, and 61 no longer living together—were excluded. In 2013, 
2911 (29.9%) women—2527 of them are never in a union, 120 widowed, 194 divorced, 
and 70 no longer living together—were excluded. I pooled the data across both survey 
years to increase statistical power; preliminary analyses show that there were not 
statistically significant differences between models in 2008 and 2013.  
Missing data among married respondents were minimal: respondent’s mother 
tongue group (Turkish) (0.01%), contraceptive use (0.01%), use of induced abortion 
(0.06%), frequency of wearing a head-scarf (0.16%), frequency of performing namaz 
(0.25%), husband’s education (0.34%), opinion on “husband should help household 
chore” (0.36%), opinion on “better to educate son rather than daughter” (0.39%), opinion 
on “family decisions should be made by men” (0.63%), frequency of fast (0.69%). I 
excluded the total of 302 cases (2.15% of total cases) through listwise deletion. My 
analytic sample was 13575 ever-married women (6888 from TDHS-2008 and 6687 from 
TDHS-2013).  
3.2 Measures  
3.2.1 Dependent Variables  
Three dependent variables are used as indicators of fertility behaviors: the number 
of children born, contraceptive use, and abortion use.  
The first variable measures the number of children ever born to a currently 
married woman. Descriptive statistics of this count variable show that women had an 
51 
 
average of 2.51 children. The modal number was two children (31.82%), but it is also 
apparent that higher parities were not uncommon. For example, 9.50% of married women 
had 4 children, 4.87% had 5 children, and 2.85% had 6 children. Only a very small 
number of women had 7 or more children. Therefore, I coded this variable into 8 
categories from 0 = No child to 7 = 7+ children. In preliminary analyses, I tested 
alternative specifications of the number of children and findings show that Wald Chi-
Square improved up until 8+ children (10971.56 for categories from 0 to 5+ children, 
12071.61 for categories from 0 to 6+ children, 12447.96 for categories from 0 to 7+ 
children, and 12450.71 for categories from 0 to 8+ children). These preliminary results 
indicate that making the highest category 7+ children had the best model fit, and that 
including categories above 7 children was therefore not necessary.    
The second set of dependent variables measure contraceptive use, and asks if the 
respondent ever used a contraceptive method and what is the currently used contraceptive 
method. From the questions about contraceptive use I created two variables. First, I 
created a simple binary variable (none = 0 and any contraceptive use = 1).  Second, I 
created a multinomial variable. Contraceptive methods being used is coded as 0 = No 
Method (omitted reference in multinomial model), 1 = Traditional Methods (Periodic 
Abstinence, Withdrawal, and Lactational Amenorrhea), 2 = Modern Reversible Methods 
(Pill, Intrauterine Device, Injections, Diaphragm/Foam/Jelly, Condom, Norplant, Female 
Condom, and Other), and 3 = Permanent Methods (Female and Male Sterilization).  
The third dependent variable measures abortion use and asks if respondents have 
had any “pregnancies [end] in induced abortion” and the number of such pregnancies.  
52 
 
This variable is coded as both a binary variable (none = 0 and any abortion use = 1) and 
as a count variable, number of abortion (0 to 3+).  
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
The present study has four focal independent variables. Three variables are 
primary components of modernization that are measured through education, 
egalitarianism scale, and urbanization. The last variable measures religiosity.  
3.2.2.1 Modernization 
The first independent variable measures highest education level in four categories: 
0 = No Education, 1 = Primary and Middle school, 2 = Secondary and 3 = Higher. The 
primary category includes the first eight years of education from general and vocational 
schools. The secondary category includes high school education from both general and 
vocational high schools. The higher category includes Bachelor’s, Master, and PhD.  
The second variable measures egalitarianism with a scale using three variables 
that asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following questions: (1) 
“the important decisions in the family should be made only by men of the family,” (2) “it 
is better to educate a son than a daughter,” (3) “men should also do the housework like 
cooking, washing, ironing, and cleaning.” The choice categories of variables measuring 
women’s opinion on “the important decisions in the family should be made by men of the 
family” and “it is better to educate a son than a daughter” are coded as 0 = Agree and 1 = 
Disagree. The choice categories of the variable measuring women’s opinion on “men 
should also do the housework like cooking washing, ironing, and cleaning” is recoded 0 
= Disagree and 1 = Agree to create a scale in which higher values indicate more 
egalitarian attitudes of women.  
53 
 
Nunnally (1978) argues that reliabilities that exceed 0.700 are considered 
acceptable. The three variables measuring egalitarian attitudes have an alpha score of 
0.440—below the recommended cut-off value of (0.700)—but this score is acceptable for 
a three item-scale because Cronbach’s alpha calculation depends both on the correlation 
between the items in a scale and the number of items in the scale (Ladhari 2010). 
Therefore, a small number of items in a scale makes them more unstable and decreases 
their alpha score (Moss et al. 1998). In addition, preliminary factor analysis also indicated 
that these three items are loaded on a one-factor (they are unidimensional). The 
egalitarianism scale was calculated through the summation of the items described above 
to range from low (0) to high (3) egalitarian gender ideology. 
The third independent variable is urban, measured as a binary variable measuring 
if respondent’s residence is 0 = Rural and 1 = Urban. Residence areas with a population 
of less than 10000 were defined by TDHS as rural, while residence areas with 
populations 10000 and more were considered urban.  
3.2.2.2 Secularization 
The fourth focal independent variable is religiosity, measured with three variables 
that asked respondents: (1) “Do you perform the namaz?” (2) “Do you fast?” and (3) “Do 
you wear a headscarf when you go outside?” All three variables are codes as follows: 0 = 
No, 1 = Regular, and 2 = Irregular. I recoded these variables into binaries where 0 = No 
and Irregular, and 1 = Regular. Therefore, the scale ranges from low religiosity (0, or no 
religious actions) to high religiosity (3, or regularly performing all three religious 
actions). 
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In preliminary analyses, I tested alternative specifications of the religiosity 
variables. I generated two different versions of these variables. First, I recoded variables 
as ordinal where 0 = No, 1 = Irregular, and 2 = Regular. Second, I created binary 
variables having categories where 0 = No and 1 = Irregular and Regular. I computed 
Wald tests after regression analyses for each versions of each variable stated above. 
Preliminary results showed that the versions of religiosity variables that I use provide, 
respectively, more meaningful results and better fit statistics (e.g., larger Wald Chi-
Squared scores [8926.05]) than other versions (8925.52, and 8920.05). Therefore, I use 
the first version of religiosity variables, and they have 0.624 alpha score, which is 
acceptable for three-item scale and quite close to the cut-off point (0.700) recommended 
by Nunnally (1978). The scale score is computed by simple summation of items, and the 
scale has ranges from 0 to 3; the higher the category, the higher religiosity respondents 
have. 
3.2.3 Control Variables  
All analyses control for several factors associated with modernization, religiosity, 
and fertility behaviors: Proximate Determinants of Fertility (PDF), women’s 
characteristics, household characteristics, region, and survey year. 
The variables that control for PDF includes: Age at first sex (measured through 
“age at first marriage” in 2008 and “age at first cohabitation” in 2013, given the strong 
norms against premarital sex in Turkey). This is a continuous variable and is centered to 
zero to avoid multi-collinearity. All dependent variables (The Number of Children, 
Contraception Methods, and Abortion Use) are also PDF and are used as control 
variables in the analyses where they are not dependent variables because they are all 
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highly related to each other, thus, controlling for these variables will provide more 
meaningful results.   
The following variables measure women’s sociodemographic characteristics: 
respondent‘s employment asking respondent “Are you currently working?” 0 = No, 1 = 
Yes. Respondent‘s age is a continuous variable and is centered at age 15 (=0) to avoid 
collinearity issues and to make a more interpretable constant. Husband’s education is 
coded as: 0 = No Education, 1 = Primary, 2 = Secondary, and 3 = Higher. Mother tongue 
variable is used to indicate ethnicity but because classifying ethnic groups requires a 
more complex procedure I use the term mother tongue groups as Yavuz (Yavuz 2008) 
did. This measurement is a dummy variable coded as 0 = Others and 1 = Turkish.  A 
woman’s economic status is measured through household wealth. DHS created this 
variable by following the procedures for a wealth index. The index was created by using 
household asset data that includes almost all household belongings (ranging from a 
television to a car), utility services (telephone, internet, and so on), and dwelling 
characteristics (e.g., source of drinking water, and type of flooring material) that reflect 
economic status: 1 = poorest, 2 = poorer, 3 = middle, 4 = richer, and 5 = richest, which is 
also recoded so that zero (0) is the lowest category to make for a meaningful constant. 
More specifically, DHS created the wealth index as explained in the following paragraph: 
Each asset was assigned a weight (factor score) generated through principal 
component analysis, and the resulting asset scores were standardized in relation to 
a standard normal distribution with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one 
(Gwatkin et al. 2000). Each household was then assigned a score for each asset, 
and the scores were summed for each household. Individuals were ranked 
according to the total score of the household in which they reside and divided into 
population quintiles (five groups with the same number of individuals in each 
category). (TDHS 2008, 2013:39). 
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As described in the literature review there are differences in birth rates by region; 
therefore, I also control for regional differences. Region is captured with four dummy 
variables (Center, North, South, and East). West is the reference category because it is 
the most developed and Europeanized part of Turkey.  
Finally, Year of the survey is included as a binary control variable as 0 = 2008 and 
1 = 2013. 
3.3 Analytic Strategy 
This study has three empirical sections following the given approach above for 
each dependent variable: number of children ever born to a currently married woman, 
contraceptive use, currently used contraceptive method, ever-used induced abortion, and 
the frequency of induced abortion use. In order to examine the effects of interactions 
terms between modernization and religiosity on these indicators of fertility behaviors, 
appropriate regression analyses (Poisson, Binary Logistic, Multinomial Logistic, and 
Negative Binomial Regressions) are respectively estimated for each dependent variable. 
First, to address the effects of modernization and religiosity on the number of 
children ever born to currently married woman, Poisson regression models (PRM) are 
estimated because the dependent variable, as can be seen in Figure 3.1, does not have 
excessive zeroes, and descriptive statistics also show that variance and mean scores are 
almost equal, (2.81 and 2.49, respectively). One assumption of PRM is that the variance 
and mean are equal (equidispersion), whereas this assumption is generally violated and 
over-dispersion or under-dispersion happens. In this case, over-dispersion happens. In 
rare cases like this, to decide whether this over-dispersion suggests PRM or Negative 
Binomial Regression Model (NBRM), the appropriate test (“countfit” code in Stata) was 
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conducted. This test shows that PRM has better fit than NBRM. More specifically, 
statistics show that PRM has smaller Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) scores (BIC = 42113.731, AIC = 41963.411) than NBRM 
does (BIC = 42123.243 and AIC = 41965.408) (Long and Freese 2014).   
These results indicate that Poisson distribution (not excessive zeroes—the 
distribution does not suggest that I need to use a Negative Binomial or Zero-Inflated 
Poisson (ZIP) model—) is good, and the Poisson model is appropriate. In preliminary 
analyses, I also ran deviance goodness of fit (gof) tests that measure whether the model’s 
predictions are close to the observed outcomes. The findings show that there is a small 
value for chi-square, and the findings from the gof test are not statistically significant 
(p>0.100). The results of these goodness of fit tests also indicate that the model is 
correctly specified. 
The structural model of a Poisson regression is: 
𝜇𝑖 = 𝐸(𝛾𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = exp⁡(𝑥𝑖𝛽)         (1) 
where y is the number of children ever born to currently married woman i, with a 
conditional mean dependent on xi, a vector of individual characteristics. β is a vector of 
regression coefficients. A necessary condition of a Poisson distribution is to exponentiate 
the product of xi and β results in an expected count, µi that is positive. The probability of 
a count given xi is: 
Pr(𝛾𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = ⁡
exp(−⁡𝜇𝑖)(𝜇𝑖
𝛾𝑖)
𝛾𝑖!
         (2) 
and the measurement model is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒(𝛾𝑖) = ⁡𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛽3𝑥3 + 𝛽4(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2) +  𝛽5(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3) + 𝛽6(𝑥2 ∗
𝑥3) +  𝛽7(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) ⁡+ ⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛        (3) 
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where 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒(𝛾𝑖) = µi is the expected number of children born to a respondent based on a 
respondent’s level of religiosity, modernization, and so forth.  𝑥1⁡is the religiosity scale, 
𝑥2⁡is woman’s education, and 𝑥3⁡women’s egalitarian ideology. 
To test my hypotheses with interaction terms, first, I examine how indicators of 
the SDT (women’s education, gender ideology, urbanization, and the level of religiosity) 
shape married women’s fertility. In addition to the main independent variables, I created 
two-way cross-product terms between components of modernization and level of 
religiosity to test if effects of religiosity on fertility behaviors vary by modernization 
factors. Finally, I include two three-way cross-product terms 
(religiosity*education*urban and religiosity*gender ideology*urban) to examine how the 
effects of religiosity on fertility behaviors vary by more components of modernization. 
 𝛽4, 𝛽5⁡, and 𝛽6 are the coefficients of two-way interactions between religiosity 
and education, religiosity and urban, and education and urban. 𝛽7 is the regression 
coefficient of the three-way interaction term between religiosity, education, and urban 
variables. 𝑽 is the vector of n control variables.  
Second, to predict the probability of contraception use of currently married 
woman, I employed Binary Logistic regression models. The dependent variable 
(contraception use) is dichotomous and has values 1=Yes (Contraception used) and 0=No 
(Contraception never used) and thus, violates some assumptions of ordinary least square 
regression (e.g., homoscedasticity of the residual and normality of the responses), thus, 
using Binary Logistic regression models is more appropriate.  The equation for Logistic 
model is: 
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𝑙𝑛 {
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑥)
Pr(𝑦 = 0|𝑥)} = ⁡𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛽3𝑥3 + 𝛽4
(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2) +  𝛽5(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3) +
𝛽6(𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) +  𝛽7(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) ⁡+ ⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛       (4) 
To make the interpretations more meaningful, we can change the log odds to the 
odds by reformulating the equation and taking the exponential for both sides of the eq. (4) 
(Long and Freese 2014) for all equations with binary dependent variables including any 
contraceptive use, and abortion use. This process provides a multiplicative model instead 
of a linear model, and the outcome can be interpreted as the odds. The basic formula to 
estimate contraception use (Y) = 1 in logit model: 
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) =
⁡
exp(𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑥1+𝛽2𝑥2+ 𝛽3𝑥3+𝛽4(𝑥1∗𝑥2)+ 𝛽5(𝑥1∗𝑥3)+𝛽6(𝑥2∗𝑥3)+ 𝛽7(𝑥1∗𝑥2∗𝑥3)⁡+⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛)
1+exp(𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑥1+𝛽2𝑥2+ 𝛽3𝑥3+𝛽4(𝑥1∗𝑥2)+ 𝛽5(𝑥1∗𝑥3)+𝛽6(𝑥2∗𝑥3)+ 𝛽7(𝑥1∗𝑥2∗𝑥3)⁡+⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛)
  (5) 
 After exponentiation of equation, the interpretation of results changes and 
requires some basic calculations. These calculations depend on the magnitude of exp(b) 
score. When exp(b)>1, we can calculate the percent increase with this equation:  
% increase = (exp(b) – 1) *100        (A)  
When exp(b)<1, we can calculate the percent decrease with this equation:  
% decrease = (1 – exp(b)) *100        (B) 
Third, to predict the odds of currently using a contraception method by married 
woman, Multinomial Logistic Regression models are used. The dependent variable, 
contraception methods, has None, Traditional, Modern Reversible, and Irreversible 
categories. Because there are 4 categories (with the first category as reference), 
multinomial regression estimates 3 (k – 1 = 4 – 1) multiple linear regression functions 
defined as:  
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𝑙𝑛 (
Pr(𝑦=1)
Pr(𝑦=0)
) = ⁡𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛽3𝑥3 + 𝛽4(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2) +  𝛽5(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3) +
𝛽6(𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) +  𝛽7(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) ⁡+ ⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛       (6) 
𝑙𝑛 (
Pr(𝑦=2)
Pr(𝑦=0)
) = ⁡𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛽3𝑥3 + 𝛽4(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2) +  𝛽5(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3) +
𝛽6(𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) +  𝛽7(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) ⁡+ ⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛       (7) 
𝑙𝑛 (
Pr(𝑦=3)
Pr(𝑦=0)
) = ⁡𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛽3𝑥3 + 𝛽4(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2) +  𝛽5(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3) +
𝛽6(𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) +  𝛽7(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) ⁡+ ⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛       (8) 
Fourth, to test the effect of modernization and religiosity on ever-used abortion 
and number of induced abortions used by currently married woman, Logistic regression 
and Negative Binominal regression models are constructed, respectively. The formula to 
estimate induced abortion use in logit is the same formula used in equation (5): 
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) =
⁡
exp(𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑥1+𝛽2𝑥2+ 𝛽3𝑥3+𝛽4(𝑥1∗𝑥2)+ 𝛽5(𝑥1∗𝑥3)+𝛽6(𝑥2∗𝑥3)+ 𝛽7(𝑥1∗𝑥2∗𝑥3)⁡+⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛)
1+exp(𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑥1+𝛽2𝑥2+ 𝛽3𝑥3+𝛽4(𝑥1∗𝑥2)+ 𝛽5(𝑥1∗𝑥3)+𝛽6(𝑥2∗𝑥3)+ 𝛽7(𝑥1∗𝑥2∗𝑥3)⁡+⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛)
  (9) 
Lastly, for the number of induced abortions, even though descriptive statistics do 
not show greater variance than the mean, the dependent variable has excessive zeroes, 
which does not meet the assumptions of Poisson regression. The test (“countfit” code in 
Stata) that compares fit of alternative count models also suggests that Negative 
Binominal regression model fits better than Poisson model for this dependent variable. 
Specifically, test results show that NBRM has smaller BIC and AIC scores (14349.5 and 
14206.7, respectively) than PRM scores (14777.7 and 14642.4, respectively). The 
equation for Negative Binomial regression is the same as the equation of Poisson 
Regression: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒(𝛾𝑖) = ⁡𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 +  𝛽3𝑥3 + 𝛽4(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2) +  𝛽5(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3) + 𝛽6(𝑥2 ∗
𝑥3) +  𝛽7(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3) ⁡+ ⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛        (10) 
Because researchers do not usually like to interpret in terms of logarithms, we can 
reformulate the equation (2) by taking its antilogarithm for both sides (Moksony and 
Hegedus 2015):  
𝛾𝑖 = ⁡exp⁡(𝛽0) ∗ ⁡exp⁡(𝛽1𝑥1) ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽2𝑥2) ∗ exp(⁡𝛽3𝑥3) ∗ exp(𝛽4(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2)) ∗
exp⁡(⁡𝛽5(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥3)) ∗ exp⁡(⁡𝛽6(𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3)) ∗ exp⁡(⁡𝛽7(𝑥1 ∗ 𝑥2 ∗ 𝑥3)) ∗ exp⁡(⁡𝛽𝑛𝑽𝑛)  (11) 
The coefficient 𝛽1⁡has an additive effect of the explanatory variable on the 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝛾) scale, 
exp(𝛽1) represents incidence-rate ratios (IRR), which have a multiplicative effect in the γ 
scale, indicating “how many times larger (or smaller) the mean frequency of the 
phenomenon under study becomes as the independent variable increases by one unit” 
(Long and Freese 2014; Moksony and Hegedus 2015:101).  
DHS recommends sample weights for all analyses to adjust for non-response. The 
weights that are used for all units of analyses in DHS are to make the sample data 
representative of the population. DHS sample weights are computed with six decimals, 
but they are presented without decimal points in the standard data files. For example, for 
women dataset, DHS provides a weight variable (v005) that does not include decimal 
points; thus, analysts need to divide that variable by 1000000 and create a new variable. I 
created this variable for sample weight and used that sampling weight variable in all 
analyses. I use the Stata/MP 14.0 software package to perform all statistical analyses 
stated above. 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present descriptive statistics for the analytic sample. I also 
presented a correlation matrix for all study variables in Appendix B. As expected, women 
in the sample are quite religious with a mean score of 2.154 (out of three) on the 
religiosity scale. Although not shown in the table, in fact, almost half (47.3%) of married 
women regularly practice all three religious behaviors (praying, fasting, and wearing a 
headscarf). Variables measuring the level of modernization of women show that a 
majority of women completed primary education (60.4%). In addition, there is a 
statistically significant (p<0.001) increase in women’s education from 2008 to 2013. A 
majority of women have egalitarian ideology in their households (mean=2.384) and this 
again significantly (p<0.001) increased between 2008 and 2013. More than four out of 
five women (84.0%) chose answers supporting egalitarian ideology for at least two 
statements measuring gender ideology in households (not shown). A majority of 
respondents (73.0%) were living in urban areas. Although urbanization is generally 
increasing in Turkey, though data do not show a statistically significant increase from 
2008 to 2013.  
The four proximate determinants of fertility measures generally show early 
marriage but also fairly high engagement with methods to avoid pregnancy. The mean 
age at first sex, which usually indicates the age at marriage in Turkey, is 20 (ranging from 
10 to 48). Almost all of married women (90.3%) have used a contraception method at 
least once. Almost half of respondents (45.2%) uses modern methods. Few women use 
irreversible contraceptive methods (9.1%). However, use of irreversible contraception 
methods significantly increases (p<0.050) from 8.5% in 2008 to 9.7% in 2013. About 
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16% of married women ended their pregnancies in induced abortion at least once, 
although the abortion rate declined over time (from 19.0% in 2008 to 12.9% in 2013; 
p<0.001). The frequency of induced abortion use shows that 10.9% of married women 
used induced abortion one time, 3.3% two times, and 1.7% three times. The number of 
children born to a married woman show that the mean children born to a married woman 
is 2.5. There is a statistically significant (p<0.001) drop from the mean of 2.6 children in 
2008 to 2.4 children in 2013. 
About 43% of married women are employed. There is a large and significant 
increase in the percent of married women’s employment from 29.2% in 2008 to 31.5% in 
2013. Since DHS examines the reproductive period of women from puberty through 
menopause, women’s age ranges from 15 to 49 and the mean age is 34.2. A majority of 
husbands completed primary education (42.7%) or secondary school (30.0%). The mean 
wealth (2.91) in the sample indicates that a majority of married women are living in at 
least middle economic status.  
A majority of respondents are Turkish (77.1%) and about 22.9% are non-
Turkish—primarily Kurdish (19.5%), with very small percentages of Arabic (around 
2.5%) and others (0.9%). A quarter (25.2%) of respondents reside in the West region, 
with 13.7% from the South, 19.8% from the Central, 13.2% from the North, and 28.1% 
from the East regions. Lastly, survey year variable shows that the ratio of respondents 
from 2008 and 2013 surveys is about equal (51.2% and 48.8%, respectively).
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSES OF NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
This chapter presents the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses of 
modernization and secularization on the number of children born to ever-married women 
in Turkey. I hypothesized that (H1) modernization would be negatively associated with 
the number of children, and a positive association between religiosity and number of 
children, but also that the interaction effects of modernization (education, egalitarianism, 
and urbanization) and religiosity variables would not provide a significant association 
with number of children (see Table 2.1). 
I expected to find a negative association between modernization and parity rates, 
because of increasing opportunity cost and changing ideologies, along with 
modernization and decreased fertility rates (Becker 1981; Lesthaeghe 2014). I also 
expected to find a positive association between religiosity and parity rates, because most 
religions encourage their believers to have many children. Religion has quite strong and 
important effects on fertility rates, so might balance the negative effect of modernization 
and prevent population growth from going into negative values. Therefore, I expected to 
find non-significant effects of interaction terms between religiosity and modernization 
factors.  
I used Poisson regression models to examine the interaction effects between 
women’s education, egalitarian gender ideology, urban residence, and level of religiosity 
on the number of children. Parity is a count of the number of children born and 
preliminary analyses showed that this count did not have excessive zeroes, and was not 
over-dispersed as the variance and mean scores were almost equal (2.81 and 2.49, 
respectively), indicating that the Poisson distribution is appropriate.  
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4.1 Number of Children 
4.1.1 Bivariate Results 
Table 4.1 shows the exponentiated Poisson regression coefficients (exp[b]) for 
bivariate analyses between the total number of children born to a married woman and all 
other variables included in analyses. I used exponentiated coefficients (Incidence Rates 
Ratio [IRR], in this case) to allow for more meaningful interpretations. IRR scores are 
interpreted in multiplicative terms; for instance, in calculating “how many times larger 
(or smaller) the mean frequency of the phenomenon under study becomes as the 
independent variable increases by one-unit” (Long and Freese 2014; Moksony and 
Hegedűs 2014). 
Consistent with my expectations, religiosity showed a statistically significant (p < 
0.001) and positive association (IRR = 1.237). These results indicate that religious 
women had more children than their counterparts. All modernization factors (women’s 
education, egalitarian ideology, and urban residence) were negative associated with parity 
(IRR = 0.658, IRR = 0.840, and IRR = 0.794, respectively) and highly significant (p < 
0.001). All these findings were consistent with my expectations and support the first and 
second part of my first hypothesis (H1), stating that modernization would be negatively 
associated with number of children, and projecting a positive association between 
religiosity and number of children. 
These four main variables were highly significant (p < 0.001) and had quite large 
effect sizes. First, religiosity had IRR = 1.237 on number of children born to a married 
woman. Specifically, for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the incidence rates of higher 
parity is multiplied by a factor of 1.237. An alternative way to interpret this effect is in 
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the percentage change, mostly preferred by social scientists, and calculated using the 
equations (6 and 7) in Chapter 3. For example, the interpretation of religiosity in 
percentage can be calculated by placing given statistics to the first equation 6, because 
IRR is larger than one. (1.237 – 1) *100 = 23.7% the change can be interpreted as: the 
incidence rates of higher parity were 23.7% larger with each one-unit increase in 
religiosity. 
The constant of this Poisson model had the value of 1.49, indicating the average 
number of children when all other variables are zero. With the given statistics, I 
calculated the estimated number of children born for any variable by using this equation 
(_cons*(exp(b)/1)), where _cons shows the expected mean value of a dependent variable. 
Exp(b), in this case, indicates the exponentiated Poisson coefficient, or IRR, and “1” 
indicates the 100 % incidence rate. The constant must be multiplied with the IRR values 
because, after exponentiation of a coefficient, the new value becomes a multiplicative 
value.  
For example, we can estimate the average number of children born to a married 
woman who practices only one religious behavior by placing given statistics into the 
equation (1.49*(1.237/1)) = 1.84. This finding shows that a married woman who 
practices only one religious behavior has an average of 1.84 children, after holding all 
other factors constant. By using the equation above, we can also estimate the average 
number of children born to married women who practice two and all three religious 
behaviors [(1.84*(1.237/1)) = 2.27 and (2.27*(1.237/1)) = 2.82, respectively]. These 
results showed that religiosity has the third largest effect size (2.82 – 1.84 = 0.98) among 
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focal independent variables. Overall, these findings show that married women’s 
religiosity is positively associated with their parity, holding all other factors constant. 
Second, women’s education is negatively associated (IRR = 0.658) with number 
of children born. This result indicates that for a one-unit increase in women’s education, 
the incidence rates of higher parity multiplied by a factor of 0.658. We can also calculate 
the number of children ever born to a married woman for each category of their 
education.  
The constant of this Poisson analyses was 3.81, which indicates the average 
number of children born to married women with no education. By using these statistical 
values, we can estimate the average number of children born to married women for each 
category of their education. For example, the estimated number of children born to a 
married woman with a primary education can be calculated with the formulation 
(3.81*(0.658/1)) = 2.51. The estimated number of children born to a married woman with 
a secondary or higher education can be calculated with the same equation, just by using 
the estimated number of children from the prior category [(2.51 *(0.658/1)) = 1.64 and 
(1.64*(0.658/1)) = 1.08, respectively]. These findings showed that women’s education 
has the largest effect size (3.81 – 1.08 = 2.73) among focal independent variables. 
Overall, findings showed that married women’s education had an inverse effect on the 
number of children ever born. 
 Third, egalitarian ideology is negatively associated (IRR = 0.840) with number of 
children born. This finding indicates that a one-unit increase in egalitarian ideology 
multiplied the incidence rates of higher parity for a married woman by a factor of 0.840, 
net of all other factors. The constant of this model was 3.57, which shows the average 
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number of children born to married women. One can estimate the number of children 
born to married women for each category of egalitarian ideology by using the equation 
given above (_cons*(IRR/1)). When we simply added the given statistics 
(3.57*(0.840/1)), we found that married women who supported only one egalitarian 
ideology statement had the average of 3.00 children. The estimated number of children 
born to married women who supported two and three egalitarian ideology statements was 
calculated with the same equation, using the estimated number of children for the prior 
category [(3.00*(0.840/1)) = 2.51 and (2.51*(0.840/1)) = 2.11]. These results showed that 
egalitarian ideology has the second largest effect size (3.57 – 2.11 = 1.46) among focal 
independent variables. Overall, egalitarian ideology had an inverse relationship with 
number of children born to married women.  
 Lastly, urban residence had IRR = 0.794 on number of children born. This finding 
shows that the incidence rates of higher parity for a married woman living in urban areas 
were 20.6 % smaller than their rural counterparts, holding all other variables constant. 
The intercept of this analysis was 2.80, meaning the average number of children born to 
rural married women. The parity rate of urban women can be estimated by using the same 
equation used for the estimations above (2.80*(0.794/1)) = 2.23. This finding indicates 
that the estimated number of children born to urban women was 2.23 children. These 
results showed that urban residence has the smallest effect size (2.80 - 2.23 = 0.57) 
among focal independent variables. Overall, results showed living in urban areas as 
negatively associated with number of children born to married women.  
 To summarize the effects of the main independent variables on number of 
children born, I found women’s education as the largest effect size. Women with no 
69 
 
education had 3.81 children on average but women with highest level of education had 
1.08 children on average. In addition, egalitarian ideology has the second largest effect 
and had 2.11 children on average for highest egalitarian ideology (which dropped from 
3.57 children on average for women with traditional ideology). Urban residence had 2.22 
children on average and rural had 2.80. On the other hand, religiosity showed that 
married women with lowest religiosity had 1.84 children on average, but married women 
with highest religiosity had 2.82 children on average. Based on these statistics, women’s 
education has the largest, egalitarian ideology is second largest, religiosity is third largest, 
and urban has the smallest effect size.   
 The variables that measure the Proximate Determinants of Fertility (PDF) showed 
that age at first marriage had a statistically significant and negative association (OR = 
0.933, p < 0.001) with number of children. Contraceptive use had a statistically 
significant and positive association (OR = 1.712, p < 0.001) with number of children. 
Thus, married women who use contraceptives had more children on average. Married 
women not using any contraceptive methods had fewer (OR = 0.768, p < 0.001) children 
than other women using any methods. Use of traditional and modern methods had no 
statistically significant associations. Permanent contraceptive method was positively 
associated (OR = 1.638, p < 0.001) with number of children born to a married woman. 
Similarly, abortion use and frequency were statistically significant and positively 
associated (OR = 1.261, p < 0.001 and OR = 1.153, p < 0.001, respectively) with number 
of children. These findings are not surprising given the cross-sectional nature of the 
data—women with more children are more apt to have completed their family size and 
thus be actively trying to avoid pregnancy/ birth. 
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 The variables measuring women’s and household characteristics showed women’s 
employment was statistically significant and negatively associated (OR = 0.888, p < 
0.001) with number of children. As expected, women’s age was positively associated 
(OR = 1.039, p < 0.001) with number of children. Husband’s education, wealth, and 
Turkish ethnicity had negative associations (OR = 0.750, p < 0.001; OR = 0.863, p < 
0.001; OR = 0.627, p < 0.001) with number of children.  
Among the region variables west and central had statistically significant and 
negative associations (OR = 0.793, p < 0.001, and OR = 0.976, p < 0.001) with number 
of children. The negative association for the central region might stem from the fact that 
the capital city is located there. The west region is the most developed and Europeanized 
in Turkey. The south and east regions had statistically significant and positive 
associations (OR = 1.069, p < 0.001 and OR = 1.504, p < 0.001) with number of children, 
and the north region was not significantly associated with parity.  
Lastly, the regression coefficients of survey year showed total number of children 
born to a married woman as declining (OR = 0.944, p < 0.001) from 2008 to 2013. This 
finding is consistent with declining birth rates in Turkey across this time period (World 
Bank 2015).  
4.1.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 4.2 presents the Poisson regression of the number of children on key 
independent variables, religiosity, women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban 
residence. The IRR are presented in the tables for all Poisson regression analyses. 
The results in Model 1 indicate that a one-unit increase in religiosity multiplied 
the incidence rates of a married woman having had another child by an additional 1.069 
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(or (1.069 – 1) *100 = 6.9%), holding the other variables constant. A one-unit change in 
religiosity indicates the difference, for example, between a respondent who never 
practices any religious behaviors and one who practices one of three religious behaviors 
(fasting during Ramadan, prays five times in a day, or wears a headscarf). All else being 
equal, the estimated parity for a married woman who practices none of the religious 
activities is 2.44. The estimated parity was calculated for other categories by using this 
equation: (2.44*(1.069/1) = 2.61 children for a married woman who practices only one 
religious behavior, (2.61*(1.069/1) = 2.79 children for a married woman who practices 
two religious behaviors, (2.79*(1.069/1) = 2.98 children for married women who practice 
all three religious behaviors, while holding all other factors constant.  
The findings of control variables were generally consistent with the prior 
literature, and their effects were similar across all models shown in Table 4.1 and Table 
4.2. The variables measuring (PDF) showed the expected results. Age at first marriage 
was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and negatively associated (IRR = 954) with the 
parity level of married women; thus, a later age at first marriage reduces the incidence 
rates of higher parity, net of other factors. The variables measuring contraceptive 
methods showed using any kind of contraceptive methods (traditional, modern reversible, 
and permanent vs. none) was statistically significant (all has p < 0.001) and positively 
associated (IRR = 1.310, IRR = 1.394, and IRR = 1.596, respectively) with higher parity 
level. In addition, the number of induced abortions used by a married woman was also 
significantly (p < 0.010) and associated with (IRR = 1.021) a higher number of children 
born to that woman.  
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This finding indicates that induced abortion is used either for purposes of limiting 
or spacing births. Prior studies suggest that even though distribution of abortion use by 
parity varies across countries (Henshaw 1986), the abortion use for limiting or spacing 
births is common among older women in some Eastern nations (Westoff et al. 1998). The 
abortion rates among younger people (age group 20–24) tend to peak in English-speaking 
countries. Thus, in developed countries induced abortion is used to prevent having any 
child, while in developing and some recently developed countries induced abortion is 
generally used following initiation of childbearing to spacing or limit subsequent births.     
 Variables controlling for women’s individual and household characteristics also 
showed generally expected findings. Women’s employment was negatively associated 
(IRR = 0.952, p < 0.001) with the parity level. Women’s age was positively associated 
(IRR = 1.040, p < 0.001) with the parity level of a married woman. However, husband’s 
education, household wealth, and Turkish ethnicity were negatively associated (all p < 
0.001, and respectively IRR = 0.929, IRR = 0.937, and IRR = 0.768) with parity. 
 Variables for region showed all regions (south with IRR = 1.091, central with IRR 
= 1.047, north with IRR = 1.062, and east with IRR = 1.240) had higher parity rates than 
the west region. Again, the western part of Turkey is the most developed and 
Europeanized. In addition, the variable controlling for survey year continued to show 
lower parity for married women in 2013, compared to 2008.  
Model 2 presents the results incorporating both religiosity and components of 
modernization. A one-unit increase in religiosity multiplied the incidence rates of higher 
parity of a married woman by an additional 1.057 (IRR), holding all modernization 
variables and other control variables constant. Adding modernization factors resulted in a 
73 
 
slight decrease in the effect of religiosity between Models 1 and 2 (from IRR = 1.069 to 
IRR = 1.057). Post-estimation Wald X2 indicated this was a statistically significant 
change (p < 0.001). The strength of the religiosity effect between Models 1 and 2 
remained robust. However, this finding also showed the effect of religiosity on married 
women’s parity as minimally mediated by these modernization factors. This indicates that 
religion had a quite strong association with the number of children born to a married 
woman. 
Except for urban residence, the components of modernization were negatively 
associated with number of children born to a married woman. For example, a one-unit 
increase in woman’s education multiplied the incidence rates of the woman would have 
had another child by a factor of 0.921 (IRR), net of all other control variables. I 
calculated the estimated parity at different levels of education. The constant value of this 
analysis was 2.44, showing the average parity while holding all factors constant. This 
means 2.44 children for women with no education, (2.44*(0.921/1)) = 2.25 children for 
women with primary education, (2.25*(0.921/1)) = 2.07children for women with 
secondary education, and (2.07*(0.921/1)) = 1.91 children for women with higher 
education. These results indicated women’s education as a statistically significant and 
quite large association with the number of children born to married women in Turkey.    
Similarly, a one-unit increase in egalitarian ideology multiplied the incidence 
rates of a married woman having had another child by a factor of 0.971, holding all other 
factors constant. A one-unit increase in egalitarian ideology indicates, for example, the 
difference between a respondent who favored statements measuring egalitarian gender 
ideology and one who supported one of the statements. By using the same equation 
74 
 
above, I calculated the estimated parity at different levels of egalitarian ideology. The 
intercept was 2.44, the average parity, after holding all factors constant in the model. This 
means women with no egalitarian ideology had 2.44 children. For women who supported 
one statement measuring egalitarian ideology, the estimated number of children was 
(2.44*(0.971/1)) = 2.36. For women who supported two statements measuring egalitarian 
ideology, the estimated parity was (2.36*(0.971/1)) = 2.29. For women with egalitarian 
ideology, the estimated parity was (2.29*(0.971/1)) = 2.22. These findings show that 
egalitarian ideology has a very small but statistically significant association with the 
number of children of married Turkish women, all else being equal.  
Unexpectedly, urban residence was positively association with number of children 
born to a married woman. More specifically, the incidence rates for higher parity of a 
married woman living in an urban area were 2.3% larger than for a married woman living 
in a rural area, net of all other factors. Preliminary analyses showed that the magnitude 
and direction of urban variable changed (from 0.967 IRR to 1.022 IRR) after controlling 
for wealth, suggesting wealth was acting as a “distorter” variable. According to 
Rosenberg (1968: 94), “a distorter variable reveals that the correct interpretation is 
precisely the reverse of that suggested by the original data.”  
In the present case, the inclusion of wealth in the model reversed the negative 
association between urban residence and number of children into a positive one. There is 
an inverse association between wealth and parity for several reasons: 1) Time is more 
expensive for wealthy people (opportunity cost); thus, they generally have two or fewer 
children (Becker 1981; Kaplan 1996; Kaplan et al. 1995). 2) Wealthy people prefer 
quality over quantity and raise quality children because of human capital they have; thus, 
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they generally have fewer children than lower income people (Becker and Lewis 1973; 
Moav 2005). 3) Aging parents are usually taken care of by their children, but such an old-
age security motive is less necessary for wealthy parents (Rendall and Bahchieva 1998). 
Yet. wealth is positively associated with urban because urban life is more expensive than 
rural life and wealthy persons are able to afford to support more children. Thus, once I 
controlled for wealth I found that urban was associated with a higher parity.  
4.1.3 Interaction Results  
Table 4.3 presents the key tests for my first hypothesis (H1). The table shows the 
results of interactions between religiosity and components of modernization on the 
number of children born to a married woman. Model 1 shows the interaction between 
religiosity and women’s education as not statistically associated with married women’s 
parity. Similarly, Model 2 shows the interaction term between religiosity and egalitarian 
gender ideology as not statistically significant with number of children ever born to a 
married woman. Model 3, however, presents a marginally significant (p = 0.050) and 
positive association between the interaction between religiosity and urban, and number of 
children ever born to a married woman. The control variables interpreted above in 
previous table (4.2) remain significant and are quite similar in magnitude in Model 1 
across Model 7 in Table 4.3. 
This statistically significant interaction between religiosity and urban residence 
(model 3) shows that for a married woman living in urban areas, a one-unit increase in 
the religiosity multiplied the incidence rates of higher parity by an additional 1.023 
(IRR), holding other factors in the model constant. Figure 4.1 graphically presents the 
interaction between religiosity and urban residence on parity and shows almost perfectly 
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parallel lines, probably because the significance level of this interaction is the cut-off 
point (p = 0.050). This interaction effect indicates that the effect of religiosity on a 
married woman’s parity slightly depends on her residence area (urban vs. rural). This 
positive association between the interaction variable and married women’s parity 
nevertheless supports my argument that the effect of religiosity and modernization factors 
(in this case, urban) can coexist because SDT theory would predict a negative association 
(see Table 2.1). 
In order to make sure these unexpected results were not caused by the effect of 
distorter variable (wealth) on urban residence, in the supplementary analysis I excluded 
the wealth variable from the analysis of Model 3, and neither the magnitude nor 
significance level of the interaction variable changed; however, the p value dropped from 
0.050 to 0.016, indicating a more significant effect. These supplementary findings 
indicate that this unexpected finding was not caused by the distorter variable wealth.  
Overall, the findings were consistent with my first hypothesis (H1). Models 1 and 
2 (Table 4.3) show that the effect of religiosity on parity did not vary by modernization 
components. Model 3 also shows that the effect of urban on parity depends on the effect 
of religiosity, which still supports my argument that secularization is not an inevitable 
result of modernization. 
Models 4 and 5, however, unexpectedly showed statistically significant (p < 
0.001) and positive interactions between women’s education and urban residence, and 
between women’s egalitarian ideology and urban residence. This significant and positive 
association of the interaction in Model 4 demonstrates the negative effect of women’s 
education on the incidence rates of higher parity was 6.3% larger in urban areas than rural 
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areas, after controlling for other factors in the model. The interaction plot in Figure 4.2 
presents the interaction between women’s education and urban residence on parity; the 
lines are not parallel. The lines in the plot demonstrate that urban women (especially 
women with higher education) having had more children than their rural counterparts. 
This interaction effect indicates that the association between women’s education and 
married women’s parity varies by residential area (urban vs. rural). 
Similarly, the association in Model 5 (Table 4.3) shows that the negative effect of 
egalitarian ideology on the incidence rates of higher parity was 3.1% larger in urban areas 
than rural areas, net of other factors in the model. Similarly, as in Model 3, 
supplementary analyses indicated that the results of these interaction variables in Model 4 
and 5 were not affected by wealth. Figure 4.3 presents the interaction between egalitarian 
ideology and urban residence on the number of children ever born; the lines as not 
parallel. This interaction effect indicates that the effect of egalitarian ideology on married 
women’s parity depended on residence area (urban vs. rural). Both Figures 4.2 and 4.3 
reveal that urban married women with higher education and higher egalitarian ideology 
had more children than their rural counterparts.  
Models 6 and 7 (Table 4.3) present the results of three-way interactions between 
religiosity and components of modernization. Model 6 shows a non-significant 
association between the first three-way interaction term between religiosity, woman’s 
education, and urban residence and number of children born to a married woman. 
Similarly, Model 7 shows the association between number of children born to a married 
woman and the second three-way interaction between religiosity, egalitarian gender 
ideology, and urban residence as not statistically significant. 
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4.1.4 Supplemental Analyses of Binary Fertility Measure 
I ran supplementary analyses to test the effects of modernization and 
secularization on a dichotomous fertility variable, where 0 = childless and 1= having at 
least one child. These results showed that contraceptive use and methods have 
unexpectedly large effect sizes due to multicollinearity. When I further checked the 
descriptive statistics of contraceptive use, I found out that the number of married women 
with no children and who also use no contraceptive methods was quite small, 400 
respondents (3.3 % of total sample). Because of the multicollinearity issue, in further 
analyses, I ran my models without controlling for contraceptive use; these findings 
showed almost all my indicators (including main independent variables) were not 
statistically significant. When I exclude married women’s age—which I suspected 
explained married women’s childlessness—the results showed some statistically 
significant associations. These supplementary analyses indicated that married Turkish 
women in the reproductive years are childless because of their age; that is, they are young 
and have not yet initiated childbearing. I did not further pursue these analyses due to this 
finding. 
4.1.5 Summary 
To summarize the findings, the main independent variables showed findings 
consistent with the literature: 1) a married woman’s religiosity was associated with the 
higher parity, and 2) components of modernization were negatively associated with 
parity. The exception to this latter point was that urban residence was influenced by the 
distorter variable wealth. 
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On the other hand, interaction terms provide quite interesting findings. The two-
way interaction terms between religiosity and two components of modernization 
(women’s education and egalitarian ideology) had statistically non-significant 
associations, but the interaction term between religiosity and urban residence provided a 
statistically significant and positive association with number of children born to a married 
woman. These statistically non-significant findings support my hypothesis (H1) and my 
argument that the effects of religiosity on parity do not depend on modernization in 
Turkey. These results contradict the general literature—where modernization and 
secularization are generally accepted as hand-in-hand processes, which exert a joint 
negative affect on fertility behaviors (Lesthaeghe 2010, 2014).  
Furthermore, the interaction term between religiosity and urban residence was 
statistically significant and positively associated with married women’s parity. This 
finding also supports the first hypothesis (H1); this positive association shows that both 
modernization factor (urban residency) and religiosity can coexist. This positive 
association also forms a key divergence because the Second Demographic Transition 
(SDT) theory would suggest a negative association. Hence, contrary to the SDT theory, 
urbanization does not diminish the positive effects of religiosity of married women on 
parity in Turkish society. 
The interaction terms between women’s education and urban residence, and 
between egalitarian ideology and urban residence were statistically significant and 
positively associated with married women’s parity. These findings indicate that the 
effects of women’s education and egalitarian ideology on married women’s parity vary 
by residential area (urban vs. rural).  
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Lastly, the three-way interaction terms had no statistically significant 
associations. These results show that the effect of religiosity on married women’s parity 
does not depend on women’s education, egalitarian ideology, or residential area.     
Overall, the results from this chapter suggest that even though the components of 
modernization (except urban residence) were negatively related to women’s parity, the 
effect of religiosity on women’s parity does not depend on components of modernization 
(except urban residence). However, both statistically significant and non-significant 
findings support my hypothesis (H1) as they reveal that, contrary to general literature, the 
effect of religiosity and modernization on women’s parity coexists together in Turkish 
society.
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 CHAPTER 5: ANALYSES OF CONTRACEPTIVE USE AND TYPE 
This chapter presents the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses of 
modernization and secularization on any contraceptive use, as well as the type of 
contraceptive method uses, by married women in Turkey. I hypothesized that (H2) 
modernization would be positively associated with contraceptive use, but there would be 
no association between religious behaviors and contraception use, as contraceptive use in 
Islamic teachings, based on many hadiths, is generally permissible. Also, H2 stated that 
the interaction terms between religiosity and modernization factors (education, 
egalitarianism, and urbanization) would have non-significant associations with 
contraceptive use (see Table 2.1).  
I expected to find such results because modernization, and the opportunity cost of 
having children that comes with modernization, increases individuals’ contraceptive use. 
In developed countries this social change is accompanied by secularization, which is also 
positively associated with contraceptive use. In Turkey’s case, however, I expected to 
find no relationship between contraceptive use and religion, because the primary 
interpretations of Islamic teachings permit contraceptive use—except for permanent 
contraceptive methods (Al-Bukhari 1999: v7: b62:h9, h11, h12, h135; e.g., Al-Ghazali 
1939; Karaman 2018). I also expected to find a statistically non-significant association 
between contraceptive use and the interaction term between religiosity and modernization 
factors, because Islamic teachings based on hadiths permit all reversible contraceptive 
methods.   
There were two dependent variables used to test this hypothesis: any 
contraceptive use (a dichotomous variable) and a categorically indicator of specific 
contraceptive methods used. Thus, I used binary logistic regression models for analyses 
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of any contraceptive use and multinomial logistic regression for the analyses of 
contraceptive type.  
5.1 Any Contraceptive Use 
5.1.1 Bivariate Results 
Table 5.1 shows the binary logistic regression coefficients of bivariate analyses 
between any contraceptive use and all other variables included in the analyses in terms of 
Odds Ratios (OR). As with IRR, I used exponentiated binary logistic regression 
coefficients (OR) for more meaningful interpretations. The exponentiated coefficients 
allow researchers to calculate percentage change by using the equations (5 and 6) in 
chapter 3. 
Religiosity was statistically significant and negatively associated with 
contraceptive use. More specifically, for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the odds of 
using any contraceptive method multiplied by a factor of 0.852 (OR), net of all other 
factors in the analysis. Alternatively, by using Equation 6 from chapter 3, we can 
calculate and interpret this result in percentages: a one-unit increase in religiosity 
decreased the odds of contraceptive use by 14.8% (=(1- 0.852) *100) net of all other 
factors in the analysis. The negative association between religiosity and contraceptive use 
was unexpected and suggests that some religious women in Turkey may believe using 
contraception goes against the general teachings of Islam. 
All components of modernization had statistically significant (all p < 0.001) and 
positive bivariate associations with contraceptive use. More specifically, women’s 
education, egalitarian ideology, and urban had positive associations (OR = 1.506, OR = 
1.479, and 1.706, respectively). The effect sizes of women’s education, egalitarian 
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ideology, and urban on contraceptive use were quite large (in percentage change in odds, 
50.6%, 47.9%, and 70.6%).  
Women’s education had OR = 1.506, which indicated that for each unit increase 
in women’s education, the odds of using any contraceptive methods multiplied by 1.506. 
Woman’s education included three categories, and the analysis between women’s 
education and any contraceptive use show a 6.82 constant score. I simply calculated the 
effect sizes by using the equation (_cons*(exp(b)/1)) for all bivariate analyses. 
Specifically, for women with no education, the odds ratio of using any method was 6.82; 
for women with primary education; the odds ratio was (6.82*(1.506/1)) = 10.27; for 
women with secondary education, the odds ratio was (10.27*(1.506/1)) = 15.47; and for 
women with higher education, the odds ratio was (15.47*(1.506/1)) = 23.30. When I 
calculated their effect sizes, I found the second highest change (23.30 – 6.82 = 16.48) in 
OR of using any contraceptive method for women’s education. 
Egalitarian ideology had OR = 1.479, which indicated that for a one-unit increase 
in egalitarian ideology, the odds of using any contraceptive method multiplies by 1.479. 
Egalitarian ideology also had three categories and a larger constant (11.24) than the 
(6.82) constant for woman’s education. I calculated the effect size for this variable with 
the same equation used for the effect size of woman’s education.  Calculations showed 
that the OR of using any contraceptive method varied, from 11.24, for women with 
traditional ideology, to 36.35, for women with egalitarian ideology. The calculations 
revealed egalitarian ideology as having the largest effect size (36.35 -11.24 = 25.11) on 
contraceptive use. 
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Lastly, urban residence had OR = 1.706, thus the odds of using a contraceptive 
method for urban married women was 70.6% larger than their rural counterparts. Urban 
was a dichotomous variable, with a 7.43 constant. I calculated the effect size with the 
same equations used above (_cons*(exp(b)/1)). Specifically, calculations showed the OR 
for women living in rural areas as 7.43, and for women living in urban areas as 
(7.43*(1.706/1)) = 12.66. The calculations showed that the OR of using any contraceptive 
method in urban areas had the smallest effect size (12.66 -7.43 = 5.23) among 
modernization factors.    
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility (PDF) showed the expected associations. 
Age at first marriage (as a proxy for age at first sex) was statistically significant and 
negatively associated (OR = 0.952 at p < 0.001) with contraceptive use. As age at 
marriage (or first sex) increases, the use of any contraceptive methods likely decreases 
because couples might want to have children before the end of reproductive years. The 
use of induced abortion was statistically significant and positively associated (OR = 
4.488 at p < 0.001) with contraceptive use. This result was expected because people who 
ended their pregnancy with induced abortion probably want to stop becoming pregnant 
again. Similarly, abortion frequency showed a highly significant and positive association 
(2.588 at p < 0.001). The number of children born to a married woman was also 
statistically significant and positively associated (OR = 1.775 at p < 0.001) with any 
contraceptive use. This result indicated that the number of children a married woman has 
increases the odds of using any contraceptive methods. This result could have occurred 
because, once the desired family size has been, reached, married women want to limit 
further pregnancies or to space their births (Westoff et al. 2008). 
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The variables measuring women’s and household characteristics showed women’s 
employment was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated (OR = 
1.433) with contraceptive use. The odds of using any contraceptive methods were 43.3% 
higher for employed married women than their unemployed counterparts. Woman’s age 
was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated (OR = 1.050) with 
contraceptive use. Her husband’s education, wealth, and Turkish ethnicity were 
statistically significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated (OR =1.375, OR = 1.423, 
and OR = 2.772, respectively) with a married women’s contraceptive use. 
 The region variables showed that, compared to other regions, the south (OR = 
0.757, p < 0.010) and east (0.358, p < 0.001) regions had statistically significant and 
negative associations with contraceptive use. Other regions showed positive associations, 
but only the west and central regions were statistically significant. The west and central 
regions showed statistically significant (p < 0.001) associations (OR = 1.802 and OR = 
1.479). As can be seen from results given above, the west and east, respectively, 
represent the areas of highest and lowest contraceptive use in Turkey. 
These contraception statistics correspond to the birth rates in these regions. The 
eastern part of Turkey has higher fertility rates than other regions, which might be briefly 
explained by the fact that, although Kurdish people live throughout the country, 71.0% of 
those who speak Kurdish as a mother tongue live in eastern parts of Turkey (TDHS 
2008–2013). Among the Kurdish people, girls generally marry earlier than Turkish girls 
and earlier age at marriage is associated with higher fertility (Gönder 2017). In contrast, 
the western part of Turkey has the lowest fertility rates primarily because these areas are 
more developed and Europeanized.  
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Finally, the survey year variable showed a positive but statistically non-significant 
association, indicating that the use of any contraceptive methods among married women 
experienced little change from 2008 to 2013.  
5.1.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 5.2 provides the results of logistic regressions of any contraceptive use with 
key independent variables in odds (exponentiated coefficients [exp(b)]). Model 1 shows 
that a one-unit increase in the religiosity multiplied the odds of using any contraceptive 
method by 0.880 (OR), net of other factors in the model. This result indicated that 
religious people are reluctant to use contraceptive methods, even though Islamic 
teachings permit reversible contraceptive use (Sahih al-Bukhari 1997: v7: b62:h9, h11, 
h12, h135).  
I ran all models in Table 5.2 with a series of control variables. The results of 
almost all control variables (except respondent’s employment) were quite similar across 
Models 1 and 2. I used three variables to control for the PDF in these analyses. Age at 
first marriage had no statistically significant association with contraceptive use. Age at 
first marriage variable had a statistically significant and negative association in the 
bivariate analysis, but in the multivariate models it was no longer significant.  The results 
of abortion frequency showed that, for a one-unit increase in induced abortion, the odds 
of using any contraceptive method were multiplied by 1.836, after controlling for other 
factors in the model. Similarly, for each additional child in married women’s parity, the 
odds of using a contraceptive method were multiplied by 2.386, net of other factors.  
In addition, I controlled for women’s and household characteristics with five 
variables. Women’s employment showed a positive association with contraceptive use 
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(but when I included modernization factors into the analysis the association disappeared). 
Respondent’s age showed a negative association with contraceptive use. A woman’s 
husband’s education, her household wealth, and Turkish ethnicity presented positive 
associations with contraceptive use. Compared to the west of Turkey, only the south and 
east were statistically significant, showing negative associations with contraceptive use. 
Survey year showed no statistically significant association with contraception use.  
Model 2 provides the results of both religiosity and components of modernization. 
Religiosity, as anticipated, was no longer statistically significant after including 
modernization factors into the analysis. I expected this result based on the assumption 
that educated people are more likely to search for and find information about their 
behaviors, and Islamic teachings have fewer strong restrictions on contraceptive use than 
on abortion use (The Pew Reserch Center (2010) also found education associated with 
greater religious knowledge in the United States.) This finding might be related with the 
available sources (books, the internet, and online forums for religious questions) that 
educated people can reach; thus they can advance their knowledge about their religion. 
Therefore, common view that  Islam prohibits contraceptive use is mostly challenged by 
educated people.  
In preliminary analyses, I tested the effects of modernization factors individually. 
Each component of modernization, except urban, showed statistically significant and 
positive associations with contraceptive use when entered into the model separately. For 
example, for a one-unit increase in women’s education, the expected odds of using a 
contraceptive method multiplied by 1.403, holding all other factors constant. Similarly, 
for a one-unit increase in egalitarian gender ideology, the odds of using a contraceptive 
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method multiplied by 1.358, net of all other factors. Only women’s education mediated 
the effect of religiosity, however.  This indicated that women’s education has a strong 
effect on contraceptive use. The Wald test showed the change in coefficients was 
statistically significant (p < 0.001). 
Urban, was not statistically associated with contraceptive use. Preliminary 
analyses showed that wealth, again, influenced the effect of the urban variable. In this 
case, this non-correlation could be spurious, because of the presence of the third variable, 
wealth (Rosenberg 1968).  
5.1.3 Interaction Results 
Table 5.3 presents the results of interactions between religiosity and 
modernization factors (women’s education, egalitarian ideology, urban) on contraceptive 
use. Model 1 shows a statistically significant (p < 0.050) and positive association (OR = 
1.128) between the interaction term between religiosity and women’s education and 
contraceptive use. Specifically, for a one-unit increase in religiosity the positive effect of 
woman’s education on the odds of using any contraceptive methods multiplied by 1.280, 
holding other factors in the model constant. 
The interaction plot in Figure 5.1 presents the interaction term between religiosity 
and women’s education on any contraceptive use. The non-parallel lines show that the 
effect of religiosity on contraceptive use varies by each unit increase in education. 
Specifically, at higher level of education the effect of education increases very little from 
no religiosity to high religiosity. However, the secondary education line shows a decline 
when religiosity increased, but the odds of contraceptive use was higher than the no 
education line and mostly higher than the primary education line. The primary education 
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line also shows a quite small decline as religiosity increased.  The no education line 
shows that religiosity has a stronger association with any contraceptive use. However, the 
effect of religiosity became smaller with the increase of women’s education. This 
interaction effect indicated that the effect of religiosity on any contraceptive use depends 
on women’s education.  Therefore, this result failed to support my hypothesis (H2). 
However, the result must be ascertained by further investigation using permanent 
contraceptive methods, discussed in the second part of this chapter. Finally, control 
variables in Table 5.3 present findings similar to those from Table 5.2. 
The interaction term between religiosity and egalitarian ideology in Model 2 
showed no statistically significant association with contraceptive use. Similarly, the 
interaction term between religiosity and urban in Model 3 had no statistically significant 
association with contraceptive use. These statistically non-significant associations 
indicated that the effect of religiosity on contraceptive use did not vary by modernization, 
specifically, egalitarian ideology and urban, thus provides partial evidence to support my 
hypothesis (H2).  
Surprisingly, Model 4 presents a statistically significant (p < 0.010) and negative 
association (OR = 0.606) interaction between women’s education and urban and any 
contraceptive use. Specifically, for women living in urban areas, the positive effect of 
woman’s education on the odds of using any contraceptive methods was 39.4% smaller 
than for their rural counterparts, holding other factors in the model constant. The 
interaction plot in Figure 5.2 shows the interaction term between women’s education and 
urban residence on any contraceptive use; the lines as not parallel as they intersect at 
women’s primary education (1). This interaction effect was mostly driven by women’s 
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primary education and indicated that the association between women’s education and any 
contraceptive use depends on residential area (urban vs. rural).  
In supplementary analyses, I ran the same analyses for different age groups and 
found that among younger women (≤ age 37) the interaction was not statistically 
significant, but it was statistically significant (OR = 0.318, p < 0.001) among older 
women (> age 37). I also created interaction terms between each category of women’s 
education and urban.  Findings showed only one interaction term, between primary 
education and urban, was statistically significant (OR = 528, p = 0.003). These results 
also indicated the significance of this interaction effect as mostly driven by the effect of 
education of older women (age > 37).  
The analysis in Model 5 revealed the effect of egalitarian ideology on any 
contraceptive use did not vary by area of residence (urban vs. rural). The first three-way 
interaction term, between religiosity, woman’s education, and urban residence, in Model 
6 was statistically significant (p < 0.050) and negatively associated (OR = 0.747) with 
contraceptive use.  
The interaction plot in Figure 5.3 presents the interaction term between 
religiosity, woman’s education, and urban residence on any contraceptive use; the lines as 
not parallel. Thus, we see the negative effect of religiosity on the association between 
women’s education and any contraceptive use—observed in no, primary, and secondary 
education lines in rural areas, but largely in no education and slightly in primary 
education lines in urban areas—was larger in rural than in urban areas. This interaction 
effect indicated that the association between religiosity and any contraceptive use 
depends on women’s education and residential area (urban vs. rural). As women’s 
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education increases, the negative effect of religiosity on any contraceptive use decreases 
and there are larger variations in rural areas. In supplementary analyses stratified by 
urban/rural, I tested whether the interaction term between women’s education and 
religiosity was significantly different by area. I found that the interaction term was 
statistically significant (p < 0.001) for only rural areas.  These findings indicate that 
religiosity and modernization have individual effects on contraceptive use in urban areas, 
and this partly supports my hypothesis (H2).   
In Model 7, the second three-way interaction term, between religiosity, egalitarian 
ideology, and urban residence, provided no statistically significant association. This 
finding indicated that the effect of religiosity on contraceptive use does not depend on 
modernization factors, egalitarian ideology, and urban. 
5.1.4 Summary 
Overall, the results from the first part of the analysis showed women’s education 
and egalitarian ideology were highly significant and positively associated with 
contraceptive use. Urban, however, was not statistically significant, because of its 
spurious relationship with wealth. These findings supported the first part of my second 
hypothesis (H2).  
However, contrary to my expectations, religiosity was negatively associated with 
contraceptive use, and the effect of religiosity on contraceptive use was mediated by the 
modernization factors in the analysis. In other words, the negative association between 
religiosity and contraceptive use disappeared when I included modernization factors. As 
the Pew Research Center (2010) found that educated people were more likely to have 
more religious knowledge, the reason for this mediation might be related to educated 
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individuals’ desire to find religious justifications for their behaviors and their access to 
more sources than their counterparts. These results showed that the second part of my 
second hypothesis (H2)—there would be no association between religious behaviors and 
contraception use because contraceptive use in Islamic teachings is generally 
permissible—was partly supported; religiosity had a non-significant relationship with 
contraceptive use when I controlled for modernization factors in the analysis. 
In addition, some interaction terms also provided unexpected results. For instance, 
the effect of religiosity on any contraceptive use depended on a woman’s education. As 
argued in the previous paragraph, this is possibly due to Islam’s perspective on 
contraceptive use. Because of this significant association between the interaction term 
between religiosity and women’s education, and contraceptive use, the last part of my 
second hypothesis (H2)—the interaction terms between religiosity and modernization 
(education, egalitarianism, and urbanization) would also demonstrate no significant 
association with contraception use—was partly supported because the effect of religiosity 
on contraceptive use did not depend on only egalitarian ideology. These analyses provide 
some evidence that contradict the general literature (positing that modernization and 
secularization co-occur and have no independent effects), which claims both of these as 
hand-in-hand processes that negatively influence individual’s fertility behaviors 
(Lesthaeghe 2010, 2014).  
Moreover, the interaction terms between women’s education and urban, and 
between religiosity, women’s education and urban, in Models 4 and 6 (Table 5.3), had 
statistically significant and negative associations with contraceptive use. In 
supplementary analyses, I tested these analyses for different age groups and found that 
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the statistically significant and negative associations of these interaction terms with 
contraceptive use were due to the older age of women (age > 37). As a conclusion of this 
section, my hypothesis (H2) was partly supported due to the strong association between 
women’s education and contraceptive use. 
5.2 Types of Contraceptive Methods 
The findings of the first part of this section necessitated further examination of 
currently used contraceptive methods, to understand if the significant and positive 
association between contraceptive use and the interaction term between religiosity and 
women’s education in Model 1 (Table 5.3) was caused by modernization or 
secularization. Since contraceptive use is generally permissible in Islam (except 
permanent contraceptive methods), this continued investigation of currently used 
contraceptive methods allowed me to demonstrate the detailed individual effects of both 
religiosity and modernization factors, and interaction effects between religiosity and 
modernization factors, on types of contraceptive methods, including categories of “no 
method,” “traditional method” (e.g., coitus interruptus, rhythm method),  “modern 
reversible methods” (e.g., male condom, IUD)  and “permanent methods” (e.g., tubal 
ligation). 
5.2.1 Bivariate Results 
Table 5.4 presents the OR of bivariate logistic analyses between all contraceptive 
methods (no method, traditional method, modern reversible methods, and permanent 
methods), and all other variables included in the analyses. The first column shows the 
results of bivariate analyses between no contraceptive method and all variables in the 
analyses. Religiosity and using no method were statistically significant (p < 0.010) and 
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positively associated (OR= 1.066).  Specifically, for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the 
odds of using no contraceptive method were multiplied by 1.066. All modernization 
factors, women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban, were statistically significant 
(all p < 0.001) and negatively associated (OR = 0.864, OR = 0.830, and OR = 0.762) with 
using no method. Women’s education specifically indicated that for a one-unit increase in 
women’s education, the odds of using no methods were multiplied by 0.864. Egalitarian 
ideology showed that for a one-unit increase in egalitarian ideology, the odds of using no 
method were multiplied by 0.830. Lastly, for women living in urban areas the odds of 
using no method were 33.8% smaller than for women living in rural areas.  
 The control variables showed several interesting findings. Age at first marriage 
was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated (OR = 1.034) with using 
no method. Abortion use and parity were statistically significant (both p < 0.001) and 
negatively associated (OR = 0.760, OR = 0.921, and OR = 0.770) with using no method. 
Variables controlling for women’s individual and household characteristics (women’s 
employment, women’s age, husband’s education, wealth, and Turkish ethnicity) were 
statistically significant (all p < 0.001) and negatively associated (OR = 0.791, OR = 
0.988, OR = 0.877, OR = 0.853, and OR = 0.500) with using no method. All region 
variables were statistically significant, and their directions correspond to the fertility rates 
in those regions. West, south, and north regions were negatively associated (OR = 0.778, 
OR = 0.777, and OR = 0.864) with using no method, but central and east regions were 
positively associated (OR = 1.156 and OR = 1.916) with using no methods. Finally, the 
survey year was not associated with using no method. Overall, control variables in all the 
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bivariate analyses provided the anticipated findings for Turkey; thus, I will interpret only 
focal independent variables for the bivariate comparisons of other contraceptive methods.  
 The second column in Table 5.4 shows the bivariate analyses between traditional 
contraceptive methods and all variables included in the analyses. A one-unit increase in 
religiosity multiplied the odds of using traditional methods by 1.079. Modernization 
factors were negative associated with traditional contraceptive use, but only women’s 
education and urban were statistically significant.  More specifically, for a one-unit 
increase in women’s education, the odds of using traditional method were multiplied by 
1.129. For women living in urban areas the odds of using traditional contraceptive 
methods were 13.4% smaller than for women living in rural areas. These results indicated 
religiosity had a statistically significant and positive association with traditional method 
use, while modernization factors (specifically, women’s education and urban) has a 
statistically significant and negative association with traditional method use. 
 The third column provides the results of bivariate analyses between modern 
reversible methods and all variables in the analyses. These analyses provided consistent 
findings with the general literature, but not consistent with my expectations. For example, 
religiosity showed a statistically significant and negative association with modern 
reversible method use. Specifically, for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the odds of 
using modern reversible methods were multiplied by 0.860. Contraceptive use is 
generally accepted as permissible in the popular interpretation of Islam (al-Bukhari 1999: 
v7: b62:h9, h11, h12, h135); thus, I was expecting to find that religiosity was not 
significantly associated with modern reversible methods. The findings, however, suggest 
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that religious women are reluctant to use contraceptive methods (especially the modern 
methods). 
On the other hand, modernization factors showed quite large and statistically 
significant positive associations with modern reversible method use. For example, for a 
one-unit increase in women’s education, the odds of using modern reversible methods 
were multiplied by 1.447. Similarly, the odds of using modern reversible contraceptive 
methods were multiplied by 1.274 with each unit increase in egalitarian ideology. Urban 
residence was positively associated and had a large effect size, indicating the odds of 
urban women’s modern reversible contraceptive use were 48.7% larger than for their 
rural counterparts.  
The last column shows the results of bivariate analyses between permanent 
methods and all variables in analyses. Unexpectedly, religiosity showed a statistically 
significant positive bivariate association with permanent contraceptive method use. This 
result indicated that for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the odds of using permanent 
methods were multiplied by 1.121.  This is surprising, because permanent methods are 
the only forbidden contraceptive methods in Islamic teachings. Furthermore, women’s 
education and egalitarian ideology were statistically significant and negatively associated 
with permanent contraceptive method use (urban was not statistically significant), which 
is surprising because prior literature would suggest the opposite (positive association).  
In supplementary analysis, I explored whether these surprising association might 
reflect the influence of a third variable. These findings showed that number of children 
was acting as a distorter variable. When I controlled for woman’s parity, the direction of 
associations reversed (from positive to negative for religiosity and from negative to 
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positive for the modernization factors) This indicated that women with high religiosity 
were more likely to have more children than their counterparts, and more likely to use 
permanent methods (possibly because of high C-section use in Turkey1) to avoid future 
pregnancies; but when controlled for number of children religious women were actually 
less likely to use permanent contraceptive methods.  
On the other hand, women with higher levels of education had fewer children than 
their counterparts and less likely to use permanent contraceptive methods to limit their 
pregnancies. When I controlled for number of children, however, I found that women 
with higher education were actaully more likely to use permanent contraceptive methods 
than their counterparts.   
5.2.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 5.5 presents the results of Multinomial Logistic regressions (I assigned 
“using no contraceptive method” as the baseline category in the analyses) in Relative 
Risk Ratio (RRR, exponentiated coefficients [exp(b)]) for all analyses. Since the model 
that I used was Multinomial Logistic regression, the analyses have a series of 
comparisons and they are defined as: Panel A: Traditional methods vs No methods; Panel 
B: Modern Reversible vs No methods; and Panel C: Permanent methods vs No methods.  
From Model 1, across panels, we see that religiosity was not significant association with 
traditional contraceptive methods, but had statistically significant and negative 
associations with modern and permanent contraceptive methods. For example, in Panel B 
                                                 
1 This positive association may be related to the high rates of Caesarean sections (C-section) in 
Turkey (Koc 2003). After the third C-section doctors discuss complications for both women and 
the child in case of a fourth pregnancy, and recommend women avoid becoming pregnant again 
or ask them to consider sterilization. In most cases, women choose sterilization because of these 
complications after C-section operations. Even while they are still in the C-section surgery, they 
may undergo sterilization. 
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(Table 5.5), for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the relative risk of using modern 
reversible methods vs. no methods was multiplied by 0.888, holding all other variables in 
the model constant. In other words, the expected risk of using modern contraceptive 
methods vs. no methods decreased with each unit increase in religiosity of married 
women. This finding suggests that some religious people are reluctant to use modern 
reversible contraceptive methods, though many popular Islamic teachings, based on 
hadiths, allow these contraceptive methods (Al-Ghazali 1939; al-Bukhari 
1999:v7:b62:h9, h11, h12, h135).  
Similarly, in Panel C (Table 5.5), for a one-unit increase in married women’s 
religiosity, the relative risk of using permanent contraceptive methods rather than using 
no methods was multiplied by 0.821, after controlling for all other variables in the model. 
In supplementary analyses, to test the other contraceptive methods as a baseline category, 
I used traditional contraceptive use and modern reversible contraceptive use as baseline 
categories. These analyses provided statistically significant and negative associations.  
More specifically, the supplementary analyses with traditional contraceptive use 
as the baseline category showed that, for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the relative 
risks of using modern reversible and permanent contraceptive methods––rather than the 
traditional method–– were multiplied by 0.893 (p < 0.001) and 0.817 ( p < 0.001), 
respectively, net of all other factors. Moreover, the supplementary analysis with modern 
reversible contraceptive methods as the baseline category showed that, for a one-unit 
increase in religiosity, the relative risk of using permanent contraceptive methods (rather 
than modern reversible methods) was multiplied by 0.914 (p < 0.050), all else being 
equal. Again, these findings suggest that married women who are religious are reluctant 
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to use modern contraceptive methods, including both reversible and permanent ones, than 
using traditional methods. Further analyses also showed that married women are more 
likely to use permanent methods than modern reversible contraceptive methods.  
I ran all analyses with a series of control variables for all three categories. In 
Panel A of Model 1 (Table 5.5), the number of children born was the only PDF indicator 
that was associated (positively) with using traditional contraceptive rather than no 
method, all else being equal. From variables measuring women’s and household 
characteristics, women’s employment, wealth, and Turkish ethnicity were statistically 
significant and positively associated with using traditional method vs. no method, holding 
all other factors constant. Women’s age was statistically significant and negatively 
associated with traditional methods of contraception. The south, central, and east regions 
were statistically significant and negatively associated with using a traditional 
contraceptive method rather than no method (relative to the west), all else being equal.  
In Panel B of Model 1 (Table 5.5), in addition to the variables discussed in the 
previous paragraph, among the variables measuring women’s individual and household 
characteristics, only husband’s education was statistically significant and positively 
associated with using modern reversible contraceptive methods vs. no method, after 
holding all other factors in the analysis constant. Among the variables measuring region, 
south and central were not statistically significant, but north was statistically significant 
and negative association with using modern reversible contraceptive methods vs. no 
methods, all else being equal.  
In Panel C of Model 1 (Table 5.5), among the variables measuring women’s 
individual and household characteristics, women’s employment, age, and husband’s 
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education were not statically significant. Among variables measuring region, north was 
significantly and positively associated with using permanent contraceptive methods 
rather than no method, all else being equal. Finally, survey year was statistically 
significant and positively associated with using permanent contraceptive methods vs. 
using no method, net of all other factors.  
Across panels, Model 2 (Table 5.5) shows the results of main independent 
variables including religiosity, women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban on the 
currently used contraceptive method. The analysis (in Panel A) for traditional vs. no 
methods showed only egalitarian gender ideology had a statistically significant and 
positive association with the use of traditional methods. This finding indicated that for a 
one-unit increase in egalitarian gender ideology, the relative risk of using the traditional 
method vs. using no methods was multiplied by 1.153, holding all other factors in the 
model constant.  
Moreover, the analysis (in Panel B in Model 2 [Table 5.5]) for modern reversible 
vs. no methods showed religiosity had a statistically significant association. More 
specifically, this result indicated that for a one-unit increase in religiosity of married 
women, the relative risk of using the modern contraceptive methods vs. no methods was 
multiplied by 0.914, holding all other variables in the model constant. 
As expected, all modernization factors had positive associations with modern 
reversible contraceptive methods vs. no methods. For example, for a one-unit increase in 
women’s education, the relative risk of using modern contraceptive methods vs. no 
methods was multiplied by 1.187, net of other factors. Similarly, for a one-unit increase 
in egalitarian ideology, the relative risk of using modern contraceptive methods vs. no 
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methods was multiplied by 1.208, holding other factors constant. Finally, for married 
women living in urban areas, the relative risk of using modern contraceptive methods 
rather than using no method was 16.0% larger than for their counterparts living in rural 
areas, controlling for all other variables in the model.  
In Panel C of Model 2 (Table 5.5), the analysis for permanent contraceptive 
methods vs. no methods showed religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and urban residence 
were statistically significant (respectively, p < 0.001, p < 0.010, and p < 0.050). More 
specifically, for a one-unit increase in religiosity, the relative risk of using permanent 
contraceptive methods rather than no methods was multiplied by 0.819, holding all other 
factors constant. Egalitarian ideology, however, showed a positive association with a one-
unit increase in the egalitarian ideology multiplying the relative risk of using permanent 
contraceptive methods rather than no methods by 1.184, net of other factors. Similarly, 
urban residence also showed a positive association with women who live in urban areas, 
having a relative risk of using permanent contraceptive methods rather than no methods 
that was 23.6% larger than their rural counterparts, all else being equal. 
5.2.3 Interaction Results  
Table 5.6 presents the results of multinomial logistic regression for interaction 
terms between religiosity and modernization factors, including women’s education, 
egalitarian ideology and urban on currently used contraceptive methods (the baseline 
category was no methods) in RRR. I used no method as the baseline category; thus, to 
better investigate the effect of religiosity on different contraceptive methods. In Model 1 
(Table 5.6), the interaction term between religiosity and women’s education was 
statistically significant associations in all comparisons (traditional vs. no methods, 
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modern reversible vs. no methods, and permanent vs. no methods). For example, in Panel 
A, a one-unit increase in religiosity, multiplied the negative effect of women’s education 
on the relative risk of using traditional method rather than using no method by 1.096, 
holding all other factors constant.  
The interaction plot in Figure 5.4 shows the interaction term between religiosity 
and woman’s education on using traditional contraceptive method. This show that women 
with higher education were less likely to use traditional contraceptive methods than 
women with other education categories. At the high level of religiosity, for women with 
secondary school education, the odds of using traditional method was as likely as women 
with no education. Except for women with no education, the relative risk of using 
traditional contraceptive method increased for women with highest, secondary, and 
primary education for each unit increased in religiosity.  These results indicated that 
women’s education decreased the relative risk of using traditional contraceptive method, 
but also that the negative effect of women’s education on the relative risk of using 
traditional contraceptive method reduced with each unit increase in religiosity for women 
with primary, secondary, and highest education. Overall, these results showed that the 
effect of women’s education on using traditional contraceptive method depends on 
religiosity.  
In Panel B (modern reversible vs. no method) of Model 1 (Table 5.6), the 
interaction term between religiosity and women’s education was statistically significant 
and positive. Specifically, for each unit increase in women’s education, the negative 
effect of religiosity on the relative risk of using modern reversible contraceptive methods, 
rather than no methods, was multiplied by 1.072, all else being equal. Figure 5.5 presents 
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the interaction between religiosity and woman’s education on using modern reversible 
contraceptive methods. The lines for primary, secondary, and higher education show that 
highly religious women are less likely to use modern contraceptive methods than women 
in other religious categories. The relative risk of using modern reversible methods for 
women with no education increased with religiosity, but also decreased slightly at the 
high level of religiosity. Nonetheless, the relative risk of using modern reversible 
contraceptive methods rose with each unit increase in women’s education. This 
interaction effect indicated that the effect of women’s education on using modern 
reversible contraceptive methods, rather than no methods, depends on religiosity. Thus, 
with each unit increase in a woman’s education the effect of women’s education on using 
modern reversible contraceptive methods decreases.   
 In supplementary analyses, I tested the traditional contraceptive use (instead of no 
methods) as the baseline category. Supplementary results showed that the interaction 
term lost was not statistically significant with traditional contraceptive use as the baseline 
category. This finding showed that the effect of religiosity on using modern reversible 
methods rather than traditional method did not depend on women’s education. This 
finding may also indicate that married women using modern reversible methods are also 
using traditional methods.  
In Panel C (permanent methods vs. no method) of Model 1 (Table 5.6), the 
examination of the interaction between religiosity and women’s education on permanent 
contraceptive method, interestingly, provided a statistically significant and positive 
association. More specifically, for each unit increase in religiosity, the negative effect of 
women’s education on the relative risk of using permanent contraceptive methods, rather 
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than using no method, was multiplied by 1.254, all else being equal. Figure 5.6 shows the 
interaction between religiosity and woman’s education on using permanent contraceptive 
methods. For women with higher education the relative risk of using permanent methods 
increased as religiosity increases. However, for women with no education, the relative 
risk of using permanent methods declines more steeply compared to women with a 
primary education as religiosity increased. Women with a secondary education showed a 
smaller decline than those with a primary education as religiosity increased. More 
specifically, at a high level of religiosity, the relative risk of using permanent 
contraceptive methods was highest for women with primary education. Overall, this 
interaction effect indicated that the effect of religiosity on using permanent contraceptive 
methods decreased depending on level of women’s education.   
In supplementary analyses, I tested all other categories: traditional and modern 
reversible contraceptive methods (one by one), as the baseline category. The results 
showed the interaction term between religiosity and women’s education as statistically 
significant and positively associated with using permanent contraceptive methods rather 
than traditional or modern reversible methods. These results indicated that the risk of 
using permanent contraceptive methods for married women who are religious and highly 
educated was higher than for married women who are less religious and less educated. 
The interaction term between religiosity and egalitarian ideology in Models 2 was 
only statistically significant in (Panel C) the comparison between using permanent 
methods vs no method. Specifically, for each one-unit increase in religiosity, the positive 
effect of egalitarian ideology on the relative risks of using permanent contraceptive 
methods rather than no methods multiplied the relative risks by 1.140, net of other factors 
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in the model. Figure 5.7 presents the interaction between religiosity and egalitarian 
ideology on using permanent contraceptive methods; the lines are not parallel. This 
indicates that the effect of religiosity on permanent contraceptive use depends on 
egalitarian ideology. The egalitarian ideology lines showed that the effect of egalitarian 
ideology on permanent contraceptive use decreases as one-unit increase in religiosity. 
However, at high level of religiosity the effect size of egalitarian ideology on the relative 
risk of permanent contraceptive use increased for each increase in egalitarian ideology. 
Interestingly, the risk of using permanent methods for women with traditional ideology 
and with high religiosity is quite similar with the risk for women with egalitarian 
ideology and with high religiosity.   
In supplementary analyses, I also tested all other contraceptive methods as a 
baseline category for permanent contraceptive methods and found that the interaction 
term between religiosity and egalitarian ideology is statistically significant in analyses 
using no methods and traditional methods as baseline categories (but not statistically 
significant for modern reversible methods). 
In Model 3 the interaction between religiosity and urban was not statistically 
significant in all three comparisons. Thus, the effect of religiosity on using traditional, 
modern reversible, and permanent methods, compared to no methods did not depend on 
residential area (urban vs. rural). Overall the results in Models 1, 2 and 3 provided 
evidence that partially support my second hypothesis (H2), where I claimed that the 
interaction terms between religiosity and modernization factors would not provide 
statistically significant associations with contraceptive use. The results of Model 1 (Table 
5.6) did not support my hypothesis (H2), because of the strong effect of women’s 
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education on their contraceptive use, regardless of methods; thus, the effect of religion on 
using any methods, including permanent methods not allowed in Islam, depended on 
women’s education.   
The interaction term between women’s education and urban in Model 4 (Table 
5.5) showed a statistically significant and negative association with using traditional, 
modern reversible, and permanent methods, rather than no methods. In Panel A 
(traditional method vs. no method), for women living in urban areas, the positive effect of 
women’s education on the relative risks of using traditional method rather than no 
methods, multiplied the relative risks by 0.758, all else being equal.  
The interaction plot in Figure 5.8 shows the interaction between woman’s 
education and urban residence on using traditional contraceptive method; the lines are not 
parallel. Specifically, the effect of woman’s education on the probability of using 
traditional contraceptive method was higher for rural women with primary education than 
for their urban counterparts, and the effect of woman’s education decreased faster for 
rural women. This interaction effect indicated that the association between women’s 
education and traditional contraceptive method use was lower for women living in urban 
areas than for their rural counterparts.  
Panel B (modern reversible vs. no methods) of Model 4 (Table 5.5) shows that for 
women living in urban areas, the positive effect of women’s education on the relative risk 
of using modern reversible contraceptive method, rather than no methods, multiplied the 
relative risks by 0.706, all else being equal. Figure 5.9 presents the interaction between 
woman’s education and urban residence on modern reversible contraceptive use; the lines 
are crossed after secondary education. Specifically, the figure shows that, at a high level 
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of education, the effect woman’s education on the relative risk of using modern reversible 
contraceptive methods, rather than no methods, was larger for women living in rural 
areas than their urban counterparts. However, the relative risk of using modern reversible 
methods was larger for urban women in all other education categories. This interaction 
effect shows that the association between women’s education and using modern 
reversible contraceptive methods depends on their residency area (urban vs. rural).  
Panel C (permanent methods vs. no method) of Model 4 (Table 5.5), 
unexpectedly shows that, for women living in urban areas, the positive effect of women’s 
education on the relative risks of using permanent method, rather than no methods, was 
42.8% smaller than their rural counterparts, all else being equal. Figure 5.10 presents the 
interaction between woman’s education and urban residence on using permanent 
contraceptive methods; the lines are crossed after primary education. The interaction 
effect indicated that the association between women’s education and using permanent 
contraceptive methods depends on women's residency (urban vs. rural). This difference 
might reflect government efforts to provide free and easier access to contraceptive 
methods in rural areas. In rural areas where no hospital or health clinics are available, a 
nurse, generally female, provides health care for people or guides them in obtaining 
necessary services, including all modern contraceptive methods (reversible and 
permanent). Female nurses commonly advise female patients on possible contraceptive 
methods.  
The interaction term between egalitarian ideology and urban in Model 5 (Table 
5.5) was not associated with traditional, modern reversible, or permanent contraceptive 
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methods vs. no method. This indicated that the effect of egalitarian ideology on 
contraceptive methods did not depend on residential areas (urban vs. rural). 
Model 6, however, shows the three-way interaction term between women’s 
education, religiosity, and urban residence in Panel A (traditional method vs. no method) 
as statistically significant and negatively associated with using traditional contraceptive 
methods, rather than using no methods. Figure 5.11 graphically displays the interaction 
between women’s education, religiosity, and urban residence on traditional contraceptive 
method. This three-way interaction effect indicates that the association between 
religiosity and using traditional contraceptive methods depends on women’s education 
and residential area (urban vs. rural). More specifically, the effect of religiosity on using 
traditional contraceptive methods was smaller for women with higher education who live 
in urban areas. The other categories of education also showed that the effect of religiosity 
on the probability of using traditional contraceptive methods had smaller effects in urban 
areas. Overall these findings indicated that the effect of religion on using traditional 
contraceptive methods varies by a woman’s education and residential area (urban vs. 
rural). In supplementary analyses, I tested whether these interactions were significant in 
stratified samples for urban and rural residence and found that the interaction term 
between women’s education and religiosity on traditional method use was statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) in only rural areas. 
The other three-way interaction term, between religiosity, egalitarian ideology 
and urban, in Model 7 (Table 5.5), however, showed no statistically significant 
association in all three comparisons. This indicates that the effect of religiosity on using 
traditional, modern reversible, and permanent did not depend on modernization factors, 
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egalitarian ideology, and residential area (urban vs. rural). This finding, a non-significant 
association of the three-way interaction term, supports my second hypothesis.  
5.2.4 Summary 
To summarize the findings, the main independent variables presented interesting 
results: In Model 1 (Table 5.2), religiosity was significantly and negatively associated 
with using modern contraceptive methods, including both reversible and permanent ones. 
In Model 2 (Table 5.2), among the modernization factors in Panel A, only egalitarian 
ideology was statistically significant with using traditional methods. In Panel 2, women’s 
education, egalitarian ideology, and urban, were statistically significant and positively 
associated with modern reversible contraceptive methods, but in Panel C, only egalitarian 
ideology and urban residence were significant and positively associated with using 
permanent methods. These results (from Model 1) do not support the first part—
religiosity would not be significantly associated with all contraceptive methods—of my 
second hypothesis (H2), but they (from Model 2) partially support the second part of 
H2—all modernization factors would be positively associated with all contraceptive 
methods. 
Furthermore, analyses including interaction terms in Table 5.6 provided quite 
unexpected findings. Women’s education had a strong positive effect on contraceptive 
use; therefore, in the interaction terms in Panels A, B, and C in Model 1 (Table 5.6), the 
effects of religiosity on contraceptive methods depended on women’s education. The 
findings in Panel C in Model 1, indicated that highly religious and educated women use 
permanent contraceptive methods without considering religious prohibitions for this type 
of contraceptive use. In addition, the finding in Panel C in Model 2 also shows an 
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interdependency between religiosity and egalitarian ideology on permanent contraceptive 
use. These findings do not support the last part of my second hypothesis (H2), where I 
expected to find no statistically significant association between contraceptive use and 
interaction terms between religiosity and modernization factors (women’s education, 
egalitarian ideology, and urban). Since the effect of religiosity on any contraceptive 
method use depended on women’s education and the effect of religiosity on permanent 
contraceptive method use depended on egalitarian ideology, findings of this section only 
partially supported the last part of H2.  
Finally, interaction terms between women’s education and urban residency in 
Panels A, B, and C in Model 4, provided unexpected findings, showing negative 
associations with all contraceptive methods. As I argued above, in the analyses of any 
contraceptive use (dichotomous variable), these negative associations were related to 
older age and might also relate with the free and easier access to contraceptive methods 
in rural areas. In addition, three-way interaction term, in Panel A in Model 6, between 
women’s education, religiosity and urban residency showed a statistically significant and 
negative association with traditional method use.
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSES OF ANY ABORTION USE AND FREQUENCY 
This chapter presents the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses of 
religiosity, women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban residency on abortion use 
and abortion frequency variables. I hypothesized (H3) that modernization positively 
associates with abortion, and that religious behaviors negatively associate with abortion, 
given Islamic regulations for the practice, but that the interaction terms between 
modernization (women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban) and religiosity 
would demonstrate no significant association with abortion use (see Table 2.1).  
For this chapter, I used Binary Logistic and Negative Binomial Regression 
Models (NBRM) to examine the effects of interaction terms between women’s education, 
egalitarian ideology, urban, and religiosity on abortion use (dichotomous variable) and 
frequency (count variable). I used NBRM because descriptive statistics for abortion 
frequency in chapter 3 show greater variance than the mean, and the dependent variable 
has excessive zeroes. In addition, in rare count events, researchers generally use the 
Poisson Regression Model (PRM) or NBRM. The “countfit” test (in Stata), which 
compares fit of alternative count models, also suggests that NBRM fit better than PRM 
for abortion frequency (Long and Freese 2014).  
6.1 Any Abortion Use  
6.1.1 Bivariate Results 
Table 6.1 shows the regression coefficients of bivariate analyses between the 
dependent variable, any abortion use, and all other variables in analyses, in Odds Ratios 
(OR). All categories in ordinal variables in the analyses were dummy-coded, so there is 
no omitted variable in the bivariate analyses on categorical measures (e.g., region). 
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Religiosity was, as expected, statistically significant (p < 0.001) and negatively 
associated (OR = 0.823) with abortion use. Specifically, for a one-unit increase in 
women’s education, the odds of using induced abortion decreased by 17.7 %. Even 
though overall abortion use in Islam is generally restricted, some Islamic scholars argue 
its permissibility depending on health conditions of the mother and the stage of 
pregnancy (Asman 2004; Hessini 2007). 
Even though I expected to find positive effects of modernization (including 
women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban) on abortion use, they were not 
consistently associated with any abortion use at the bivariate level. Only women’s 
education was statistically significant (p < 0.010) but this was negatively associated (OR 
= 0.889) with married women’s abortion use. This result indicated that for a one-unit 
increase in women’s education, the odds of ending a pregnancy with induced abortion 
decreased by 11.1%. In supplemental analyses, I checked primary statistics and found 
women’s parity as a distorter variable “reveals that the correct interpretation is precisely 
the reverse of that suggested by the original data” (Rosenberg 1968:94). Thus, when 
controlling parity—and no other variables, the direction of the association between 
woman’s education and any abortion use turned positive (p < 0.001). This indicates that 
women with high education are actually more likely to end their pregnancy with induced 
abortion, as expected.  
Variables used to control for the behavioral aspects of the Proximate 
Determinants of Fertility (PDF) had interesting associations with abortion use. Age at 
first marriage was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and negatively associated (OR = 
0.952) with abortion use. This indicated that for a year increase in age at first marriage, 
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the odds of using induced abortion reduced by 4.8%. Any contraceptive use had a 
statistically significant (p < 0.001) and positive association (OR = 4.488) with abortion 
use. Specifically, for women who ever used a contraceptive method, the odds of using 
induced abortion was 4.5 times higher than women who never used any contraceptive 
methods.  
Types of contraceptive methods showed using no method had a negative 
association and permanent contraceptive use had a positive association with any abortion 
use. More specifically, for women not using any method, the odds of using induced 
abortion was 24.0% lower than for women using any contraceptive methods (p < 0.001). 
Both traditional and modern reversible contraceptive methods were not association with 
abortion use. However, for women who use permanent contraceptive methods, the odds 
of having had an induced abortion was 42.0% higher than for women not using 
permanent contraceptive methods (p < 0.001). This is perhaps not surprising given that 
women who’ve undergone permanent contraceptive procedures have completed their 
family sizes and thus may have had an abortion prior to tubal ligation reflecting this 
completion. Lastly, the number of children born to married women was also statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated (OR = 1.239) with abortion use.  
The variables measuring women’s individual and household characteristics 
showed women’s employment was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and positively 
associated (OR = 1.332) with abortion use. Women’s age was statistically significant (p < 
0.001) and positively associated (OR = 1.098) with abortion use. This indicated that, for 
each year increase in a woman’s age, the odds of using induced abortion multiplied by an 
additional 1.098. Similar to women’s education, the husband’s education was statistically 
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significant (p < 0.050) and negatively associated (OR = 0.932) with abortion use. Again, 
when I controlled for parity, the direction of the association between husband’s education 
and abortion use reversed and became positive, because parity was a distorter variable for 
both women’s and husband’s education. Wealth and Turkish ethnicity had statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) and positive associations (1.140 and 1.521, respectively) with 
abortion use. 
 For these bivariate analyses each region (= 1) was compared to all other regions 
(= 0). West was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated (OR = 
1.416) with abortion use, possibly because the western parts of Turkey are the most 
developed and Europeanized. On the other hand, south and east were statistically 
significant (respectively at p < 0.010 and p < 0.001) and negatively associated 
(respectively, OR = 0.803 and OR = 0.611) with abortion use.  
Finally, the survey year unexpectedly showed as statistically significant, at p < 
0.001, and negatively associated (OR = 0.544) with abortion use. This result indicated 
that, for women interviewed in 2013, the odds of using induced abortion was 45.6% 
lower than women interviewed in 2008. The main reason for this enormous difference in 
abortion use from 2008 to 2013 may lie in the Turkish government’s agenda in 2012, set 
on changing abortion policy. The Ministry of Health discussed changing the abortion 
policy, which allows women to use state hospitals to end their pregnancies before 10 
weeks, because abortion rates were rising very fast after having declines since the1980s 
(Senlet et al. 2001) and because of complaints from doctors who found giving induced 
abortion as a contraceptive method unethical. Today the abortion policy has not changed, 
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but when a woman wants to use induced abortion, hospitals ask for her husband’s consent 
and if possible, immediately inform the husband about the situation.  
6.1.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 6.2 presents Binary Logistic regressions of the main independent variables: 
religiosity, women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban on abortion use. Odds 
Ratios (OR) are presented for all analyses in this table. Model 1 showed religiosity as 
statistically significant (p < 0.001) and negatively associated (OR = .709) with abortion 
use. More specifically, for a one-unit increase in religiosity, reduced the odds of ending a 
pregnancy with induced abortion for a married woman by 29.1%, net of all other factors 
in the analysis.  
 I computed all analyses with a series of control variables in Table 6.2. The results 
of all control variables were quite similar with the interpretations of the control variables 
in Table 6.1, but some variables lost their significance or became statistically significant 
in multivariate analyses. For example, permanent contraceptive use lost its significance, 
but modern reversible contraceptive method use in multivariate analysis was statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) and positively associated (OR = 1.321) with any abortion use. 
Women’s age was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and all other variables in women’s 
individual and household characteristics category lost their significance. Lastly, only 
south and east region variables remained statistically significant (p < 0.001, and p < 
0.010, respectively) and had negative associations (OR = 0.735 and OR = 0.766) with 
abortion use.  
Model 2 includes both religiosity and modernization factors (women’s education, 
egalitarian ideology, and urban), showing religiosity as still statistically significant (p < 
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0.001) and negatively associated (OR = 0.710) with abortion use. This highly significant 
and negative association remained almost the same—most likely because of the strong 
argument of Islam against abortion use—even after controlling for main independent 
variables, modernization factors. Among modernization factors, only egalitarian ideology 
showed a statistically significant (OR = 1.113) association with abortion use. This finding 
indicated that, for a one-unit increase in egalitarian ideology, the odds of any abortion use 
for a married woman multiplied by an additional 11.3%, holding all other factors in the 
analysis constant. The results of control variables (except wealth) in Model 1 were 
consistent across Models 1 and 2. 
6.1.3 Interaction Results 
Table 6.3 presents the results of interaction terms between religiosity and 
modernization factors, including women’s education, egalitarian ideology, urban, on 
abortion use in Odds Ratios (OR). Models 1, 2, and 3 show that two-way interaction 
terms between religiosity and modernization factors (women’s education, egalitarian 
ideology, and urban); none of these had statistically significant associations with abortion 
use. This indicates that the effect of religiosity on abortion did not vary by women’s 
education, egalitarian ideology, or residential area (urban vs. rural). These findings 
supported the argument in the latter part of my final hypothesis (H3), stating that 
interaction terms between modernization factors (women’s education, egalitarian 
ideology, and urban) and religiosity would demonstrate no significant association with 
abortion use.  
 In Model 4, the interaction term between women’s education and urban, however, 
was statistically significant (p < 0.001) and negatively associated (OR = 0.728) with 
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abortion use. This result indicated that the positive effect of women’s education on the 
odds of any abortion use decreased by 27.2% in urban areas, holding all other variables in 
the model constant. In other words, the positive effect of women’s education on abortion 
use in urban areas was weaker than the positive effect of women’s education in rural 
areas. This unexpected difference may relate to women’s contraceptive use prior to 
abortion use (Westoff et al. 1998). Since my data were cross-sectional, it was not possible 
to discover women’s contraceptive use prior to their abortion use. Figure 6.1 shows the 
interaction between women’s education and urban residence for any abortion use; the 
lines are not parallel. Specifically, the positive effect of women’s education on any 
abortion use for women living in rural areas increased directly after their primary 
education. Overall, this finding indicated that the effect of women’s education on any 
abortion use depended on residential areas (urban vs. rural). 
Model 5 shows the interaction term between egalitarian ideology and urban was 
not statistically significant. Furthermore, two three-way interaction terms (between 
religiosity, women’s education, and urban, and between religiosity, egalitarian ideology, 
and urban) in Models 6 and 7 also were not statistically significant. These results 
revealed that the effect of religiosity on abortion use did not depend on women’s 
education, egalitarian ideology, and residential area (urban vs. rural). 
6.1.4 Summary 
To summarize the findings, the main independent variables in Table 6.2 showed 
two main variables were statistically significant and associated with abortion use. First, 
religiosity, as expected, was statistically significant and negatively associated with 
abortion use. Second, only egalitarian ideology was statistically significant (p < 0.050) 
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and positively associated with abortion use. However, women’s education and urban 
variables were jointly associated with any abortion use. The results for religiosity support 
the first part of H3 (religiosity would be negatively associated with abortion, given 
Islamic regulations for the practice), but the results of modernization factors only partly 
support the second part of H3 (modernization would be positively associated with 
abortion use).   
Moreover, in Table 6.3, which shows the results of interaction variables, only one 
interaction term (between women’s education and urban) was statistically significant. 
The other two-way and three-way interaction terms were not statistically significant. 
These statistically non-significant associations indicated that, in all analyses for abortion 
use, the effect of religiosity did not depend on women’s education, egalitarian ideology, 
or residency (urban vs. rural) factors. Thus, modernization did not affect the association 
between religiosity and abortion use.  
Overall, findings supported my general argument stating that both modernization 
and religiosity have independent effects on determinants of fertility (in this case abortion 
use), and modernization and religiosity can coexist in a Muslim-majority nation such as 
Turkey.  
6.2 Abortion Frequency  
6.2.1 Bivariate Results 
I also estimated bivariate analyses between the abortion frequency (0, 1, and 2+) 
and each of the independent variables. Since the results of bivariate analyses between all 
variables and abortion frequency were consistent with the previous bivariate analyses 
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between all variables and any abortion use, I refrain here from discussing these findings 
but they are presented in Table 6.4.  
6.2.2 Multivariate Results 
Table 6.5 shows the results of Negative Binomial regressions for the main 
independent variables, religiosity, women’s education, egalitarian ideology, and urban. 
The results are presented in Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR, exponentiated coefficients 
[exp(b)]) in all analyses. Model 1 shows religiosity was statistically significant, at p < 
0.001, and negatively associated with abortion frequency. This result indicated that for a 
one-unit increase in religiosity, the incidence rate of abortion frequency was reduced by 
27.2%, after controlling for all other variables in the analysis.  
  Results including the control variables showed relatively consistent across the 
models. Variables used for the PDF showed age at first marriage as statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) and negatively associated (IRR = 0.937) with abortion frequency. 
Variables for contraceptive methods revealed only modern reversible contraceptive 
methods was statistically significant (p < 0.050) and positively associated (IRR = 1.180) 
with abortion frequency. Lastly, the number of children was also statistically significant 
(p < 0.001), but positively associated (IRR = 1.108) with abortion frequency. This 
indicated that, all else being equal, for each additional child a married woman had the 
incidence rate of using induced abortion was 1.109 times larger. Although the TDHS 
does not ask about the motivation for abortion received, this result suggests that women 
who believed they had completed their family size were more likely to use induced 
abortion.  
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Variables that measured women’s individual and household characteristics 
showed women’s age, wealth and Turkish ethnicity were statistically significant and 
positively associated with abortion frequency. For each a one-year increase in women’s 
age, the incidence rate of using induced abortion multiplied by an additional 9.2%, 
holding all other variables constant. For each one-unit increase in household wealth, the 
incidence rate of using induced abortion multiplied by an additional 5.9%, holding all 
other variables in the model constant. Lastly, women of Turkish ethnicity had an 
incidence rate of using induced abortion 21.0% higher than women from other ethnic 
groups, net of all other factors in the model.  
Among the region variables, only the south and east regions were statistically (p < 
0.050) significant and negatively associated with abortion frequency. These results 
indicate that for women living in the south or east areas of Turkey, the incidence rate of 
using induced abortion again was 19.1% and 18.2%, respectively, lower than for women 
living in the west region. Lastly, the survey year showed statistically significant (p < 
0.001) and negative association with abortion frequency.  
In Model 2, I included modernization factors (women’s education egalitarian 
ideology, and urban), none of these were statistically significant. Religiosity (IRR = 
0.726, p < 0.001) retained its statistically significant and negative association with 
abortion frequency. Thus, these findings show that modernization had no statistically 
significant effect on abortion frequency, whereas religiosity had a quite strong association 
with abortion use. Control variables in Model 2 were had similar effects as those 
discussed in Model 1, except for wealth, which was no longer statistically significant 
(Table 6.5). 
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6.2.3 Interaction Results 
Table 6.6 presents the results of interaction terms between religiosity and each of 
the modernization factors, including women’s education, egalitarian ideology, urban, on 
abortion frequency in IRR. Model 1 shows the interaction term between religiosity and 
women’s education was not statistically significant for abortion frequency. Model 2 
shows the interaction term between religiosity and egalitarian ideology was statistically 
significant (p < 0.050) and positively associated with abortion frequency. Specifically, for 
each one-unit increase in religiosity, the positive effect of egalitarian ideology on the 
incidence rate of using induced abortion was multiplied by an additional 1.075, all else 
being equal. This indicates that the effect of religiosity on induced abortion use depended 
on egalitarian ideology, contrary to my expectation. 
Figure 6.2 presents the interaction between religiosity and egalitarian ideology on 
the frequency of abortion use. The egalitarian ideology lines show that for both women 
supporting traditional ideology and egalitarian ideology (1), religiosity is associated with 
a steeper decline in induced abortion use, from practicing no religious behavior to only 
one religious behavior, compared to other categories of egalitarian ideology. The lines for 
women who supported two egalitarian ideology statements (2) and all egalitarian 
ideology statements (3) showed a weaker effect at low levels of religiosity; however, at 
high levels of religiosity, the predicted frequency of abortion use for women supporting 
one egalitarian ideology statement was quite similar to women supporting two egalitarian 
ideology statements. At high levels of religiosity, the findings also showed that women 
with egalitarian ideology had the highest predicted frequency of abortion use. Overall, 
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these results indicated the effect of religiosity on abortion use substantially varies by 
women’s egalitarian ideology. 
In Model 3 the interaction term between religiosity and urban was not statistically 
significant. The results of Models 1 and 3 indicated that the effect of religiosity on 
abortion frequency did not depend on women’s education and residential areas (urban vs. 
rural), but the result of the interaction term in Model 2, unexpectedly, showed that the 
effect of religiosity on induced abortion use depended on egalitarian ideology. Overall, 
these results partly support the last part of my third hypothesis (H3).  
The interaction term between women’s education and urban in Model 4 was 
statistically significant (p < 0.001) and negatively associated (IRR= 0.758) with abortion 
frequency. This result indicated that, for women living in urban areas, the incidence rate 
of using induced abortion was reduced by 24.2% compared to women living in rural 
areas, holding all other factors in the analysis constant. This indicates that the association 
between women’s education and abortion frequency varied by residential areas (urban vs. 
rural). As I argued after Table 6.3, this unexpected association may be related to 
women’s contraceptive use prior to abortion practice (Westoff et al. 1998). Figure 6.3 
presents the interaction between women’s education and urban residence on abortion 
frequency; the lines as not parallel. Specifically, the effect of women’s education on 
abortion frequency increased right after primary education in rural areas. This indicated 
that women’s education had a stronger positive effect on abortion use in rural areas. 
 Model 5 shows there was no statistically significant association between 
egalitarian ideology and urban residence an abortion frequency. Finally, the three-way 
interaction terms showed the interaction terms between religiosity women’s education 
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and urban, and between religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and urban, was not statistically 
significant. Overall, these findings reveal that the effects of religiosity on abortion 
frequency do not depended on modernization factors, women’s education, and urban but 
only depends on egalitarian ideology. These non-significant interaction terms supported 
the last part of my H3.  
6.2.4 Summary 
To summarize, religiosity had a strong negative association with abortion 
frequency. The magnitude and significance of religiosity remained the same across 
models after including the modernization factors (women’s education, egalitarian 
ideology, and urban). This indicated that the effect of religiosity on abortion frequency 
was not mediated by modernization measures.  
The non-significant interaction terms between religiosity and modernization 
factors (except egalitarian ideology) show that the association between religiosity and 
abortion frequency did not depend on modernization factors. However, religiosity and 
egalitarian ideology did statistically interact such that egalitarian ideology was associated 
with more frequent abortion use regardless of women’s religiosity. In addition, the 
statistically significant and negative association between women’s education and urban 
also indicate that the effect of women’s education on abortion frequency depends on 
urban residency. The findings of chapter 6 did not fully (but mostly) support my last 
hypothesis (H3), stating the interaction terms between modernization (women’s 
education, egalitarian ideology, and urban) and religiosity would demonstrate no 
significant association with abortion use.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
This study analyzed nationally representative data on married women from the 
2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey Turkey (TDHS) to assess whether 
modernization and secularization were separately or jointly associated with several 
indicators of fertility. The study addressed three focal aims. First, I tested the independent 
and joint effects of modernization factors (education, egalitarianism, and urban 
residency) and religiosity on the number of children ever born to married women (parity) 
in Chapter 4. Second, I tested the independent and joint effects of modernization factors 
(education, egalitarianism, and urban residency) and religiosity on contraception use in 
Chapter 5. Third, I tested both independent and joint effects of modernization factors 
(education, egalitarianism, and urban residency) and religiosity on abortion. The results 
of this dissertation make several contributions to the literature on the importance of 
examining modernization and secularization processes separately in a different social 
context than on which most studies of Second Demographic Transition theory have been 
tested—the Muslim-majority country Turkey. In the sections that follow I summarize the 
overall findings for each of my dependent variables—parity, contraception use, and 
abortion. The general direction and significance of the findings for each measure of 
religiosity, modernization, and their interactions are also presented in Table 7.1. 
7.1 The Effects of Modernization and Secularization on Married Women’s Parity 
The findings reveal that both modernization factors (except urban residency) and 
religiosity have independent effects on married women’s parity. Contrary to SDT theory 
arguments (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986) where modernization 
and secularization co-occur and have joint effects on fertility behaviors, my analyses 
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revealed that there is independence between the effect of modernization factors (woman’s 
education and egalitarianism) and religiosity on married women’s parity. This indicates 
that contrary to findings of prior studies largely of modern Christian nations, 
modernization and religiosity can coexist and have independent effects on married 
women’s parity in a Muslim majority nation, Turkey.  
However, I also found a statistically significant and positive interaction between 
urban residency (one of the modernization indicators) and religiosity on married 
women’s party. This is contrary to the expected negative association derived from SDT 
theory (see Table 2.1), whereby modernization should undermine the effect of religiosity. 
This finding also demonstrates that both modernization (at least, urban residency) and 
religiosity can also coexist because contrary to SDT theory, urbanization does not reduce 
the positive effect of religiosity on married women’s parity in Turkey. Overall, the 
findings of Chapter 4 suggest that the components of modernization factors have strong 
and negative associations with married women’s parity, though the positive effect of 
religiosity does not depend on components of modernization (except urban residence, 
which is in the opposite direction expected by SDT theory and thus suggests that 
modernization and religiosity are compatible in Turkey). 
7.2 The Effects of Modernization and Secularization on Contraception Use 
7.2.1 Any Contraception Use 
Overall, I find mixed evidence concerning the effects of modernization and 
religiosity on contraceptive use. Religiosity had a negative association with any 
contraceptive use, whereas modernization factors were positively associated with any 
contraceptive use. These effects are consistent with the prior literature are not consistent 
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with my expectations (of non-significant association) because the primary interpretation 
of Islamic teachings (Al-Ghazali 1939) generally allow reversible contraceptive use. This 
negative association might reflect women’s limited knowledge on the perspective of 
Islamic teachings about contraceptive use and their hesitancy to ask for information on 
these kinds of private topics from a male religious leader. 
In addition, I found that the interaction between religiosity and women’s 
education was positive. This indicates that effect of religiosity on contraceptive use vary 
by women’s education. Even though I did not expect this significant association, this 
association is consistent with the increased opportunity cost for women with higher 
education (Becker 1981), and the perspective of the primary teachings of Islam on 
contraceptive use (Al-Ghazali 1939). For women’s education and urban residency, I 
found a negative association indicating the effect of women’s education on any 
contraceptive use in rural areas was larger than its effect in urban areas. The reason for 
this difference is unclear. It may be that the weaker effect of education in urban areas 
may reflect the fact that contractive use is more prevalent and normative in urban areas. 
However, supplemental analyses by age showed that this negative interaction between 
education and urban residency was only significant for women over age 37. Thus, this 
unexpected finding might reflect urban women’s postponement of marriage and 
parenthood (Kulu 2013; White et al. 2008). Older urban women may be less likely to use 
any contraceptive method than their rural counterparts at older ages because they are not 
trying to avoided pregnancy, whereas rural women at the same age have already achieved 
their ideal number of children.  
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Finally, the statistically significant and negative association of the three-way 
interaction term (between religiosity, women’s education and urban residency) indicates 
that the effect of religiosity on contraceptive use depends on modernization factors 
(women’s education and urban residency). Both of these findings are not consistent with 
my expectation of separate and independent effects of modernization and religiosity on 
any contraceptive use. On the other hand, the only non-significant interaction between 
religiosity and egalitarianism shows the individual effects of modernization and 
religiosity partly supports my expectations. 
7.2.2 Types of Contraceptive Methods 
The interdependency between religiosity and women’s education on any 
contraception use is not consistent with my expectations. Findings examining types of 
contraceptive methods (traditional, modern reversible, and permanent) also showed a 
statistically significant and positive interaction between women’s education and 
religiosity. These findings—most surprisingly for permanent contraception use—indicate 
that educated married women are willing to use all types of contraception methods 
regardless of their religiosity. This unexpected finding demonstrates that the effect of 
religiosity on contraception use (specifically permanent method) depends on women’s 
education.  
Analyses examining types of contraceptive methods also show that there is a 
statistically significant and negatively associated interaction effect between women’s 
education and urban residency on all types of contraceptive methods. As I argued above 
in section 7.2.1 in any contraceptive use, this unexpected statistically significant and 
negative association may be explained by age groups, because of the urban women’s 
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postponement of marriage and parenthood (Kulu 2013; White et al. 2008). In addition, 
the three-way interaction term between women’s education, religiosity, and urban 
residency show that the effect of religiosity on using traditional contraceptive methods 
rather than using nothing also depends on the modernization factors (Lesthaeghe 2010; 
Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986). 
Overall, the results of the Chapter 5 suggest that there is a strong interdependency 
between women’s education and religiosity and both any contraceptive use and each 
types of contraceptive method. The strong positive effect of women’s education on 
contraceptive use regardless of religiosity is in line with the propositions of SDT theory 
(Lesthaeghe 2010). 
7.3 The Effects of Modernization and Secularization on Abortion Use 
The findings of Chapter 6 reveal that modernization factors and religiosity have 
independent effects on any abortion use and that they do not significantly interact as 
expected. The negative association between religiosity and any abortion use is consistent 
with prior literature (Erfani and McQuillan 2008). Contrary to expectation and prior 
literature, however, modernization factors (except egalitarian ideology) were non-
significantly associated with abortion use.  
The analyses of abortion frequency indicated interdependency between religiosity 
and egalitarian ideology, contrary to my expectation. This indicates that the effect of 
religiosity on the frequency of abortion use depends on women’s egalitarian ideology. 
Married women with more egalitarian ideologies appear more likely to have had an 
abortion regardless of their level of religiosity. Even though the other interaction terms 
are consistent with my argument of modernization and religiosity having independent 
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effects on abortion use, this significant and positive finding is consistent with the 
propositions of SDT theory (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986). 
7.4 Limitations    
The results presented in this dissertation should be considered with the study’s 
limitations. First, due to the fact that the TDHS are cross-sectional studies collected every 
five years, the data does not allow observation of individual change. Thus, it is not 
possible to determine whether married women’s religiosity and characteristics signifying 
modernization have effects on their subsequent fertility behavior. Cross-sectional studies 
provide no evidence that religiosity and modernization are in any way causally related to 
women’s behavior. 
Second, this study is also limited because the TDHS does not collect information 
on the motivation behind fertility behaviors. For example, it is not possible to know why 
women are using certain contraceptive methods (e.g., hormonal methods to regulate 
menstruation, or permanent methods due to having previously received too many C-
sections [see footnote 1 in Chapter 5]). Likewise, I am unable to ascertain why women 
use induced abortion to end their pregnancies (e.g., did not want any (more) children, or 
felt that having another child was not possible given income). Relatedly, the TDHS lacks 
detailed measures on fertility intentions.2 Information on women’s motivation for fertility 
                                                 
2 The TDHS contains a single item that asks women what their “ideal” number of children is. As (Philipov 
2009) argues, though, the ideal number of children is a problematic measure because—outside of the 
United States—it is often interpreted to mean the number of children desired under “ideal” conditions. This 
problematic nature may be even greater in a Muslim-majority country like Turkey given that Islam 
encourages adherents to marry and have children without worry because Allah (God) will always provide 
for children and their parents (Quran 6:151, 17:31). Nevertheless, future studies with the TDHS should 
explore the utility of this single measure.  
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behaviors and their intentions would help to understand how modernization and 
secularization might exert their effects through such individual level processes.  
Third, the TDHS collects data only on women. Yet, fertility decisions in married 
couples represent joint decision-making processes with a spouse. According to Thomson 
(1997) a man or woman’s intention to have a child highly depends on the desire of their 
spouses. Specifically, this study of U.S. couples showed that respondents’ odds of having 
a child were reduced by more than half the couple’s fertility intentions were incongruent 
(one wanted a(nother) child, one did not). In developing countries, men typically express 
a desire for more children than do their wives and across countries men’s preferences 
appear to hold slightly more sway in couple level fertility behavior (Bankole and Singh 
1998). Although I included indicators of husband’s education and the household 
socioeconomic status in my analyses, these do not capture the full extent of husbands’ 
influence on fertility. Additional information, ideally self-reported, on husbands’ fertility 
intentions and religiosity, for example, would be useful. 
7.5 Contributions 
Using nationally representative data from a sample of married women, I examined 
the separate and joint effects of modernization and secularization on indicators of fertility 
in Turkey. The findings of this study are important for two reasons. First, the study 
provides evidence that the secularization argument of the SDT theory is not necessarily 
directly applicable to Muslim-majority countries in general and to Turkey specifically. 
The results of interaction analyses generally emphasize that, contrary to the existing 
theory and literature (Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986), both 
modernization and secularization mostly have independent effects on indicators of 
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fertility behaviors—with some exceptions primarily surrounding married women’s 
contraceptive use and methods. Thus, these findings reveal that low fertility in Turkey is 
largely related to modernization and not to secularization. Indeed, the continued positive 
effects of religiosity indicates that religion somewhat balances out the negative effect of 
modernization factors in Turkey and if this were not the case Turkish fertility would be 
even lower.  
 Second, this dissertation provides empirical evidence that is important for 
government policies on fertility, contraception use, and abortion. There are several ways 
that these findings have policy relevance. First, the results suggest that policies should 
provide opportunities for women to balance family and career demands (Chesnais 1996). 
For example, since education has a very negative effect on women’s parity, the 
government could support couples who are planning to marry and have children during 
their college years by providing free family dorm rooms and childcare services at 
campuses. This kind of policy might be quite costly, but it might deter couples from 
postponing marriage and parenthood, and therefore would ease the higher cost of 
shrinking working age people in the country. Advanced countries that have policies that 
reduce the opportunity costs of childbearing for women are more likely to maintain a 
TFR closer to replacement-level than those countries that do not have such policies 
(Rindfuss, Choe, and Brauner-Otto 2016). 
Second, contraceptive use among married women in Turkey is quite high (above 
95%) and indicates that married women are trying to limit or space their births. This is 
generally socially acceptable (Koc 2000) and is associated with better maternal and child 
health outcomes (Ahmed et al. 2012). However, religiosity is, surprisingly, positively 
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associated with permanent contraception use. This unexpected association 
unquestionably requires further investigation because permanent contraceptive methods 
are the only contraceptive methods that are prohibited by the primary interpretation of 
Islamic teachings (Al-Bukhari 1999). As noted previously, permanent contraception 
might be related with the high C-section delivery rate because, after the third or fourth C-
section, obstetricians may suggest women undergo tubal ligation given the increased 
complication risk of future pregnancies.  
Therefore, the government may wish to develop policies that reduce the use of C-
sections. An ethnographic study of Iranian women, for example, suggests that some 
women may use C-section based on the belief that it reduces the pain associated with 
delivery (Zakerihamidi, Latifnejad Roudsari, and Merghati Khoei 2015). A government 
sponsored information campaign could be developed to inform women about the health 
consequences of elective C-section use, including the potential to limit future fertility. 
Policies aimed at physicians to discourage the routine use of C-section out of 
convenience may also be warranted.  
Third, my findings show that women with more egalitarian attitudes are more 
likely to have received abortion services regardless of their religiosity. This suggests that 
any policy response should look to those that have been implemented by other countries 
undergoing the SDT. In general, abortion use is rather high in Turkey with 16% of 
women in the pooled 2008-2013 TDHS indicating that they had received an abortion 
previously. This rate is lower than it was in the 1990s (Senlet et al. 2001). The 
government could simply outlaw abortion, although this would likely be politically 
unfeasible and would contradict the secular nature of the Republic of Turkey. Previous 
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studies (e.g., Senlet et al. 2001) suggested that abortion use was higher among Turkish 
women who used traditional contraceptive methods, owing to their high failure rate. My 
findings indicate that this unlikely to be the explanation for the higher abortion use 
among egalitarian women given that they are less likely to use traditional contraceptive 
methods. Although my data cannot speak to the motivation for abortion receipt as noted 
above, it may be that more egalitarian women are more concerned with their ability to 
provide adequate time and resources to children and thus to want to limit family size. If 
this were the case, government policies that provided more generous family allowances, 
longer maternity leave, and greater employment protections for women (Chesnais 1996) 
may be effective as modernized countries that have reduced opportunity costs for 
childbearing have fertility rates closer to replacement level (Rindfuss et al. 2016). 
7.6. Conclusion 
Overall, my findings add to the growing body of literature challenging the general 
proposition of SDT theory that very low fertility is the outcome of the co-occurring 
processes of modernization and secularization. My study is among the first to do this in a 
majority-Muslim country. I show that modernization and secularization do not co-occur 
in Turkey as these processes have separate effects on fertility behaviors, although the 
findings vary depending on the modernization factors and outcomes examined. It is 
possible for modernization to proceed without secularization in a Muslim-majority 
country, where there are high rates of religiosity, because of the dominant interpretation 
of Islam placing value in both secular and sacred knowledge. The co-occurrence of 
modernization and secularization—and their joint effects on family behaviors—appears 
to be a uniquely Northern, Western European and Christian one.
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Al-Bukhari. 1976. Ṣaḥīḥ Al-Bukhārī : The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-
Bukhari. Vol. 7, Bo. edited by M. ibn I. Bukhārī and M. M. Khan. Saudi Arabia: Al 
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Figure 2.1. The Stages of Demographic Transition 
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Source: http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/zieeuropa.php?year=2008 
 
Figure 2.2. Percentage of Europeans Expressing a Belief in God, by Country. Results 
from the 2008 European Value Survey 
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Figure 2.3. Percentage of Europeans Indicating that Relgion is Important in their Lives, 
by Country. Results from the 2008. European Value Survey  
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Source: http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/zieeuropa.php?year=2008 
 
Figure 2.4. Percentage of Europeans AttendinG Religious Services at Least Once per 
Week, by Country. Results from the 2008 European Value Survey 
 
 
 
  
149 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Modernization and Secularization as Joint Processes according to SDT theory 
(Panel A) and as Separate Processes as Hypothesized Here (Panel B)  
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Figure 2.6. Observed and Projected Total Fertility Rate for Turkey  
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Table 2.1. Hypotheses Table Comparing the Expected Association Derived from SDT 
Theory and those Hypothesized in this Study 
 
Hypotheses SDT Theory Expectation Hypothesized 
The interaction effects of 
modernization (education, 
egalitarianism, and urban 
residence) and religiosity 
variables would provide a 
non-significant association 
with the number of 
children. 
Negative and Significant 
Association 
Non-significant 
Association 
The interaction effects of 
modernization (education, 
egalitarianism, and urban 
residence) and religiosity 
would provide a non-
significant association with 
contraceptive use. 
Positive and Significant 
Association 
Non-significant 
Association 
The interaction effects of 
modernization (education, 
egalitarianism, and urban 
residence) and religiosity 
would provide a non-
significant association with 
abortion use. 
Positive and Significant 
Association 
Non-significant 
Association 
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Figure 3.1. Distribution of the Number of Children Ever Born  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Analytic Sample (N=13578) 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max 
Secularization     
Religiosity  2.154 0.964 0 3 
Modernization     
Woman Education 1.203 0.828 0 3 
No education 0.151 0.358   
Primary Education 0.604 0.488   
Secondary Education 0.134 0.341   
Higher Education 0.109 0.312   
Egalitarian Ideology 2.384 0.813 0 3 
Urban 0.731 0.443 0 1 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility     
Age at First Sex 20.087 4.221 10 48 
Contraception Use 0.903 0.297 0 1 
Contraception None 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Contraception Traditional 0.263 0.441 0 1 
Contraception Modern 0.361 0.480 0 1 
Contraception Irreversible 0.091 0.288 0 1 
Induced Abortion  0.160 0.366 0 1 
Abortion Frequency 0.227 0.588 0 3 
0 0.840 0.365   
1 0.108 0.310   
2 0.033 0.179   
3+ 0.017 0.033   
The Number of Children 2.513 1.694 0 7 
0 0.860 0.280   
1 0.184 0.388   
2 0.318 0.465   
3 0.193 0.395   
4 0.095 0.293   
5 0.048 0.215   
6 0.028 0.166   
7+ 0.044 0.207   
Women’s and Household Characteristics     
Woman Employment 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Woman Age 34.189 8.194 15 49 
Husband Education 1.747 0.860 0 3 
No education 0.033 0.180   
Primary Education 0.427 0.495   
Secondary Education 0.299 0.458   
Higher Education 0.239 0.426   
154 
 
Wealth  2.909 1.395 1 5 
Turkish 0.771 0.420 0 1 
Region     
West 0.252 0.434 0 1 
South 0.137 0.344 0 1 
Central 0.198 0.398 0 1 
North 0.132 0.338 0 1 
East 0.281 0.450 0 1 
Survey Year (2013) 0.488 0.500 0 1 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics and Mean Differences Between 2008 and 2013 
 Descriptive Statistics 
Significant 
Difference 
Variables 
2008 Mean  
(N=6888) 
2013 Mean 
(N=6687) 
Secularization    
Religiosity Scale 2.158 2.149 NS 
Modernization    
Woman Education 1.167 1.241 *** 
Egalitarian Ideology 2.318 2.453 *** 
Urban 0.734 0.728 NS 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility    
Age at First Sex 19.901 20.284 *** 
Contraception Use 0.898 0.908 NS 
Contraception None 0.286 0.282 NS 
Contraception Traditional 0.264 0.262 NS 
Contraception Modern 0.364 0.359 NS 
Contraception Irreversible 0.085 0.097 * 
Induced Abortion  0.190 0.128 *** 
Abortion Frequency 0.274 0.178 *** 
The Number of Children 2.577 2.447 *** 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
   
Woman Employment 0.292 0.574 *** 
Woman Age 33.830 34.566 *** 
Husband Education 1.791 1.700 *** 
Wealth Index 2.934 2.884 * 
Turkish 0.772 0.769 NS 
Region    
West 0.253 0.252 NS 
South 0.135 0.139 NS 
Central 0.199 0.197 NS 
North 0.118 0.146 *** 
East 0.296 0.267 *** 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
 
156 
 
Table 4.1. Bivariate Poisson Regression Analyses between Number of Children and All 
Other Variables, IRR1 (N = 13575) 
Variables Number of Children 
Secularization  
Religiosity 1.237*** 
Modernization  
Woman’s Education 0.658*** 
Egalitarian Ideology 0.840*** 
Urban 0.794*** 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility  
Age at First Marriage 0.933*** 
Any Contraception Use 1.712*** 
Contraception None 0.768*** 
Contraception Traditional 1.026 
Contraception Modern 0.976 
Contraception Irreversible 1.638*** 
Induced Abortion  1.261*** 
Abortion Frequency 1.153*** 
Women’s Individual and Household 
Characteristics 
 
Woman’s Employment 0.888*** 
Woman’s Age 1.039*** 
Husband Education 0.750*** 
Wealth  0.863*** 
Turkish 0.627*** 
Region  
West 0.793*** 
South 1.069*** 
Central 0.927*** 
North 0.976 
East 1.504*** 
Survey Year (2013) 0.944*** 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) = exp(b); b = Poisson coefficient 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Table 4.2. Poisson Regression Results for Effect of Secularization and Modernization on 
Number of Children, IRR1 (N = 13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization   
Religiosity 1.069*** 1.057*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Modernization   
Woman’s Education  0.921*** 
  (0.008) 
Egalitarian Ideology  0.971*** 
  (0.006) 
Urban  1.022* 
  (0.011) 
Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility 
  
Age at First Marriagea 0.954*** 0.957*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Contraception Traditionalb 1.310*** 1.310*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Contraception Modern 1.394*** 1.403*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Contraception Irreversible 1.596*** 1.591*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
Abortion Frequency 1.021** 1.021** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Women’s Individual and Household 
Characteristics 
Woman’s Employment 0.952*** 0.967*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Woman’s Agec 1.040*** 1.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Husband Education 0.929*** 0.949*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
Wealth  0.937*** 0.948*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Turkish 0.768*** 0.790*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Regiond   
South 1.091*** 1.099*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Central 1.047*** 1.054*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
North 1.062*** 1.066*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) 
East 1.240*** 1.240*** 
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 (0.019) (0.019) 
Survey Year (2013) 0.947*** 0.953*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) = exp(b); b = Poisson coefficient. Note: se = standard errors; se are exp(se) 
 aCentered at age 10, bUsing no method is the reference, cCentered at age 15, dWest is the reference 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Figure 4.1. The Effect of The Interaction Term between Religiosity and Urban on the 
Number of Children Born to A Married Woman. 
 
  
Exp(b) = 1.023 
p <0.050 
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Figure 4.2. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Respondent’s Education and 
Urban on the Number of Children Born to A Married Woman 
 
Exp(b) = 1.063 
p<0.001 
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Table 4.3. Poisson Regression Results for the Interactions between Secularization and Modernization on Number of Children, IRR (N 
= 13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization        
Religiosity 1.056*** 1.056*** 1.038*** 1.058*** 1.057*** 1.027* 1.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) 
Modernization        
Woman’s Education 0.922*** 0.921*** 0.921*** 0.875*** 0.920*** 0.867*** 0.921*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) 
Egalitarian Ideology 0.971*** 0.971*** 0.971*** 0.972*** 0.952*** 0.972*** 0.950*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) 
Urban 1.022* 1.022* 1.017 1.046*** 1.029* 1.044*** 1.024* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 1.006e     1.002  
 (0.006)     (0.015)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology  1.001f     1.002 
  (0.007)     (0.012) 
Religiosity * Urban   1.023*g   1.037** 1.027* 
   (0.011)   (0.013) (0.012) 
Woman’s Education * Urban    1.063***h  1.078***  
    (0.016)  (0.017)  
Egalitarian Ideology * Urban     1.031**i  1.035** 
     (0.011)  (0.013) 
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 
* Urban 
     
1.003j 
 
      (0.017)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology 
* Urban 
      
0.997k 
       (0.014) 
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Proximate Determinants of Fertility        
Age at First Marriagea 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Contraception Traditionalb 1.310*** 1.310*** 1.310*** 1.312*** 1.310*** 1.312*** 1.310*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Contraception Modern 1.403*** 1.403*** 1.403*** 1.404*** 1.403*** 1.405*** 1.403*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Contraception Irreversible 1.591*** 1.591*** 1.591*** 1.593*** 1.591*** 1.592*** 1.590*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Abortion Frequency 1.021** 1.021** 1.021** 1.022** 1.021** 1.022** 1.021** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Women’s Individual and Household 
Characteristics 
       
Woman’s Employment 0.967*** 0.967*** 0.968*** 0.965*** 0.966*** 0.967*** 0.967*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Woman’s Agec 1.039*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Husband Education 0.950*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 0.949*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Wealth  0.948*** 0.948*** 0.949*** 0.947*** 0.948*** 0.948*** 0.948*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Turkish 0.788*** 0.790*** 0.790*** 0.791*** 0.789*** 0.791*** 0.790*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Regiond        
South 1.099*** 1.099*** 1.099*** 1.099*** 1.099*** 1.099*** 1.098*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Central 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.053*** 1.053*** 1.053*** 1.053*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
North 1.066*** 1.066*** 1.067*** 1.065*** 1.064*** 1.067*** 1.065*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
East 1.241*** 1.240*** 1.242*** 1.232*** 1.238*** 1.233*** 1.239*** 
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 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
Survey Year (2013) 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.953*** 0.952*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
Note: b  =  Poisson coefficient; incidence rate ratio (IRR)  =  exp(b); se  =  standard error; 
aCentered at age 10, bUsing no method is the reference, cCentered at age 15, dWest is the reference 
eJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, and religiosity x women’s education are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3)  =  244.8, p  =  .0000). 
fJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and religiosity x egalitarian ideology are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3)  = 144.5, p  =  .0000). 
gJoint effects of religiosity, urban, and religiosity x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3)  =  114.5, p  =  .0000). 
hJoint effects of women’s education, urban, and women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3)  =  122.7, p  =  .0000). 
iJoint effects of egalitarian ideology, urban, and egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3)  =  38.4, p  =  .0000). 
jJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, urban, religiosity x women’s education, religiosity x urban, women’s education x urban, and religiosity x 
women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8)  =  332.5, p  =  .0000). 
kJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, urban, religiosity x egalitarian ideology, religiosity x urban, egalitarian ideology x urban, and religiosity x 
egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8)  =  317.2, p  =  .0000). 
*p <  0.05, **p <  0.01, ***p <  0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Figure 4.3. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Egalitarian Ideology and Urban 
on the Number of Children Born to A Married Woman. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exp(b) = 1.031 
p<0.010 
165 
 
 
 
Table 5.1. Bivariate Logistic Regression Analyses between Contraceptive Use and All 
Other Variables, OR1 (N=13575) 
Variables Any Contraception Use 
Secularization  
Religiosity 0.852*** 
Modernization  
Woman’s Education 1.506*** 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.479*** 
Urban 1.706*** 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility  
Age at First Marriage 0.952*** 
Induced Abortion  4.488*** 
Abortion Frequency 2.588*** 
The Number of Children 1.775*** 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
 
Woman’s Employment 1.433*** 
Woman’s Age 1.050*** 
Husband Education 1.375*** 
Wealth 1.423*** 
Turkish 2.772*** 
Region  
West 1.802*** 
South 0.757** 
Central 1.479*** 
North 1.236 
East 0.358*** 
Survey Year (2013) 1.056 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Odds Ratios = exp(b); b = Logistic coefficient 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.2. Logistic Regression Results for the Effect of Secularization and Modernization 
on the Contraceptive Use, OR1 (N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization   
Religiosity  0.880** 0.931 
 (0.039) (0.041) 
Modernization   
Woman’s Education  1.403*** 
  (0.107) 
Egalitarian Ideology  1.358*** 
  (0.062) 
Urban  1.148 
  (0.099) 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility   
Age at First Marriagea 0.995 0.988 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Abortion Frequency 1.836*** 1.844*** 
 (0.295) (0.298) 
The Number of Children 2.386*** 2.445*** 
 (0.141) (0.147) 
Women’s and Household Characteristics   
Woman’s Employment 1.260** 1.172 
 (0.107) (0.101) 
Woman’s Ageb 0.960*** 0.965*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Husband Education 1.401*** 1.253*** 
 (0.078) (0.071) 
Wealth  1.308*** 1.193*** 
 (0.051) (0.049) 
Turkish 2.216*** 1.990*** 
 (0.208) (0.191) 
Regionc   
South 0.637*** 0.596*** 
 (0.074) (0.069) 
Central 0.872 0.840 
 (0.109) (0.106) 
North 0.828 0.833 
 (0.110) (0.112) 
East 0.361*** 0.352*** 
 (0.040) (0.039) 
Survey Year (2013) 1.180* 1.127 
 (0.093) (0.090) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Odds Ratios = exp(b); b = Logistic coefficient, Note: se = standard error; exp(se) is exponentiated. 
aCentered at age 10, bCentered at age 15, cWest is the reference 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Figure 5.1. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Religiosity and Women’s 
Education on Contraceptive Use 
 
 
  
Exp(b) = 1.128 
p<0.050 
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Figure 5.2. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Women’s Education and Urban 
on Contraceptive Use 
 
 
 
  
Exp(b) = 0.606 
p<0.010 
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Figure 5.3. The Effect of the Three-Way Interaction Term between Religiosity, Women’s 
Education, and Urban on Contraceptive Use 
Exp(b) = 0.747 
p<0.050 
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Table 5.3. Logistic Regression Results for the Interactions between Secularization and Modernization on the Contraceptive Use, OR1 
(N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization        
Religiosity Scale 0.919 0.930 0.880 0.924 0.930 0.998 0.890 
 (0.042) (0.041) (0.065) (0.041) (0.041) (0.078) (0.067) 
Modernization        
Woman’s Education 1.454*** 1.407*** 1.405*** 2.102*** 1.405*** 2.203*** 1.409*** 
 (0.112) (0.106) (0.107) (0.309) (0.107) (0.298) (0.107) 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.357*** 1.353*** 1.357*** 1.352*** 1.398*** 1.352*** 1.377*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.095) (0.063) (0.096) 
Urban 1.145 1.147 1.140 1.001 1.136 0.942 1.127 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.105) (0.100) (0.096) (0.100) 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 1.128*d     1.417**  
 (0.062)     (0.164)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology  1.032e     1.060 
  (0.055)     (0.088) 
Religiosity * Urban   1.077f   0.912 1.062 
   (0.096)   (0.087) (0.096) 
Woman’s Education * Urban    0.606**g  0.588***  
    (0.096)  (0.087)  
Egalitarian Ideology * Urban     0.956h  0.971 
     (0.086)  (0.089) 
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 
* Urban 
     
0.747*i 
 
      (0.099)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology 
* Urban 
      
0.956j 
       (0.102) 
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The Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility 
       
Age at First Marriagea 0.989 0.988 0.988 0.989 0.988 0.990 0.988 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Abortion Frequency 1.838*** 1.843*** 1.847*** 1.836*** 1.843*** 1.833*** 1.845*** 
 (0.297) (0.298) (0.299) (0.297) (0.298) (0.298) (0.299) 
The Number of Children 2.462*** 2.448*** 2.447*** 2.468*** 2.447*** 2.493*** 2.451*** 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147) (0.147) (0.149) (0.147) 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
       
Woman’s Employment 1.188* 1.175 1.178 1.199* 1.175 1.204* 1.182 
 (0.104) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.102) (0.106) (0.102) 
Woman’s Ageb 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 0.965*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Husband Education 1.258*** 1.253*** 1.252*** 1.261*** 1.253*** 1.263*** 1.252*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) 
Wealth  1.201*** 1.195*** 1.195*** 1.207*** 1.194*** 1.217*** 1.197*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) 
Turkish 1.922*** 1.984*** 1.995*** 1.976*** 1.991*** 1.918*** 1.990*** 
 (0.186) (0.191) (0.192) (0.193) (0.192) (0.188) (0.192) 
Regionc        
South 0.593*** 0.595*** 0.596*** 0.594*** 0.596*** 0.590*** 0.596*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) 
Central 0.839 0.840 0.841 0.852 0.841 0.843 0.841 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
North 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.837 0.835 0.836 0.838 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) 
East 0.355*** 0.352*** 0.353*** 0.370*** 0.353*** 0.372*** 0.353*** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) 
Survey Year (2013) 1.121 1.126 1.126 1.126 1.128 1.123 1.126 
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 (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013, 1 Odds Ratio (OR) = exp(b); b = Logistic coefficient 
Note: se = standard errors; se are exp(se), aCentered at age 10, bCentered at age 15, cWest is the reference 
dJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, and religiosity x women’s education are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 33.5, p = .0000). 
eJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and religiosity x egalitarian ideology are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) =48.5, p = .0000). 
fJoint effects of religiosity, urban, and religiosity x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 7.9, p = .0478). 
gJoint effects of women’s education, urban, and women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 35.1, p = .0000). 
hJoint effects of egalitarian ideology, urban, and egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 38.4, p = .0000). 
iJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, urban, religiosity x women’s education, religiosity x urban, women’s education x urban, and religiosity x 
women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 53.9, p = .0000). 
jJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, urban, religiosity x egalitarian ideology, religiosity x urban, egalitarian ideology x urban, and religiosity x 
egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 58.1, p = .0000). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 5.4. Bivariate Logistic Regression Analyses between Contraceptive Method Type 
and All Other Variables, OR1 (N=13575) 
Variables 
No Method 
Traditional 
Method 
Modern 
Reversible 
Methods 
Permanent 
Methods  
Secularization     
Religiosity 1.066** 1.079** 0.860*** 1.121** 
Modernization     
Woman’s Education 0.864*** 0.871*** 1.447*** 0.620*** 
Egalitarian Ideology 0.830*** 0.987 1.274*** 0.844*** 
Urban 0.762*** 0.866** 1.487*** 0.915 
The Proximate Determinants 
of Fertility 
    
Age at First Marriage 1.034*** 0.988* 1.001 0.942*** 
Induced Abortion  0.760*** 0.991 1.096 1.420*** 
Abortion Frequency 0.921 0.989 0.999 1.213*** 
The Number of Children 0.770*** 1.024 0.977 1.583*** 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
    
Woman’s Employment 0.791*** 1.017 1.183*** 1.017 
Woman’s Age 0.988*** 1.001 0.983*** 1.087*** 
Husband Education 0.877*** 0.919** 1.329*** 0.725*** 
Wealth  0.853*** 0.955** 1.219*** 0.926** 
Turkish 0.500*** 1.022 1.934*** 0.963 
Region     
West 0.778*** 1.165** 1.100* 0.954 
South 1.156* 0.868* 0.908 1.265** 
Central 0.777*** 0.888* 1.464*** 0.752** 
North 0.864* 1.450*** 0.635*** 1.694*** 
East 1.916*** 0.810*** 0.665*** 0.927 
Survey Year (2013) 0.986 0.952 1.011 1.127 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Odds Ratios = exp(b); b = Logistic coefficient 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5.5. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for the Effect of Secularization and 
Modernization on Currently Used Contraceptive Method Types, RRR1 (N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Panel A: Traditional Method vs No Method  
Secularization   
Religiosity  0.995 0.995 
 (0.033) (0.034) 
Modernization   
Woman’s Education  0.942 
  (0.050) 
Egalitarian Ideology  1.153*** 
  (0.044) 
Urban  1.023 
  (0.071) 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility   
Age at First Marriagea 1.000 1.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Abortion Frequency 0.941 0.939 
 (0.053) (0.052) 
The Number of Children 1.580*** 1.585*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Women’s and Household Characteristics   
Woman’s Employment 1.220** 1.221** 
 (0.077) (0.079) 
Woman’s Ageb 0.964*** 0.963*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Husband Education 1.071 1.070 
 (0.045) (0.046) 
Wealth  1.099*** 1.087** 
 (0.029) (0.034) 
Turkish 1.745*** 1.757*** 
 (0.154) (0.157) 
Regionc   
South 0.694*** 0.689*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) 
Central 0.834* 0.840* 
 (0.071) (0.072) 
North 1.071 1.085 
 (0.097) (0.098) 
East 0.445*** 0.445*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Survey Year (2013) 1.012 0.995 
 (0.061) (0.061) 
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Panel B: Modern Reversible vs No Methods 
Secularization   
Religiosity  0.888*** 0.914** 
 (0.027) (0.029) 
Modernization   
Woman’s Education  1.187*** 
  (0.058) 
Egalitarian Ideology  1.208*** 
  (0.045) 
Urban  1.160* 
  (0.080) 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility   
Age at First Marriagea 1.008 1.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Abortion Frequency 0.967 0.966 
 (0.050) (0.050) 
The Number of Children 1.826*** 1.852*** 
 (0.056) (0.057) 
Women’s and Household Characteristics   
Woman’s Employment 1.206** 1.176** 
 (0.073) (0.073) 
Woman’s Age 0.940*** 0.943*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Husband Education 1.211*** 1.141** 
 (0.048) (0.047) 
Wealth  1.264*** 1.174*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) 
Turkish 2.732*** 2.613*** 
 (0.226) (0.220) 
Regionc   
South 0.856 0.830* 
 (0.071) (0.069) 
Central 1.105 1.097 
 (0.088) (0.087) 
North 0.702*** 0.719*** 
 (0.064) (0.065) 
East 0.549*** 0.546*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) 
Survey Year (2013) 1.119 1.078 
 (0.064) (0.062) 
Panel C: Permanent Methods vs No Methods 
Secularization   
Religiosity  0.821*** 0.819*** 
 (0.040) (0.041) 
Modernization   
Woman’s Education  0.913 
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  (0.069) 
Egalitarian Ideology  1.184** 
  (0.073) 
Urban  1.236* 
  (0.141) 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility   
Age at First Marriagea 1.011 1.013 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Abortion Frequency 0.868 0.865 
 (0.065) (0.065) 
The Number of Children 2.686*** 2.699*** 
 (0.117) (0.119) 
Women’s and Household Characteristics   
Woman’s Employment 0.986 1.012 
 (0.093) (0.098) 
Woman’s Ageb 0.999 0.999 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Husband Education 1.094 1.101 
 (0.071) (0.074) 
Wealth  1.215*** 1.165** 
 (0.051) (0.057) 
Turkish 3.601*** 3.687*** 
 (0.544) (0.563) 
Regionc   
South 0.870 0.864 
 (0.116) (0.115) 
Central 0.735* 0.753* 
 (0.096) (0.099) 
North 1.412** 1.484** 
 (0.187) (0.194) 
East 0.344*** 0.346*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Survey Year (2013) 1.396*** 1.355*** 
 (0.127) (0.124) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Relative Risk Ratios = exp(b); b = Multinomial Logistic coefficient, Note: se = standard error; exp(se) 
is exponentiated. aCentered at age 10 ,bCentered at age 15, cWest is the reference 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Figure 5.4. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Religiosity and Women’s 
Education on Traditional Contraceptive Methods  
 
 
 
  
Exp(b) = 1.096 
p<0.050 
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Figure 5.5. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Religiosity and Women’s 
Education on Modern Reversible Contraceptive Methods 
  
Exp(b) = 1.072 
p<0.050 
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Figure 5.6. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Religiosity and Women’s 
Education on Permanent Contraceptive Methods 
  
Exp(b) = 1.254 
p<0.001 
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Figure 5.7. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Religiosity and Egalitarian 
Ideology on Permanent Contraceptive Methods 
 
 
 
 
Exp(b) = 1.140 
p<0.001 
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Table 5.6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for the Interactions between Secularization and Modernization on Currently Used 
Contraceptive Method Types, RRR (N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Panel A: Traditional Method vs No Method     
Secularization        
Religiosity  0.975 1.000 0.983 0.992 0.995 1.060 0.984 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.060) (0.034) (0.034) (0.069) (0.060) 
Modernization        
Woman’s Education 0.975 0.940 0.942 1.191 0.942 1.251* 0.940 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) (0.113) (0.050) (0.126) (0.050) 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.151*** 1.160*** 1.153*** 1.149*** 1.152* 1.148*** 1.138* 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.064) (0.044) (0.067) 
Urban 1.020 1.023 1.023 0.968 1.022 0.930 1.011 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.072) 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman’s 
Education 1.096*d1 
    
1.314** 
 
 (0.043)     (0.114)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian 
Ideology 
 
0.982e1 
    
1.059 
  (0.042)     (0.075) 
Religiosity * Urban   1.015f1   0.910 1.027 
   (0.070)   (0.069) (0.073) 
Woman’s Education * Urban    0.758**g1  0.737**  
    (0.075)  (0.078)  
Egalitarian Ideology * Urban     1.002h1  1.022 
     (0.072)  (0.077) 
Religiosity * Woman’s 
Education * Urban 
     
0.808*i1 
 
      (0.078)  
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Religiosity * Egalitarian 
Ideology * Urban 
      
0.901j1 
       (0.079) 
The Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility 
       
Age at First Marriagea 1.003 1.002 1.002 1.003 1.002 1.004 1.002 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Abortion Frequency 0.936 0.939 0.939 0.936 0.939 0.932 0.940 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
The Number of Children 1.594*** 1.585*** 1.586*** 1.595*** 1.585*** 1.606*** 1.586*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
       
Woman’s Employment 1.233** 1.220** 1.222** 1.236** 1.221** 1.239*** 1.221** 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) 
Woman’s Ageb 0.964*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Husband Education 1.073 1.070 1.070 1.073 1.070 1.075 1.070 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) 
Wealth  1.091** 1.087** 1.087** 1.091** 1.087** 1.096** 1.087** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Turkish 1.706*** 1.761*** 1.757*** 1.747*** 1.756*** 1.700*** 1.763*** 
 (0.154) (0.158) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.154) (0.158) 
Regionc        
South 0.687*** 0.688*** 0.688*** 0.686*** 0.689*** 0.683*** 0.689*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) 
Central 0.841* 0.840* 0.840* 0.845* 0.840* 0.840* 0.840* 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
North 1.087 1.085 1.085 1.083 1.084 1.080 1.087 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) 
East 0.451*** 0.445*** 0.445*** 0.456*** 0.445*** 0.463*** 0.445*** 
183 
 
 
 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) 
Survey Year (2013) 0.989 0.996 0.995 0.994 0.995 0.990 0.996 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061) 
Panel B: Modern Reversible Methods vs No Method     
Secularization        
Religiosity  0.899** 0.903** 0.863* 0.910** 0.913** 0.930 0.864* 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.050) (0.029) (0.029) (0.057) (0.050) 
Modernization        
Woman’s Education 1.220*** 1.193*** 1.188*** 1.600*** 1.188*** 1.628*** 1.194*** 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.058) (0.152) (0.058) (0.163) (0.059) 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.206*** 1.202*** 1.207*** 1.202*** 1.246*** 1.202*** 1.212** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.072) (0.045) (0.072) 
Urban 1.157* 1.157* 1.158* 1.098 1.156* 1.093 1.145 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.084) (0.080) 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman’s 
Education 1.072*d2 
    
1.090 
 
 (0.037)     (0.085)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian 
Ideology 
 
1.059e2 
    
1.116 
  (0.042)     (0.076) 
Religiosity * Urban   1.071f2   0.959 1.060 
   (0.070)   (0.068) (0.070) 
Woman’s Education * Urban    0.706***g2  0.710***  
    (0.069)  (0.074)  
Egalitarian Ideology * Urban     0.957h2  0.985 
     (0.069)  (0.073) 
Religiosity * Woman’s 
Education * Urban 
     
0.973i2 
 
      (0.084)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian       0.927j2 
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Ideology * Urban 
       (0.076) 
The Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility 
       
Age at First Marriagea 1.002 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.001 1.003 1.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Abortion Frequency 0.963 0.964 0.967 0.962 0.966 0.959 0.965 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
The Number of Children 1.861*** 1.856*** 1.853*** 1.868*** 1.853*** 1.876*** 1.858*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
       
Woman’s Employment 1.185** 1.179** 1.181** 1.195** 1.177** 1.200** 1.183** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.073) 
Woman’s Ageb 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 0.943*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Husband Education 1.144** 1.141** 1.141** 1.145** 1.141** 1.147*** 1.140** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
Wealth  1.177*** 1.176*** 1.175*** 1.177*** 1.174*** 1.179*** 1.177*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Turkish 2.558*** 2.602*** 2.614*** 2.594*** 2.613*** 2.546*** 2.605*** 
 (0.218) (0.219) (0.220) (0.219) (0.220) (0.217) (0.219) 
Regionc        
South 0.828* 0.829* 0.829* 0.826* 0.830* 0.825* 0.830* 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) 
Central 1.098 1.097 1.098 1.105 1.098 1.106 1.098 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
North 0.721*** 0.720*** 0.721*** 0.718*** 0.720*** 0.719*** 0.723*** 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
East 0.550*** 0.546*** 0.548*** 0.560*** 0.546*** 0.564*** 0.548*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
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Survey Year (2013) 1.072 1.075 1.076 1.075 1.078 1.071 1.075 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Panel C: Permanent Methods vs No Method      
Secularization        
Religiosity  0.799*** 0.802*** 0.738*** 0.813*** 0.818*** 0.821* 0.748** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.066) (0.041) (0.041) (0.076) (0.068) 
Modernization        
Woman’s Education 0.985 0.929 0.916 1.469** 0.914 1.548** 0.928 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.070) (0.214) (0.070) (0.233) (0.071) 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.180** 1.158* 1.182** 1.176** 1.203* 1.174** 1.128 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.106) (0.072) (0.103) 
Urban 1.228 1.227 1.221 1.062 1.232 1.083 1.203 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.128) (0.142) (0.134) (0.139) 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman’s 
Education 1.254***d3 
    
1.173 
 
 (0.068)     (0.147)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian 
Ideology 
 
1.140*e3 
    
1.274* 
  (0.073)     (0.131) 
Religiosity * Urban   1.135f3   0.960 1.099 
   (0.114)   (0.102) (0.115) 
Woman’s Education * Urban    0.572***g3  0.587***  
    (0.083)  (0.089)  
Egalitarian Ideology * Urban     0.977h3  1.031 
     (0.110)  (0.120) 
Religiosity * Woman’s 
Education * Urban 
     
1.068i3 
 
      (0.148)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian 
Ideology * Urban 
      
0.858j3 
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       (0.111) 
The Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility 
       
Age at First Marriagea 1.017 1.013 1.013 1.015 1.013 1.018 1.013 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Abortion Frequency 0.858* 0.860* 0.866 0.859* 0.865 0.853* 0.863* 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
The Number of Children 2.734*** 2.708*** 2.699*** 2.729*** 2.700*** 2.764*** 2.708*** 
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.119) (0.121) (0.119) (0.124) (0.120) 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
       
Woman’s Employment 1.034 1.016 1.019 1.034 1.013 1.052 1.019 
 (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) (0.098) (0.102) (0.099) 
Woman’s Ageb 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Husband Education 1.110 1.100 1.101 1.109 1.101 1.117 1.099 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) 
Wealth 1.174*** 1.171** 1.166** 1.172** 1.165** 1.179*** 1.172** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Turkish 3.402*** 3.644*** 3.694*** 3.648*** 3.687*** 3.372*** 3.657*** 
 (0.515) (0.554) (0.563) (0.555) (0.563) (0.509) (0.557) 
Regionc        
South 0.864 0.864 0.863 0.859 0.864 0.860 0.865 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
Central 0.751* 0.750* 0.753* 0.761* 0.753* 0.760* 0.749* 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.100) (0.098) 
North 1.490** 1.487** 1.492** 1.483** 1.486** 1.486** 1.497** 
 (0.196) (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.194) (0.195) (0.195) 
East 0.358*** 0.348*** 0.350*** 0.364*** 0.347*** 0.372*** 0.350*** 
 (0.054) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052) 
Survey Year (2013) 1.340** 1.347** 1.351*** 1.351*** 1.355*** 1.337** 1.347** 
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 (0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.122) (0.123) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013, 1 Relative Risks Ratio (RRR) = exp(b); b = Multinomial Logistic coefficient  
Note: se = standard errors; se are exp(se), aCentered at age 10, bCentered at age 15, cWest is the reference 
d1Joint effects of religiosity, women’s education, and religiosity x women’s education are not statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 6.6, p = .0855). 
d2 Joint effects of religiosity, women’s education, and religiosity x women’s education are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 27.9, p = .0000). 
d3Joint effects of religiosity, women’s education, and religiosity x women’s education are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 35.5, p = .0000). 
e1 Joint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and religiosity x egalitarian ideology are not statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) =11.7, p = .0113). 
e2 Joint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and religiosity x egalitarian ideology are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) =18.4, p = .0004). 
e3 Joint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and religiosity x egalitarian ideology are not statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) =4.9, p = .1831). 
f1 Joint effects of religiosity, urban, and religiosity x urban are not statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 0.1, p = .9937). 
f2 Joint effects of religiosity, urban, and religiosity x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 16.7, p = .0008). 
f3 Joint effects of religiosity, urban, and religiosity x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 24.3, p = .0000). 
g1 Joint effects of women’s education, urban, and women’s education x urban are not statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 8.1, p = .0433). 
g2 Joint effects of women’s education, urban, and women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 34.2, p = .0000). 
g3 Joint effects of women’s education, urban, and women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 22.4, p = .0001). 
h1 Joint effects of egalitarian ideology, urban, and egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 15.7, p = .0013). 
h2 Joint effects of egalitarian ideology, urban, and egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 38.2, p = .0000). 
h3 Joint effects of egalitarian ideology, urban, and egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 13.2, p = .0043). 
i1 Joint effects of religiosity, women’s education, urban, religiosity x women’s education, religiosity x urban, women’s education x urban, and religiosity x 
women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 19.5, p = .0068). 
i2 Joint effects of religiosity, women’s education, urban, religiosity x women’s education, religiosity x urban, women’s education x urban, and religiosity x 
women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 47.3, p = .0000). 
i3 Joint effects of religiosity, women’s education, urban, religiosity x women’s education, religiosity x urban, women’s education x urban, and religiosity x 
women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 53.3, p = .0000). 
j1 Joint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, urban, religiosity x egalitarian ideology, religiosity x urban, egalitarian ideology x urban, and religiosity x 
egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 17.5, p = .0145). 
j2 Joint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, urban, religiosity x egalitarian ideology, religiosity x urban, egalitarian ideology x urban, and religiosity x 
egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 54.2, p = .0000). 
j3 Joint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, urban, religiosity x egalitarian ideology, religiosity x urban, egalitarian ideology x urban, and religiosity x 
egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 38.8, p = .0000). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Figure 5.8. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Women’s Education and Urban 
on Traditional Contraceptive Methods 
 
  
Exp(b) = 0.572 
p<0.001 
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Figure 5.9. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Women’s Education and Urban 
on Modern Reversible Contraceptive Methods 
 
 
 
  
Exp(b) = 0.706 
p<0.001 
190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Women’s Education and Urban 
on Permanent Contraceptive Methods 
 
 
 
 
  
Exp(b) = 0.572 
p<0.001 
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Figure 5.11. The Effect of the Three-Way Interaction Term between Religiosity, 
Women’s Education, and Urban on Traditional Contraceptive Methods 
 
 
 
Three-way Interaction  
Exp(b) = 0.808 
p<0.050 
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Figure 6.1.The Effect of the Interaction Term between Woman’s Education and Urban on 
Any Abortion Use  
  
Exp(b) = 0.728 
p<0.001 
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Figure 6.2. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Religiosity and Egalitarian 
Ideology on Abortion Frequency 
  
Exp(b) = 1.075 
p<0.001 
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Figure 6.3. The Effect of the Interaction Term between Woman’s Education and Urban 
on Abortion Frequency 
  
Exp(b) = 0.758 
p<0.001 
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Table 6.1. Bivariate Logistic Regression Analyses between Abortion Use and all Other 
Variables, OR1 (N=13575) 
Variables Induced Abortion 
Secularization  
Religiosity  0.823*** 
Modernization  
Woman’s Education 0.889** 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.065 
Urban 1.097 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility  
Age at First Marriage 0.952*** 
Contraception Use 4.488*** 
Contraception None 0.760*** 
Contraception Traditional 0.991 
Contraception Modern 1.096 
Contraception Irreversible 1.420*** 
The Number of Children 1.239*** 
Women’s Individual and Household  
Characteristics 
 
Woman’s Employment 1.332*** 
Woman’s Age 1.098*** 
Husband Education 0.932* 
Wealth  1.140*** 
Turkish 1.521*** 
Region  
West 1.416*** 
South 0.803** 
Central 0.982 
North 0.970 
East 0.611*** 
Survey Year (2013) 0.544*** 
  
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Odds Ratios = exp(b); b = Logistic coefficient 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 6.2. Logistic Regression Results for the Effect of Secularization and Modernization 
on Abortion Use, OR1 (N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization   
Religiosity  0.709*** 0.710*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Modernization   
Woman’s Education  0.960 
  (0.051) 
Egalitarian Ideology  1.113* 
  (0.047) 
Urban  1.102 
  (0.089) 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility   
Age at First Marriagea 0.926*** 0.928*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Contraception Traditional 1.156 1.147 
 (0.102) (0.101) 
Contraception Modern 1.331*** 1.321*** 
 (0.111) (0.111) 
Contraception Irreversible 1.070 1.058 
 (0.126) (0.125) 
The Number of Children 1.092*** 1.097*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Women’s and Household Characteristics   
Woman’s Employment 1.108 1.124 
 (0.074) (0.076) 
Woman’s Ageb 1.100*** 1.100*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Husband Education 0.970 0.972 
 (0.042) (0.044) 
Wealth  1.075* 1.052 
 (0.030) (0.034) 
Turkish 1.214 1.229 
 (0.127) (0.130) 
Regionc   
South 0.738** 0.735*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) 
Central 0.906 0.916 
 (0.077) (0.078) 
North 0.929 0.949 
 (0.087) (0.089) 
East 0.765** 0.766** 
 (0.076) (0.075) 
Survey Year (2013) 0.494*** 0.484*** 
197 
 
 
 
 (0.032) (0.031) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013,  
1 Odds Ratios = exp(b); b = Logistic coefficient, Note: se = standard error; exp(se) is exponentiated. 
aCentered at age 10,  bCentered at age 15, cWest is the reference 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 6.3. Logistic Regression Results for the Interactions between Secularization and Modernization on Abortion Use, OR1 
(N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization        
Religiosity 0.708*** 0.699*** 0.734*** 0.708*** 0.710*** 0.788*** 0.743*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.048) (0.024) (0.024) (0.052) (0.049) 
Modernization        
Woman’s Education 0.971 0.969 0.959 1.268* 0.962 1.345** 0.970 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.119) (0.052) (0.127) (0.052) 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.112* 1.108* 1.114* 1.109* 1.164* 1.110* 1.182* 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.076) (0.047) (0.081) 
Urban 1.101 1.097 1.102 1.032 1.096 1.018 1.111 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.084) (0.089) (0.086) (0.091) 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 1.020     1.015  
 (0.036)     (0.081)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology  1.079     0.959 
  (0.047)     (0.075) 
Religiosity * Urban   0.961   0.876 0.923 
   (0.070)   (0.066) (0.068) 
Woman’s Education * Urban    0.728***  0.686***  
    (0.069)  (0.067)  
Egalitarian Ideology * Urban     0.938  0.922 
     (0.075)  (0.077) 
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 
* Urban 
     
1.005 
 
      (0.089)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology 
* Urban 
      
1.164 
       (0.109) 
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The Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility 
       
Age at First Marriagea 0.928*** 0.927*** 0.927*** 0.929*** 0.928*** 0.929*** 0.928*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Contraception Traditionalb 1.145 1.148 1.147 1.141 1.147 1.138 1.150 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
Contraception Modernb 1.320*** 1.321*** 1.321*** 1.314** 1.321*** 1.310** 1.322*** 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) 
Contraception Irreversibleb 1.055 1.053 1.058 1.047 1.058 1.042 1.055 
 (0.125) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.125) 
The Number of Children 1.099*** 1.100*** 1.097*** 1.103*** 1.098*** 1.105*** 1.102*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
       
Woman’s Employment 1.126 1.127 1.120 1.139 1.126 1.133 1.127 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Woman’s Agec 1.100*** 1.100*** 1.100*** 1.101*** 1.100*** 1.100*** 1.100*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Husband Education 0.972 0.971 0.972 0.975 0.972 0.976 0.972 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Wealth  1.053 1.056 1.052 1.053 1.052 1.053 1.055 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
Turkish 1.220 1.223 1.228 1.219 1.231* 1.206 1.222 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.130) (0.128) (0.130) (0.128) (0.129) 
Regiond        
South 0.735*** 0.734*** 0.736*** 0.735*** 0.735*** 0.735*** 0.732*** 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) 
Central 0.916 0.915 0.915 0.924 0.918 0.923 0.917 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) 
North 0.949 0.950 0.946 0.954 0.951 0.948 0.946 
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 (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) 
East 0.769** 0.768** 0.764** 0.785* 0.768** 0.786* 0.768** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) 
Survey Year(2013) 0.484*** 0.482*** 0.485*** 0.483*** 0.485*** 0.484*** 0.482*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013, 1 Odds Ratio (OR) = exp(b); b = Logistic coefficient 
Note: se = standard errors; se are exp(se) 
aCentered at age 10, bUsing no method is the reference, cCentered at age 15, dWest is the reference 
eJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, and religiosity x women’s education are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 105.0, p = .0000). 
fJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and religiosity x egalitarian ideology are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) =115.1, p = .0000). 
gJoint effects of religiosity, urban, and religiosity x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 12.4, p = .0062). 
hJoint effects of women’s education, urban, and women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 12.4, p = .0062). 
iJoint effects of egalitarian ideology, urban, and egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 9.3, p = .0252). 
jJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, urban, religiosity x women’s education, religiosity x urban, women’s education x urban, and religiosity x 
women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 116.8, p = .0000). 
kJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, urban, religiosity x egalitarian ideology, religiosity x urban, egalitarian ideology x urban, and religiosity x 
egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 120.0, p = .0000). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 6.4. Negative Binominal Regression Results for the Effect of Secularization and 
Modernization on Abortion Frequency, IRR1 (N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization   
Religiosity  0.728*** 0.726*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
Modernization   
Woman’s Education  0.936 
  (0.042) 
Egalitarian Ideology  1.074 
  (0.039) 
Urban  1.112 
  (0.074) 
The Proximate Determinants of Fertility   
Age at First Marriagea 0.937*** 0.939*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Contraception Traditionalb 1.070 1.066 
 (0.079) (0.078) 
Contraception Modernb 1.180* 1.181* 
 (0.082) (0.083) 
Contraception Irreversibleb 1.005 0.998 
 (0.097) (0.096) 
The Number of Children 1.108*** 1.109*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
  
Woman’s Employment 1.077 1.102 
 (0.061) (0.063) 
Woman’s Agec 1.092*** 1.092*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Husband Education 0.968 0.979 
 (0.035) (0.037) 
Wealth  1.059* 1.044 
 (0.026) (0.029) 
Turkish 1.210* 1.229* 
 (0.111) (0.113) 
Regiond   
South 0.809* 0.810* 
 (0.067) (0.067) 
Central 0.989 1.007 
 (0.069) (0.070) 
North 1.004 1.028 
 (0.083) (0.084) 
East 0.816* 0.821* 
 (0.070) (0.070) 
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Survey Year (2013) 0.556*** 0.549*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) = exp(b); b = Negative binomial coefficient 
Note: se = standard error; exp(se) is exponentiated. 
aCentered at age 10, bUsing no method is the reference cCentered at age 15, dWest is the reference 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 6.5. Negative Binominal Regression Results for the Interactions between Secularization and Modernization on Abortion 
Frequency, IRR1 (N=13575) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Secularization        
Religiosity  0.723*** 0.716*** 0.767*** 0.724*** 0.725*** 0.816*** 0.775*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.043) (0.020) (0.020) (0.046) (0.043) 
Modernization        
Woman’s Education 0.955 0.946 0.935 1.192* 0.938 1.282** 0.947 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.091) (0.042) (0.105) (0.043) 
Egalitarian Ideology 1.073 1.072 1.075* 1.071 1.126* 1.072 1.140* 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.063) (0.039) (0.066) 
Urban 1.110 1.106 1.112 1.046 1.105 1.026 1.111 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 1.032     1.038  
 (0.031)     (0.066)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology  1.075*     0.996 
  (0.038)     (0.064) 
Religiosity * Urban   0.936   0.863* 0.906 
   (0.057)   (0.055) (0.056) 
Woman’s Education * Urban    0.758***  0.711***  
    (0.058)  (0.060)  
Egalitarian Ideology * Urban     0.935  0.926 
     (0.064)  (0.065) 
Religiosity * Woman’s Education 
* Urban 
     
0.993 
 
      (0.070)  
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology 
* Urban 
      
1.100 
       (0.083) 
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The Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility 
       
Age at First Marriagea 0.939*** 0.939*** 0.938*** 0.939*** 0.939*** 0.940*** 0.939*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Contraception Traditionalb 1.062 1.065 1.065 1.062 1.066 1.056 1.067 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Contraception Modernb 1.180* 1.180* 1.181* 1.176* 1.181* 1.173* 1.180* 
 (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Contraception Irreversibleb 0.994 0.994 0.997 0.992 0.998 0.985 0.997 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.097) 
The Number of Children 1.111*** 1.112*** 1.109*** 1.113*** 1.110*** 1.116*** 1.113*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Women’s and Household 
Characteristics 
       
Woman’s Employment 1.106 1.104 1.098 1.113 1.104 1.108 1.101 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) 
Woman’s Agec 1.093*** 1.092*** 1.092*** 1.093*** 1.092*** 1.093*** 1.092*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Husband Education 0.980 0.979 0.979 0.983 0.980 0.985 0.980 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) 
Wealth  1.045 1.046 1.044 1.044 1.044 1.045 1.046 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
Turkish 1.216* 1.225* 1.228* 1.221* 1.230* 1.203* 1.224* 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.111) (0.113) 
Regiond        
South 0.811* 0.808** 0.811* 0.808** 0.811* 0.810* 0.809* 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Central 1.007 1.005 1.005 1.014 1.010 1.011 1.007 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) 
North 1.030 1.028 1.024 1.034 1.031 1.027 1.025 
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 (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) 
East 0.827* 0.823* 0.819* 0.840* 0.824* 0.845* 0.823* 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) 
Survey Year (2013) 0.547*** 0.546*** 0.550*** 0.547*** 0.549*** 0.548*** 0.547*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013, 1 Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) = exp(b); b = Negative Binomial coefficient, Note: se = 
standard errors; se are exp(se) 
aCentered at age 10, bUsing no method is the reference, cCentered at age 15, dWest is the reference 
eJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, and religiosity x women’s education are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 144.4, p = .0000). 
fJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, and religiosity x egalitarian ideology are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) =151.5, p = .0000). 
gJoint effects of religiosity, urban, and religiosity x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 142.5, p = .0000). 
hJoint effects of women’s education, urban, and women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 15.8, p = .0012). 
iJoint effects of egalitarian ideology, urban, and egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (3) = 8.0, p = .0471). 
jJoint effects of religiosity, women’s education, urban, religiosity x women’s education, religiosity x urban, women’s education x urban, and religiosity x 
women’s education x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 158.4, p = .0000). 
kJoint effects of religiosity, egalitarian ideology, urban, religiosity x egalitarian ideology, religiosity x urban, egalitarian ideology x urban, and religiosity x 
egalitarian ideology x urban are statistically significant (Wald chi2 (8) = 157.7, p = .0000). 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 7.1. Summary of Findings (Direction of Statistically Significant Effects)a, b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Contraception Methodsc Induced Abortion 
Variables 
Number of 
Children 
Any 
Contraception 
Use 
Traditional 
Method 
Modern 
Reversible 
Methods 
Permanent 
Methods 
Any 
Abortion 
Use 
Abortion 
Frequency 
Secularization        
Religiosity + - n.s. - - - - 
Modernization        
Woman Education - + n.s. + n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Egalitarian Ideology - + + + + + n.s. 
Urban + n.s. n.s. + + n.s. n.s. 
Interactions        
Religiosity * Woman Education n.s. + + + + n.s. n.s. 
Religiosity * Egalitarian Ideology n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. + n.s. + 
Religiosity * Urban + n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
aResults from models where each term entered separately 
bn.s. = not statistically significant 
cCompared to no method 
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APPENDIX A: Supplemental Analyses Using the European Values Surveys 
 
Table A.1. Poisson Regression Analysis for Number of Children, IRR1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) Exp(b)/(se) 
Religiosity 1.085***  1.121*** 1.121*** 
 (0.009)  (0.027) (0.027) 
Woman's Education  0.823*** 0.856*** 0.856*** 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) 
Religiosity * Woman Education   0.977* 0.977* 
   (0.011) (0.011) 
Woman's Age 1.062*** 1.061*** 1.061*** 1.060*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income Level 1.013 1.046*** 1.044*** 1.044*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Woman's Employment 0.776*** 0.816*** 0.836*** 0.835*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Observations 15049 15049 15049 14972 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
1 Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR) = exp(b); b = Poisson coefficient 
Note: se = standard errors; se are exp(se) 
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Figure A.1. The Effect of The Interaction Term between woman’s education and 
Religiosity on the Number of Children Born to An Ever Married Woman. 
Exp(b) = 0.977 
p<0.050 
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APPENDIX B: Correlation Matrix for All Study Variables 
 
Table B.1. Correlation Matrix for All Study Variables 
  
Variables 
Religiosity 
Woman 
Education 
Egalitarian 
Ideology 
Urban 
Age at First 
Sex 
Abortion 
Frequency 
Any 
Contraceptive 
Use 
The 
Number of 
Children 
Woman 
Employment 
Religiosity 1.000         
Woman Education -0.356*** 1.000        
Egalitarian Ideology -0.167*** 0.307*** 1.000       
Urban -0.090*** 0.235*** 0.183*** 1.000      
Age at First Sex -0.205*** 0.344*** 0.135*** 0.116*** 1.000     
Abortion Frequency -0.055*** -0.044*** 0.010 0.024** -0.081*** 1.000    
Any Contraceptive Use -0.042*** 0.098*** 0.106*** 0.086*** -0.059*** 0.089*** 1.000   
The Number of Children 0.288*** -0.450*** -0.217*** -0.167*** -0.368*** 0.142*** 0.174*** 1.000  
Woman Employment -0.121*** 0.140*** 0.051*** -0.147*** 0.075*** 0.035*** 0.061*** -0.027** 1.000 
Woman Age 0.098*** -0.155*** -0.021* -0.003 0.115*** 0.262*** 0.121*** 0.458*** 0.134*** 
Husband Education -0.193*** 0.534*** 0.252*** 0.233*** 0.220*** -0.018* 0.094*** -0.348*** 0.035*** 
Wealth  -0.246*** 0.540*** 0.308*** 0.487*** 0.227*** 0.065*** 0.149*** -0.308*** 0.033*** 
Turkish -0.171*** 0.380*** 0.177*** 0.166*** 0.151*** 0.048*** 0.168*** -0.318*** 0.142*** 
West -0.206*** 0.143*** 0.108*** 0.133*** 0.099*** 0.044*** 0.073*** -0.178*** 0.067*** 
South -0.068*** -0.009 0.013 -0.038*** 0.020* -0.017* -0.011 0.002 -0.028*** 
Central 0.037*** 0.078*** -0.000 0.005 -0.052*** 0.013 0.051*** -0.054*** -0.035*** 
North 0.022* 0.092*** 0.043*** 0.006 0.086*** 0.005 0.044*** -0.068*** 0.174*** 
East 0.203*** -0.270*** -0.147*** -0.107*** -0.131*** -0.045*** -0.141*** 0.270*** -0.143*** 
Survey Year (2013) -0.002 0.044*** 0.082*** -0.005 0.046*** -0.081*** 0.017 -0.039*** 0.020* 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table B.1. Continued 
Variables 
Woman 
Age 
Husband 
Education 
Wealth Turkish West South Central North East 
Survey 
Year 
(2013) 
Religiosity           
Woman Education           
Egalitarian Ideology           
Urban           
Age at First Sex           
Abortion Frequency           
Any contraceptive use           
The Number of Children           
Woman Employment           
Woman Age 1.000          
Husband Education -0.129*** 1.000         
Wealth  0.107*** 0.512*** 1.000        
Turkish 0.095*** 0.280*** 0.385*** 1.000       
West 0.065*** 0.058*** 0.274*** 0.184*** 1.000      
South 0.026** -0.052*** -0.090*** 0.017 -0.231*** 1.000     
Central -0.010 0.070*** 0.075*** 0.213*** -0.288*** -0.198*** 1.000    
North 0.049*** 0.090*** 0.067*** 0.191*** -0.226*** -0.155*** -0.194*** 1.000   
East -0.110*** -0.146*** -0.313*** -0.522*** -0.363*** -0.249*** -0.311*** -0.244*** 1.000  
Survey Year (2013) 0.045*** -0.054*** -0.019* -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.004 0.042*** -0.032*** 1.000 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Turkey 2008 and 2013 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
